Q&A: Midrashic Interpretation of Verses in Halakhic Argumentation
Midrashic Interpretation of Verses in Halakhic Argumentation
Question
Rabbi, how do we know how to relate to a verse that is brought as part of a halakhic argument? Is it merely an asmachta, or a genuine derivation with a different kind of force? For example, the argument that women are disqualified from testimony is supported (as best as I remember, though it does not really matter whether this is correct; it is only for the sake of the example) by the exposition of the word “man” — and not woman. But today some argue that the basis for excluding women from the religious court was their lack of participation in public life in the outside world in the time of the Sages, and nowadays, since things have changed, the status of women in the religious court should also be changed. But what do we do with the verse exposition? Perhaps the Sages did think that women were sufficiently familiar with the world for the purpose of testimony in religious court, but their hands were tied because that is how they understood the verse? And while we are already on the subject of verses, could the Rabbi briefly explain (or refer me to an article): if we say that the essential basis is the reasoning of the Sages, what does the asmachta add? On the face of it, the verse looks like a mere decoration for their reasoning…
Thank you very much
Answer
I do not know who these people are who argue this (other than me, since I have brought this example in several places).
There is no general criterion for distinguishing between an asmachta and a full-fledged exposition. Each case has to be judged on its own. But it is clear that in every exposition, even if it is not an asmachta, there is also a component of the expositor’s reasoning. After all, when something is derived from the word “et,” it is still not clear what exactly is being included. That comes from reasoning. Therefore, when the reasoning changes, there is room to change the result of the exposition.
Discussion on Answer
The logic of the expositor enters in only partially. Once the interpretive rule tells us that we should make an exposition, reasoning comes in and says which exposition to make. For example, once we know that something is to be included from the word “et,” we still have to decide what exactly to include. That decision is made based on the reasoning of the expositor. But reasoning alone is usually not enough to create the law. Without the trigger of the interpretive rule, we would not create that halakha. For example, let us say there is no independent reasoning to establish a commandment to fear Torah scholars. But once the verse “You shall fear the Lord your God” tells us to include something, the reasoning says that if something is being included, the most plausible thing to include is Torah scholars.
The exposition of “man and not woman” is really not clear at all. Usually the word “man” is used in the sense of a person, male or female.
From what I understood from the Rabbi’s words, an exposition is made up of a textual trigger plus reasoning. So would it not be correct to say that someone who wants to change a halakha that incorporates verse exposition needs to propose a different exposition for the textual trigger? Without an alternative explanation, would it still be fair on his part to ask for a change in the halakha?
Absolutely correct. And that is exactly what Rabbi Akiva did in Babylonian Talmud Shabbat 64a: “in her menstrual state.”
A. So I still did not fully understand: is there no such thing as a binding derivation from a verse that would run against the logic of the expositor? In the example of “man and not woman,” the exposition seems pretty clear to me, and it does not seem to require much reasoning from the expositor. And B. I also did not understand the end of my previous question — what is the role of an asmachta other than decorating my idea?
Thanks