Question

Rabbi Michi, hello,
In one of your lessons on YouTube you give an example of midrashic interpretation in the case of the prohibition against a woman’s testimony in monetary cases, based on the reasoning that today women are different from what they were in the past (open, educated, etc.), and therefore there is room to permit it.
A. There are other reasons that have been written for why to prohibit a woman’s testimony, some of them under arguments that also fit today’s reality (a woman has an emotional inner world, can break under interrogation, “all the honor of the king’s daughter is inward,” modesty, and so on). If so, how can one choose one reason and on that basis say, “this is not relevant today”?
B. The derivation of the prohibition against a woman’s testimony is learned from the Torah through a verbal analogy. That is a “weighty” source, not some kind of rabbinic enactment or safeguard. If here you take the reasoning and remove the relevance, you could do that to the entire Torah.
1. In your view, what are the boundaries of our ability to understand independently how one should proceed in interpreting the reasons for prohibitions?
2. The question of authority. In your view, to whom was the authority given to decide whether here we say that “when the reason no longer applies, the Jewish law no longer applies,” or only that things have changed somewhat? Are you speaking on the theoretical plane and expecting a Sanhedrin, or are there things that in your view can already be implemented today?