Q&A: Rabbinic Exegesis
Rabbinic Exegesis
Question
What is the Rabbi’s position on the question of to what extent the rabbinic exegeses are a “mathematical” reading of the text of the Torah according to the rules of interpretation, and to what extent they merely come to anchor underlying reasoning?
Granted, we find among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) explanations that the exegesis affects which position is taken in a dispute about the exegeses, but there they are dealing with two alternatives.
If the reasoning is really only a tool within the exegesis, why can’t it be used on its own? A halakhic decisor who is asked today about the definition of a certain category of damager will compare one matter to another, and that is enough. Why is that not enough, for example, to decide whether “his fire” is treated because of his arrows or because of his property (there Tosafot explained that the reasoning determines the exegesis)?
Answer
See my article on reasoning in Jewish law. Briefly: reasoning alone is not always enough to establish a law. Were it not for the verse or the exegesis, we would not have thought that the reasoning was sufficient. Once there is an exegesis, the reasoning explains it. For example: “a stubborn and rebellious son,” and not a daughter. The reasoning is that it is not the way of a daughter to become a bandit. But without the exegesis, would we exclude daughters on the basis of that reasoning alone? Probably not.
Sometimes the reasoning decides between two ways of interpreting.
When the reasoning is sufficient on its own, then the exegesis really is only a mere scriptural support. But that is only where the exegesis adds a detail within an already existing Torah-level law. When we are dealing with a novel law (such as the blessing over benefit), then the existence of reasoning without an exegesis is not enough to give it the status of a Torah-level law.
See my article there, and also my article “What Is a Scriptural Decree?”