Nice. But I didn’t see any discussion there about the giving of the Torah. Can you point me to another place?

I’ve written this several times, and at the moment I can’t find it.
This comes to answer two questions: How does the Sinai oath help if the obligation to keep oaths itself comes from the giving of the Torah? And how does the parents’ oath on behalf of their children help, when in the Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah, it says that a vow or oath on behalf of others is ineffective (including children)? And I cited a responsum of the Rosh (brought there) that in the case of communal bans it does work. The explanation is that the community is a collective, and the one placed under the ban / oath is the collective, and everyone who belongs to the collective is included in it.
It may also appear in audio lectures on the individual and the community.

Okay, thank you very much. That’s roughly what I was thinking. And regarding your first question, is your claim that the obligation to keep the oath preceded the religious command? Meaning, along the lines of what Rabbi Shimon Shkop wrote?

Yes. See Avnei Nezer, Yoreh De’ah, sec. 306, and what he writes there about the Mishneh LaMelekh and Rabbi Yosef Migash.

Thanks

I didn’t understand how your question, “How does the Sinai oath help if the obligation to keep oaths itself comes from the giving of the Torah,” is connected to the answer about a collective. It seems like that question has nothing to do with the relation between individual and community.

True, but the Avnei Nezer and Rabbi Yosef Migash answer that too.

So I understand that my religious obligation is because my ancestors swore at Mount Sinai as part of a collective, and that obligates me.

Now, let’s say the collective doesn’t suit me. Why can’t I leave it? Unlike Israeli citizenship, which I can renounce at any moment, there’s apparently something about the Jewish collective that Jewish law does not recognize my ability to leave. What is the logic and justification for that?

First, you also don’t leave a state all that quickly unless you find some other suckers to give you citizenship.
Second, the contract with the collective binds all its members. If everyone can leave, then what is the meaning of such a contract? Everyone can just leave the collective and empty it out.
Third, who says you can’t leave? Leave. The fact that Jewish law still sees you as Jewish shouldn’t really matter to you if you don’t regard yourself as bound by it. By the way, in the past there were opinions among the medieval authorities that an apostate becomes a gentile. As for punishment from the Holy One, blessed be He, He operates morally. So if you’re right that it’s immoral to forbid you to leave, then apparently He will take that into account.

Thanks.

I want to focus for a moment on the third point: let’s say I leave, because I think Judaism is nonsense (just hypothetically). In your view, would I not be punished for each and every transgression I commit? If not, then I understand and accept your answer. But if yes, then what did my formal departure from the collective accomplish? In the end, Jewish law still sees me as inside.

Maybe one could say that I’d receive one punishment for leaving the collective, since that itself is not rational (assuming there are some decent arguments for Judaism). But from that point on, I’m “mistaken according to my own position,” and I wouldn’t receive punishments for the other transgressions.

What do you think?

If Jewish law says that a Jew cannot detach himself from the collective, then one of two things must be true: either God also acts immorally [the Torah itself and His conduct in the world significantly strengthen this assumption], and He will punish you because He decided that you’re forbidden to leave; or the prohibition on leaving is moral, and the reason would be that He is your master and the master of the world, or because of an obligation of gratitude, or other such things.
So the Rabbi’s basic assumption—that when a person sincerely thinks something, he need not worry about the consequences of his conclusion—is highly questionable.

Chaim,
I explained this. You would not be punished for two reasons: 1. Because you are coerced in this too (the claim that there are good reasons is a principle you don’t accept if you’ve left). 2. Because the Holy One, blessed be He, is moral and does not punish when there is no justification. And if leaving is the right of any person who did not himself undertake the commitment, then the Holy One should recognize that too.

Eliezer,
There’s a third possibility: Jewish law, which is a human creation (an interpretation of the texts), is mistaken about this, and this is not God’s will. If it’s immoral, then the Sages were probably mistaken about it.

With respect, you need a somewhat more solid argument than just throwing at the interpretation of the Sages that their words are immoral, and thereby opening up a third option. They knew that just as well as you do, and nevertheless it was obvious to them that God can compel even a person who does not want to comply. And if that seems immoral to you [anthropomorphism? understanding the whole picture?], then jump—but don’t reduce the Torah to your own limited understandings [relatively speaking], specifically.

Apologies, apologies, apologies. It’s just on the issue of reading comprehension that you still need some work. Good luck.

Come on—what do we see in the Torah? That someone who violates the covenant gets a list of curses that would put even the fiercest hothead to shame. There’s no option of “sorry, I’m switching nations”; it’s only “My anger will blaze and I will kill you,” whether you like it or not.

You don’t see anything like that there. The punishment is for someone who sins deliberately, not for someone under compulsion who acts according to what he understands. Following idolatry in the Hebrew Bible was the result of temptation, not of a different belief.
And even if you do see that there, then that proves that the questioner is wrong and that there is no moral problem here, as I myself wrote. What I pointed out to him (and this is your reading-comprehension mistake) is that according to his claim that there is a moral problem here, the Holy One presumably would not do that.

By the way, in your article on disagreement among peers, you explained that only when there are two equals does one need to ask why I should rely on my own opinion more than on my colleague’s. But a person who stands at the end of the whole decline of the generations [which you explained in your book Two Carts—that we are completely far from understanding the “language” and concepts of the Torah], and sits on the couch tossing out speculations to force conclusions on matters of such consequence, out of a policy of “my reason above all,” is something that really demands explanation, and one really needs to work more on understanding this phenomenon…

A bit sharp, but a little pepper doesn’t hurt in life… of course with sincere appreciation bordering on admiration.

Exactly the opposite. Only if they are equals is there room to say that I should not rely on my own opinion. Otherwise I have nothing but my own judgment. See also my article on autonomy. In general, we have nothing but our own reason, especially in moral questions (which is what we were discussing here), where the decline of the generations is irrelevant and closeness to the source carries no importance.
Sharpness is indeed a blessing, and pepper certainly doesn’t hurt. But admiration does.

The Rabbi wrote that one who leaves the path (Chaim) will not be punished because 1. he is under compulsion and does not agree with the principle. And I ask: why is this called compulsion? There is no coercion here. And he is not even merely inadvertent—rather, he is rebellious (and a rebel with excuses is still a rebel!). If I don’t agree with Israeli law and I violate it, will the judge exempt me because I was “coerced”?!
A point that seems to need clarification to me in reason 2 is that the Rabbi spoke only when he is right and indeed it is possible to leave, yes? Then obviously he would not be punished, because in truth God also holds that you can leave if it doesn’t suit you. But isn’t that a bit presumptuous on his part? Meaning, according to this reasoning I’d also have to convert to Christianity, and if I’m right that I should convert to Christianity then the God of Israel won’t punish me, since He is moral.
Good night

The Torah is different from law, because it was given by the Creator, who probes the hidden depths within us. The purpose of law is also different. If a person disagrees with the law but understands that one must obey the law, then he is not coerced. But if he thinks one need not obey the law, then he is indeed coerced. If he is not exempted, that is only in order to achieve social benefits. Essentially, he is exempt.

I didn’t understand your question. What is presumptuous about it? That’s what he thinks. Is it not presumptuous to disagree with all the sages of the Christians or the Muslims? What does presumptuousness have to do with this? And yes, if one should convert to Christianity, then God will not punish you if you do so. What’s the problem?

But someone under compulsion is forced, against his will. And here, who forced him? His own mind itself?
It’s very presumptuous because he is alone. Not everyone has yet emerged from immaturity and still doesn’t dare follow reason, as Kant said. As for Christians and so on, yes indeed, that too is presumptuous, but not to the same extent. Shared trouble is half a comfort, and I dwell among my people.
I only showed that the reasoning the Rabbi used also includes cases of conversion to another religion. So all I asked was whether the Rabbi still says one should convert despite “You shall have no other gods before Me,” and so on. It doesn’t seem to me, as it does to the Rabbi, that there’s no problem here. These are novel claims as if newly given at Sinai—a different, new Sinai. Does this not realize what the Vilna Gaon wrote about Maimonides, that philosophy drew his heart after it and therefore he did not believe in the incantations mentioned by the Sages—except that here it already uproots the Ten Commandments.
Good night

Indeed, someone coerced by his understanding is coerced in every respect. The Radbaz wrote this as well, and reason inclines that way.
I absolutely said to convert to Christianity, and to worship idols, and to do whatever you think. Obviously. What distinction is there?
And regarding the Vilna Gaon—if he puts me in Maimonides’ company, who am I to argue?! I would say the same thing even without Maimonides’ support. But when I have his support, then certainly, certainly I will stand my ground.

Is the Radbaz speaking about someone who cannot know, or about someone who disagrees with the view?
As for the Rabbi putting himself in Maimonides’ camp—fine, by his own lights. The problem is that I helped him do it. And that is a refutation of the a fortiori argument the Rabbi used, since the Rabbi always refutes my arguments. Though one could say that I can serve as support for the Rabbi when my opinion matches his. Fortunate are we—how good is our mutual support.

He is speaking about someone who thought Moses our teacher was the Holy One, blessed be He. That is an erroneous belief.

Can the Rabbi please indicate where in the Radbaz this appears? Thanks.
As the Rabbi already formulated it, “someone coerced by his understanding” is considered coerced. And when is someone considered coerced by his understanding?

https://he.m.wikisource.org/wiki/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99_%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%99%D7%94/%D7%A4%D7%A8%D7%A7_%D7%91%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%AA_%D7%A6%D7%91%D7%95%D7%A8_(%D7%9E%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%9A_%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%98%D7%A8%D7%A1_%D7%99%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%91_%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%A4%D7%98)