Q&A: Commitment to Jewish Law
Commitment to Jewish Law
Question
Hello and blessings,
I read the Rabbi’s fifth booklet, in which he discusses commitment to the divine command, and parallels it to commitment to morality, in that the very knowledge of it obligates us.
(I’m not familiar with the terminology, so I’m not mentioning the names of the concepts.)
Moral truths obligate me because my “inner conscience” causes me to feel that they are true. And indeed, it is hard to explain to a person who does not grasp the internal logic of morality, just as it is hard to explain to a blind person what seeing means.
The difficulty regarding the divine command is that one does not necessarily feel that it is true and right. There can be a situation in which I recognize that there is a Creator, and that there was a revelation to the masses in which the Creator spoke and commanded the world. But unlike morality, toward which there is a very strong moral compass that commands me to listen, with respect to the divine command there can be many situations in which I will not feel a need to fulfill the command because I do not identify with it.
I think a moral conscience obligates us because we feel identification with it (which is indeed hard to explain), but with the divine command the situation can be different, and then we get into a tangle that I don’t see a solution to. If I do not feel identification with the command, there is no reason for me to try to investigate it and understand why it is right
Answer
Someone who does not feel it, of course, will not observe it. Why is that a problem? Someone who has no talent for physics or mathematics cannot understand mathematics or physics. In my personal opinion, most people do have this feeling, and only reflexive reactions cause them to reject it as unacceptable, but that is of course only my personal assessment.
By the way, you speak about many situations in which you will not have such a feeling. That is a mistake. The feeling does not have to exist in every situation and regarding every commandment. The feeling is a general one: that it is proper to fulfill the Creator’s command. From that point on, one should fulfill all His commands.
Discussion on Answer
If you are mistaken and intend to do good, that does have value. But if you reached the conclusion that it is a legend and you act only for the sake of fulfilling a command that does not exist, that has no value.
I discussed this in the fifth booklet.
Even if we currently do not have “identification” with one of the details included in God’s will, there is still recognition that the good also includes that with which we do not currently identify. We can use the following analogy: when we were small children, we did not identify with many values or norms, and even so, those values or norms seem clear to us today. And accordingly, there can also be a certain kind of “identification” by way of trust, when a son trusts his father.
The following conclusion can be inferred from the following passage: the only justification it provides for a normative claim with which we do not “identify” (such as many of the commandments or religious obligations, for example) is a justification with the following structure: if we were more mature, and if we had internalized several significant principles, if we were more connected to ourselves, and if we were aware, attentive, and had internalized all the relevant facts, we would—even now—“identify” with that commandment or religious obligation.
Regarding the concept of “God,” there are several possibilities: 1. The property “wills what is good” or “His command is good” is logically necessary for the concept, just as the property “shape” is logically necessary for the concept of a square. 2. The property “wills what is good” or “His command is good” is not logically necessary, just as the property “possesses a sense of hearing” is not necessary for the concept “human being.”
There are two kinds of justifications for normative claims. 1. A justification that is logically sufficient even without requiring an additional assumption: Why should one give charity to Reuven, a poor man? Because one should give charity to the poor.
2. A justification that is not logically sufficient unless we assume an additional premise:
Why should one smile? Because some entity wants that to be done. (The additional premise here is: the will of that entity reflects what ought to be done.)
So it turns out that according to the first possibility (regarding God), the justification “because this is God’s will” (answering the question: why is it right to do A?) is of the first kind, whereas according to the second possibility (regarding God), the justification “because this is God’s will” is of the second kind.
However, there are people who claim that the property “that which God wants” is logically necessary for the concept of “good” (which means that one cannot accept the first possibility mentioned above regarding God). I do not agree with those people. I presented arguments for this position (against those people) elsewhere (in articles I wrote)…
Correction: However, there are people who claim that the property “that which God wants” is logically necessary for the concept of “good” (which means that we must agree with the first possibility mentioned above regarding God). I do not agree with those people. I presented arguments for this position (against those people) in articles I wrote…
What I wrote above is not correct! (Sorry for being hasty…) In order to infer the following conclusion, one must also assume a certain premise regarding the necessary properties of the good (I won’t get into that now). In any case, even if this is not the only justification it provides, it is certainly a sufficient justification. I am referring to the following passage: “The following conclusion can be inferred from the following passage: the only justification it provides for a normative claim with which we do not ‘identify’ (such as many of the commandments or religious obligations, for example) is a justification with the following structure: if we were more mature, and if we had internalized several significant principles, if we were more connected to ourselves, and if we were aware, attentive, and had internalized all the relevant facts, we would—even now—‘identify’ with that commandment or religious obligation.”
I’m tangled up with a different question. I accept the reasoning that it is proper to obey God’s will assuming He revealed Himself and commanded, but I’m really not sure that God actually revealed Himself somewhere more than three thousand years ago. I do rely on the tradition and say, “Okay, I accept it,” but honestly, what if this is a folk legend that became entrenched over time?
I try to calm myself by saying that even if I am mistaken and none of it ever happened, even if the revelation at Mount Sinai really did not occur and I was wrong, I am still performing a “good” act because of the very desire to fulfill God’s will, even if in practice there was no command.
Am I right?