Q&A: Morality and Its Meaning
Morality and Its Meaning
Question
Hello Rabbi, I asked the Rabbi this morning about the meaning of the word morality, and the Rabbi referred me to the fourth notebook, from which I understood that morality must be objective and come from God. From this I understand that, in order to know what is moral and what is not, I basically have to identify morality with the divine command, or in other words: Jewish law. The Rabbi said in the lecture on Torah and morality that although this is Rabbi Kook’s view, it is not the view of the Maharal, the Ran, or even his own, but I can’t understand the fourth notebook any other way… I would appreciate it if the Rabbi could explain this and give me an alternative way of understanding what is moral and what is not, because if not Jewish law (at least not always), then what is?
Answer
There is a small logical leap here. Morality is part of God's will, but it is not part of Jewish law. The Holy One, blessed be He, expects us to be moral and to observe Jewish law, but these are two different categories. To identify what is moral, you should not look to Jewish law. There is no connection at all (in my opinion). You need to examine your conscience, and that of any reasonable person. The Torah says, "And you shall do what is right and good," and does not spell out what is right and good. That means that it itself assumes that our conscience is a sufficiently good source for this.
Discussion on Answer
I am not sure this is Rabbi Kook’s view. See Pinkas HaDapim I, sections 8, 20.
I am far from being an expert on Rabbi Kook, but this is what he writes in several places (for example in his commentary on the Binding in Olat Re’iyah, and many others). There are many contradictions in his thought, especially when we are dealing with different periods in his life.
1) Does the Rabbi hold that one can arrive at moral clarification through thought and reflection alone?
Questions about abortion (at least at the beginning of pregnancy), euthanasia, and several other issues seem unresolved… The feeling is that it is impossible to reach a clear conclusion on the matter, and everyone comes from his own direction…
I don’t think this has to lead to relativism… There are general issues that all human beings can agree on… but when you get into the details, there is a limit beyond which you cannot infer things through ordinary moral reasoning… and here perhaps there would be room for society and culture to decide (the way moral values are implemented and the relationship between them)… Is that correct…
2) When the Sages ruled on questions like these, did they not use their own moral reasoning? Isn’t the determination of when a fetus is considered a human being (if it is considered one at all), and therefore the prohibition of murder would apply (which halakhic decisors have discussed), the same question that stands before us? What advantage did they have regarding this issue?
1. It is certainly reasonable that there are questions for which we cannot arrive at a clear answer. In Jewish law too this is the case; that is what the laws of doubt are for. So even if you attach morality to Jewish law, that does not guarantee that you will have clear answers to every question.
Still, each person has to try to reach an answer to the best of his understanding and act accordingly. It may be that when I am in doubt society can set standards, although I am not inclined to give society that kind of credit. Even if it does decide, I do not accept it unless I agree.
2. The Sages certainly used their own reasoning, both in Jewish law and in morality. But determining from when a fetus is called a human being is not necessarily a moral reasoning. It is meta-moral or meta-halakhic reasoning.
To the best of my judgment, they have no advantage over us in these matters. What entered Jewish law is binding (to the extent that the various sources of Jewish law are binding), and what did not—do as you understand.
When the Torah commands us, "And you shall do what is right and good," it does not spell out what that right and good is. Its assumption is that we understand it on our own. That is, it tells us to rely on our moral intuitions. The authority of the Sages applies to Jewish law, not to determinations outside Jewish law, such as morality or facts.
But regarding "You shall not murder," that same meta-moral and meta-halakhic question that stood before the Sages also stands before my moral questions…
If I accept their determination regarding when the fetus is considered an independent being, that affects my moral decision on the matter. After all, these are not different questions… It is strange that I accept this determination from the standpoint of Jewish law, but from the standpoint of private morality I do not (in both directions—I might take a more lenient view or a stricter one)…
And furthermore, in light of the development of science and the broad information we have about the fetus that did not exist in the days of the Sages, seemingly we have a great advantage regarding these determinations.
Their determination regarding the fetus establishes the halakhically binding requirement, and it has nothing to do with moral determinations. One can be stricter or more lenient. It should be remembered that there is no sharp line here, and the determination is somewhat arbitrary in any case. Indeed, you can take a more lenient or a stricter position.
As for science, it has nothing to say about this issue. It is a value question, not a scientific one. But as I said, if you think otherwise, act otherwise, regardless of science.
But as you said in the notebook, if everyone determines morality for himself based on his own feelings, then there will be no objective morality, and that will create the problems the Rabbi pointed out in the notebook…