Question

Hi,
It seems to me that you would agree with me that the work of reason (logical inference) is done by the intellect and not, for example, by the senses.
It also seems to me that you would agree that the mode of operation of the senses is very different from the mode of operation of reason.
Against that background, philosophers are tempted to believe, mistakenly in my opinion, the following: philosophical discussion, which is conducted in natural language and therefore mediated by the intellect, ostensibly deals only with the “senses.” In other words: it ostensibly deals with an abstract (intellectual) concept and not with the sensory mechanism itself. Consequently, from this point of view, the mode of operation of the “senses” is set up on the model of the mode of operation of the intellect. 
My question: how, in your opinion, can one nevertheless believe in the separateness of the intellect from the senses, and therefore also in the distinctness of the mode of operation of these two mechanisms?