Q&A: lex specialis in deciding between the intuitions of freedom and causality
lex specialis in deciding between the intuitions of freedom and causality
Question
In the book The Science of Freedom, the Rabbi argues that when there is a conflict between the intuition of causality (which leads to determinism) and the intuition of freedom (which leads to libertarianism), we should use the doctrine of lex specialis and therefore prefer freedom over causality.
And I do not understand: determinism purports to explain our intuition as well in a deterministic way (as the Rabbi himself mentions in the book). If so, according to determinism, the intuition of freedom really does exist, except that despite this it is impossible to prove from it the existence of free will. If so, determinism does not contradict any intuition; rather, it simply claims that even though the intuition exists, nothing can be inferred from it. So why not prefer it, such that no intuition would be rejected (only the conclusion that we might draw from it)?
Answer
You are treating the intuition of freedom as a mental phenomenon. I am speaking about it as objective cognition. When I say that there is a conflict between the intuition of freedom and the intuition of causality, I mean that I believe in freedom and in causality. This is not a description of two mental states, but of two claims about the world.
Beyond that, I do not think determinism offers an explanation for the consciousness of freedom. I brought there a strange proposal that I heard, but it truly does not seem serious to me (and I explained there why).
Discussion on Answer
A follow-up question that arrived by email:
Now another question has occurred to me. After all, the libertarian too assumes that the intuition of causality is true regarding the entire universe except for the brain. If so, the conflict is not between the intuitions of freedom and causality, but between the intuition of freedom and the reasoning that it is unreasonable to exclude the brain from the rest of the objects found in the universe. These two considerations are both particular, and relate only to the matter itself; if so, the doctrine of decision, which is meant to decide between a general consideration and a specific consideration, does not apply here.
My response:
According to this, there is no consideration of lex specialis at all. You can always focus the dilemma on the specific issue. But that is not correct. The question is what your intuition really is. The two conflicting intuitions are general causality and the freedom that a person has. I do not have an intuition not to exclude something or to exclude it. The question whether to exclude it or not is derivative of the dilemma.
I was asked again:
Thank you for the response on the site. But I did not understand why the conflict must be between two intuitions. Why can there not be a conflict between an intuition and an intellectual consideration (such as that it is unreasonable to exclude the brain)? After all, the considerations in the discussion are those that relate to the object under discussion, and if the discussion is only about the brain then the considerations in the discussion are those that relate to the brain.
My response:
Because the claim that it is unreasonable to exclude the brain is not an intellectual consideration. It is not true that it is unreasonable to exclude it. It is reasonable to exclude it if there is an intuition of free will. That consideration comes in, if at all, at the stage after the presentation of the dilemma. As I wrote to you, according to your approach there is no lex specialis in the world.
A follow-up question that arrived by email:
I did not understand the response. Does the Rabbi mean that intuition is not a mental phenomenon at all, or that after the mental phenomenon comes objective cognition?
If the meaning is that after the mental phenomenon comes objective cognition, why should cognition judge only the two mental phenomena (causality and freedom) and not additional intellectual considerations as well (such as the strangeness of the possibility that within the vast universe there is a certain organ in a certain species of mammals that is exempted from the laws governing the entire universe, and the like)?
My response:
Intuition is a mental state that expresses cognition (it does not create cognition. Note this carefully). Sight too is a mental state, but the assumption is that this mental state is a representation of a fact that exists outside me. In my view, intuition is a kind of seeing (with the mind’s eye, of course, not with the ordinary senses).