Okay.

And what about a case where there are two options without a definite decision, and there are probabilities in both directions? Of course, in your view there is still weight to the more probable option, but it isn’t a knockout. Rather, the traditional religious implication if you are mistaken is severe.
Even if that isn’t understandable to you—that is, even if you don’t grasp how it could make sense to punish a person as long as he acts in accordance with the conclusion he reached—but according to the traditional side, if it is correct, you don’t need to understand it, and even so you will be punished for it if it turns out to be true.
For example, if a person made every effort to understand the law and still failed to understand it, is that a reason not to punish him?
So if there is a certain view that has quite serious probability, but in your opinion your probability outweighs it, yet if you were wrong you would be punished severely even though you don’t understand why—shouldn’t that be taken into account?

Another analogy: if in business you arrive at an insight, and all the experts and economists argue against you, and you were unable to understand their arguments despite trying and making your best effort, and they warn you that your view will lead to your going to prison and losing all your money and your whole family for the rest of your life—and you already have a history with them in arguments about economics, where you didn’t understand them and paid for it dearly—wouldn’t you be deterred?
After all, in the past they sounded to you like people who weren’t so wise, and it turned out you had failed to get to the bottom of what they meant. Shouldn’t you at least be afraid and think it through several more times, and maybe still not take the gamble?

Simple, your name suits you.
Simple, you’re like a boor who keeps making the same argument in endless forms even though he already got an answer once.
It’s as if you deliberately want to drive Rabbi Michi crazy, like that story of the man who tried to provoke Hillel for four hundred zuz—who exactly did you make a bet with?
And I’m amazed that Michi hasn’t stopped answering you altogether, and only regarding divine involvement did he stop.
I would have forgotten your name long ago.
Apparently Rabbi Michi has taken on the trait of humble Hillel and never ignores anyone.

And seriously, Simple, there is nothing ethical in what you’re doing. I protest the humiliation of a sage.

Dear Wise,

True, I am simple, but this is Torah and I need to learn. I understand the facts and don’t understand the implications; see the Rabbi’s column on who the “simple son” is.

As for the substance of the matter: if you have some way to make me wiser regarding my question in its second part, where I added to the first part—not just examples, but another component—and in case you missed it, I’ll summarize it.

Everything the Rabbi said is true, except that the other side has no small weight and serious implications, and if in this world he would not act on them—as in the example I gave of the economic advisers—then in this world one should treat that as a serious consideration.

He answered mainly with respect to others, because the first question focused on the effect on others, and now I asked with respect to him himself. The answer regarding others was a substantive and satisfactory answer, and that’s why I wrote “Okay,” meaning I agree, except that…

If you, wise one, have an insight, share it with me, for this is Torah and I need to learn. And it isn’t nice to accuse the simple one; rather, he should be taught until he understands. More power to you in advance, wise and dear man that you are.
And I accept your comment regarding the Rabbi, although it seems to me I’m not angering him, because I learned this style of conduct from him, and some of the phrasing too. I’m in the middle of an educational workshop with him; hopefully I’ll improve slowly but surely.

Correction: fourth paragraph, line 4 should be “in the world to come” and not “in this world.”

Wise, that was really unnecessary.

Simple,
If I have two equally balanced sides, I can either not write, or write both and say they are balanced. What difference does it make?
I answered what you asked. There is no reason to take that into account. A person is not punished for something he does in good faith. That’s all. What isn’t clear?
The business example is irrelevant, because if the law says that, then I have no choice but to take it into account. But here, in my opinion, the law does not say that. In short, there is no barrier to publishing anything at all, of any kind whatsoever, as long as it is reasoned. And the same applies if that is what the experts say. If what they say convinces me that there is something to it, then of course my opinion changes and with it my conclusion. But so long as I’m not convinced, and in my opinion they are mistaken, then I’m really not interested in the fact that they say so. Let them say it.

A tale of the wise man and the simple man.

It’s Simple with charm.
Just by rearranging the letters.

More power to you, Rabbi, for your answer.

Just clarifying:
Would a Muslim who murdered in accordance with his own outlook and belief not deserve punishment, but only to be placed in confinement out of fear that he will continue murdering with his outlook and belief? Or would we put him in detention and punish him only so that others will hear and be warned?

1. If the second option is correct, what is he guilty of that I use him to deter others? True, I’m also not to blame for the fact that there are people who believe that what is right is to murder my people—but is it moral to punish them for that? At the end of the day they act according to their belief and the end-point of their thinking. Who permits me to use them for my own personal benefit?

2. If you understand that they do deserve punishment because the purpose served by punishing them justifies the wrong done to them, because in the end the moral consideration outweighs it—that it is better to use punishment of the mistaken person in order to save others from other fanatics—then it is certainly possible that this might also be the case in matters of faith.

And I’ll explain: if and when the damage caused to the sincere believer—and if that is indeed what the Creator wants from a believer—is significant damage because of the person acting according to his outlook and belief, and I’m talking about direct harm to another, and even direct harm to that believer himself, then the fact that he acted according to the best of his belief does not contradict the need to save others from him, and perhaps even to save him from himself.

After all, one cannot ignore the fact that there is a very significant side within Judaism that believes certain views are views that warrant punishment, and if the person holding them is mistaken like that Muslim, then his punishment is deserved.

Of course, I’m not ignoring your answer above, that you do not take responsibility for those who draw conclusions without reaching a true and full understanding of your words. But I think you would punish even the Muslim preacher who brought about the result that because of him that youth reached the conclusion that the right thing is to kill the Jew, even if the murderer was persuaded of it. If you know that the one who influenced his thinking in that direction was a major partner in the outcome!

To sum up:
1. Seemingly we see that there is responsibility and punishment even for someone who does what he does in good faith.

2. The view of those who disagree with you is that you absolutely will be punished even if you act in good faith, and as in the Muslim analogy, that is not far-fetched.

3. Therefore, in my opinion, your conclusion that if you act in good faith you bear no responsibility is mistaken. If you have an explanation for how you differ from the responsibility of the Muslim who receives his punishment, I’d be glad to hear it.

Thank you so much for the patience!

That depends on an assessment of what is in his heart. If he really believes in what he is doing, then he should be dealt with only as protection for society, under the law of a pursuer. That is not punishment but prevention of harm. The law of a pursuer applies even to an insane person or a minor who does not deserve punishment.
1. I explained that this is under the law of a pursuer. He is not guilty, and this is not punishment but prevention.
2. It is not punishment.
3. If the Holy One, blessed be He, sees me as a pursuer, He can of course strike me under the law of a pursuer, and not as punishment.
The question about preaching raises the issue of incitement as opposed to the offense itself. In Jewish law there is no punishment for incitement, except in the case of idolatry. Incitement to other offenses is not punishable, aside from the view of the Ramah in the Sanhedrin passage about “we do not argue in defense of an enticer,” from the serpent primordial. And even the preacher would not be punished, except perhaps under the law of a pursuer, as a contributing cause to the pursuit. And even there, only if the pursued cannot be saved except by killing him. If it is possible to act only against those who were incited, then only they should be killed.

Someone who thinks I am causing harm can indeed think that it is permitted or proper to harm me under the law of a pursuer. I think that raising arguments is not harmful, and in my estimation that is also the view of the Holy One, blessed be He. I did not say my words according to the method of those who think I am a pursuer—in which case too, as noted, this would not be punishment but prevention—but according to the truth.

Many thanks, Rabbi!!
You’ve made me wiser!

Just one last clarification based on what was said above.
It comes out that even if Hitler acted out of his worldview, and he is now in our hands, and we explained it to him and he really became convinced of his mistake, and there is no concern that releasing him would affect the future (no deterrent effect)—
Would you host him in your living room like any other person?

Or if you erred in good faith, do you still have to bear responsibility—something like “a person is always forewarned”?

Absolutely.

Thank you very much, Rabbi. I think your opinion is clear as the sun.
A summary of the position, and presentation of the other side. Just if I summarize incorrectly, correct me, and/or if I have, heaven forbid, misled the reader.

1. One who acts in good faith bears no responsibility. This can include responsibility toward another person as well (like Hitler and co.).

2. If one who acts in good faith sees that for some reason all the sages (the reasonable person) think the opposite of him, as long as he has heard their arguments and failed to understand them, he is permitted to act according to his own understanding even actively (for example, even toward another person, such as murdering him).

3. There is no point in refraining and taking into account the considerations of the other side, so long as I have made my best effort to understand it (and not acting would be a kind of impotence).

4. Considerations like “how can it be that you are one against a hundred?” are irrelevant; they are relevant only for trying to give the hundred a chance to be understood, and after that chance, if I still haven’t understood, I am obligated to act and destroy and kill.

Summary: according to the above, if my conclusion is against everyone, apparently I am the only reasonable person on earth.

The other side of the coin!

5. One who acts in good faith, when all opinions disagree with him, is obligated to act like the majority, even if he does not understand them.

6. Certainly he cannot make decisions regarding others if, according to the majority view, his decision is harmful.

7. If he acts, he will bear the consequences and be punished.

8. His punishment is for acting despite the fact that the majority thought differently from him. (“I am the only reasonable person” is not a legitimate opinion; there is consensus on this and it is an absolute truth, and it does not need to be explained—more precisely, it cannot be explained, because it is an endless circle.)

9. The reasonable person does not kill even if he has reached the conclusion that he is obligated to kill, so long as in the eyes of the majority his conclusion is mistaken.

10. Since the reasonable person thinks that the one acting in good faith is mistaken, this obligates him to refrain from active conduct, even if he does not understand why it obligates him; and if he acts, he will be punished. (The reasonable person is the absolute truth.)

11. The reason he must refrain even though he does not understand the reasonable person is that the very fact that the reasonable person disagrees with him obligates him not to act, because necessarily there is another possibility here that he did not take into account.

12. True, there is also the possibility that the reasonable person did not take into account what the one acting in good faith did take into account, but there is no way to prove that, and therefore one may not act actively, and certainly not against another person, and not even against what appears to the other side to be against another person! (Consensus wins where there is a tie.)

Clarification!
An argument like “we follow the majority only when there is doubt” is unacceptable, because here the reasonable person disagrees and that is a good enough reason for doubt, even if I do not understand why he holds what he holds, because as to the fact that he holds what he holds, there is no doubt!!

The doubt is not about the what, but about the why. The fact that everyone disagrees with him is a fact; he simply cannot understand why.

Let me sharpen it again!
The reasonable person is the person about whom there is broad consensus that he is the reasonable person, and someone who disagrees with him in matters where he lacks information would rely on him without concern.

Let the reasonable person judge how he would have acted toward Hitler, and how the religious person must act when he sees that the reasonable religious person sees the dissenter as causing mortal harm to religion.

Thank you very much both for the patience and for the substance.
Sabbath peace,
Simple.

Granted I’m not the Rabbi (not even close), but since the words were given over to be read, let me voice my opinion too. All the clauses in your summary seem to me to be new claims and not a summary of what came before them. In other words, I accept everything written in the Rabbi’s answer and disagree with everything you wrote.

1. Responsibility is something different from punishment. If it were possible to collect compensation from Hitler, I assume the Rabbi would approve that too. Punishment has no place (and in my own opinion, may his Rock and Redeemer preserve him, even for directly choosing evil there is no place for punishment).
2. There is no point in issuing someone a prohibition and permission regarding violating a prohibition. Even if it is “forbidden” for the sincere person in question to act against everyone, as long as he does it in good faith out of belief that he is right, the defense of good faith stands for him.
3. At the clarification stage, ad hominem and ad populum can be useful. But we are dealing with a person who has reached a conclusion, not with advice on how to reach the correct conclusion.
4. Same as 3.
All the other clauses suffer from the same problem: trying to formulate rules of what is permitted and forbidden. The simple person under discussion does forbidden things while in his view they are correct. And it doesn’t matter how obvious those forbidden things seem to us. Adding a meta-prohibition against going against the majority doesn’t add much, because this simple man violates that in good faith too, and will get the same protection.

Dear Delilah,
Advice on how to reach the correct conclusion must enter the set of considerations, and once they have been taken into account, they are binding and may not be ignored; the responsibility vs. punishment issue is a consequence.
And your truly simple servant did take the reasonable person as a consideration.
The rest of the off-putting mockery, even if it were a thousand rebukes, does not strengthen your argument, although it is legitimate for someone whose arguments are weak to use means that are irrelevant to the matter.

Good Sabbath.

What mockery? In any case, I wasn’t joking consciously. If you meant the double use of the word “simple” (about the topic and about you), it never crossed my mind. I didn’t understand what you are claiming as a summary. If this is your own opinion, I won’t argue. They must enter the considerations—fine, but if he violates in good faith this prohibition of including the matter in his considerations, then what is his status? I don’t see any difference between that and any other prohibition. The punisher here refrains from punishment even if the punisher is completely sure of his own rightness (and of the good-faith person’s error).

Dear Delilah,

See the Rabbi’s column on disagreement between colleagues.

If and when we both seek truth, and there is nevertheless a disagreement—assuming that both of us listened to the sides, and neither of us is locked in—
then we must conclude that one thermometer is faulty. In this case, one of us missed something. And if there are ten thermometers that show A and one that shows B, then I am obligated to conclude that the single thermometer is faulty, even though it is possible that the ten are faulty. But the probability is that the one is faulty, and the burden of proof is on it, and if it continues to act on that basis then it is negligent!!

Simple.

(I’m a man.) That is all very nice as a way to persuade him, and if he violates that then he is negligent, but he is negligent even without this argument too (because of the very forbidden act he did, in good faith). Are you saying there are prohibitions more exalted and obvious than the moral or religious prohibition itself? Such that if he erred in those, there is a presumption that he is aware of his error and nevertheless does it brazenly? In my opinion, for example, the thought that the opinion of most people reflects something “correct” in matters of morality (and sometimes also in matters of fact) is far less obvious than the moral prohibition itself. In any case, I’ve barged in enough and will leave room for others. And know that in general I enjoy reading the discussions you conduct here (even if I don’t always agree).

To Simple, who makes himself out to be simple-minded (and for the wise, a hint is enough).
In all your lengthy words, in the end you made one and only one claim (as I said before, your way is to repeat your words in different forms without end, without anything new, only with various emphases that contribute nothing, because they merely distract from the core argument and make it harder to understand your main point—for example: “What? You’d even go murder based only on your own reasoning?” Obviously that adds nothing to the argument, but only injects strange emotions that distract from the discussion itself. And you call that substantive—so be it…).
Your claim is this: “How does a person dare do what he thinks when most of the world says otherwise?” And as support for this you brought proof from economics.
Correct me if I’m wrong. (Of course, it may be that I have not plumbed the depth of your words, and therefore I ask you to correct me if I am mistaken. But as noted, judge me favorably—the reason is your rambling lengthiness.)

So in typical Jewish fashion, I’ll answer with two questions:
1. How does a person dare do what everyone else is doing even though he himself thinks it isn’t right? After all, whichever side he takes will have consequences. And with your economics example—I really would do what I think, because I trust my own intuition more than the intuition of the majority. If indeed there are people I know understand the field better than I do, and I know I cannot grasp the depth of their view and that is why I don’t think as they do, then that is a different case, and there I would most likely act according to the experts. (But that is not the case here, because Rabbi Michi thinks this is how one should act, and he understands the source of the experts’ error. Hope the distinction is clear to the “pretend” simpleton that you are…)
2. What about Abraham our forefather—how did he do something unheard of in his region and smash the beautiful and coveted idols in the whole village that everyone worshiped, just because he thought differently from everyone? What is this comparable to? To someone who comes and smashes the idols of a false faith that everyone around him held, and he did not fear the fact that everyone disagreed with him! Shameful!

Regards,
The one who learns from every person (which, as is known from Avot, is the wise person) (and in the meantime—) except from Simple.

To Delilah, Wise, and the rest of the stars.

I see that Wise insists on dealing with the person rather than the issue, and I’ll try to satisfy his wish further below.

But to the substance of the matter, for those deficient in reading comprehension, or who simply couldn’t be bothered to read:

1. The murder example was brought as an implication regarding another person.

2. The economics example was brought as an implication regarding yourself.

3. The economics example was also brought in order to check whether there isn’t room to infer that perhaps I’m missing something, since even the previous time I listened to the experts and thought they were wrong, and I discovered that I was the one who was wrong.

4. At this point, after refining the arguments, we are at the stage where anyone who wants to persuade the simple man has to explain why, if there are a hundred thermometers in the same bathtub and only one thermometer says otherwise than all the rest (and we can’t identify the bug), is the probability that the bug is in only one thermometer, or that the bug is in all ninety-nine?

And on that I referred to the Rabbi’s column—I don’t remember its number—about a disagreement between colleagues.

5. As for Abraham our forefather, who was mentioned as an implication for Rabbi Michael Abraham: the distinction is as follows. Abraham listened to the arguments of the others and they didn’t listen to him; and on that too one should look at the said column. Here, there is no shortage of thermometers that listened to Rabbi Michael Abraham’s argument and, lo and behold, remained with their own arguments. To assume that all of them are locked in and only Rabbi Michael Abraham is not locked in seems less probable, although there is currently no way to prove it.

6. To dear Wise, who insists so much on attacking the person, I would recommend: “Let another praise you, and not your own mouth.” A wise man does not call himself wise; rather, it is his words that call him wise. Therefore one who calls himself wise will be considered a fool… and enough said.

7. A good piece of advice: don’t get angry. Besides the fact that it isn’t healthy, it also doesn’t help.

“Wise are they to do evil.” We have received from Rabbi Michi that everything may be asked—what upset you so much?! There are two strong questions in Simple’s words:
1. How can one know anything about life, since on every matter there are several opinions?
2. Is a person punished for doing something out of idealism?

1. A person can reach a conclusion in two ways: 1) study the topic thoroughly; 2) bury his head in the sand and emotionally reinforce his thought. Of course he’ll do that if he thinks he has reached the truth and only wants to transfer it into feeling. Option A is for people who think this is genuine knowledge—like the Rabbi—or who are not sure. A person who studied a topic properly and is confident in the rightness of his path will obviously act that way, unlike economics where he may think perhaps he lacks information or didn’t study the topic properly.
If all the experts say no, I’m sure even the present Simple would rely on his own view in any subject he had studied in depth. [And I’ll add: everyone has an opinion even on the question of how many bats there are in the city of Van, only since I don’t know whether it’s 100 or 100,000, I won’t rely on my own opinion, and even if I check I still won’t be sure because I lack data. And the more a person checks, the stronger his conclusion becomes in his own mind, even if he hears other opinions. Reflect on this, because it is deep.]
2. Samson’s wife’s distinction between bearing responsibility and punishment makes sense.
Besides that, it is common for a person to reach a mistaken conclusion because of urges [“The people of Israel worshiped idols only in order to permit forbidden sexual relations,” or because disdain for the Sages causes him not to accept their words, and the like], or because he prefers to bury his head in the sand even though he should think he may be wrong—in that case he will receive full punishment.

Paragraph 3: perhaps I’m missing
Paragraph 4: at the end, a bug in all ninety-nine

Simple Simpleton,
Apparently you didn’t get to the end of my words there, where I wrote explicitly that the name “Wise” that I chose for myself was based on what is written in Avot in the definition of a wise person—there it says that the wise person is one who learns from every person, and in that respect I indeed learn from every person.
I even manage to learn various things from you, believe it or not…
What is certain is that in all your long verbiage, you’ve proven for the two-hundredth time that you don’t add anything new in your repeated responses; you just write the same thing.
I asked how a person would dare act like everyone else if he thinks otherwise, and you answer with an unrelated analogy you already wrote.
As for Abraham our forefather, notice that your answer is that apparently people didn’t listen to Abraham’s arguments… as they say, “the gates of excuses are never locked.” (Actually I’m quite sure there were many people there who listened and still weren’t convinced, and I brought Abraham as an analogy to illustrate the argument… namely, it is very possible that everyone in the world is mistaken except for you; see the case of Boltzmann and many others—there is no shortage of such cases. The fact that most of the world thinks otherwise only means you need to be more confident in your conclusion, but once you are confident, it doesn’t matter. Only people with no self-worth wait for validation from the world regarding their personal opinions and conclusions.)

In any case, as for the person himself, dear Simple, I am not angry at all. Even when you write untrue things about me, I am not angry. On the contrary, I love you (although in my opinion you behave disgracefully).
I’m rebuking you out of love, as it says, “Whom the Lord loves, He rebukes.”
Truly there is no anger in me; I think you are acting improperly.
I still believe you are not trying to reach the truth.

Wise,

It seems to me we’re drifting off, and indeed the discussion isn’t advancing. This time I won’t be dragged into what I am and what your opinions are of me, because that simply doesn’t interest anyone, and pity the readers if they read it.

And here is your question:
“I asked how a person would dare do as everyone does if he thinks otherwise, and you answer with an unrelated analogy that you already wrote.”

And here is my answer: indeed, he ought not dare, and he is negligent if he does dare when it concerns others. And regarding himself, he will answer for it if and when the thermometer test showed that all the thermometers yielded a uniform result against him, because the last refuge in human thermometers is to say—after they listened to the full arguments—that all the human thermometers are “locked in.”

Here probability enters: is it reasonable to assume that everyone is locked in and only I am not?! After all, the lock can also be subconscious, and then the probability is even stronger that out of a hundred thermometers, the locked one is the single one.

Moreover, it is not easy and almost not human to retract your entire old worldview. The fact that you retract every now and then is only perhaps to reinforce your falsehood, because as is known, a falsehood that contains no truth does not endure. (See Nachmanides on a harlot’s fee.)

So the most reasonable thing to say to a person who genuinely seeks truth is that despite the difficulty, if there is an enormous number of human truth-meters against him, all of whom listened to his arguments and thoughts and nevertheless disagree with him, then probably—and this is the more plausible view—the one who is locked in is him, and no one else.

Whoever disagrees with the obvious result is nothing but a donkey or a person with pathological arrogance, in Rabbi Michael Abraham’s words.

And one who does not understand why the obvious result of a hundred thermometers against one is more probable—even if not empirical, still certainly plausible; see Rabbi Michael Abraham’s book on “… Dice,” between what is proven and what is probable—is simply a foolish man lacking basic understanding, and certainly he should not be blamed for anything, but viewed as a pursuer, a category that applies even to a minor or an insane person.

Dear Wise, in the end my impulse overcomes me and I can’t refrain from replying to Wise the “wise man” personally.

“For the wise, a hint is enough”—let the questioner ask: must one be wise in order to understand hints?! Strange. Even a fool can understand hints.
And therefore one should interpret it precisely: a wise person—“enough for him” is a hint, meaning the wise person needs only a hint in order to infer the implication that follows from the hint. But the fool—“a hint is not enough” for him, and he goes on and on until people tell him “enough!!”

Therefore I ask Mr. “Wise” openly and not by hint: please, let’s stop talking about people themselves, because it lowers the level of discourse!!

Hoping this will be internalized!
Simple.

Necessary and important correction!

I just noticed that in your question you referred to how one dares to act against his own view.

And from the above one can infer: the moment there is a probability—even if you do not understand it—you are bound by it, because the probability that you are driven by ulterior motives, or that you missed something along the way, is entirely reasonable!

And if you do not understand why probability obligates you, then you are simply a fool. This is the only way to test whether you are objective or subjective!!

Sabbath peace.

Correction: the thermometer test. (That unruly autocorrect.)

Simple with charm.
The answer is simple.
If you are in a situation where others are discovering bugs in you, then it would be proper for you to listen to those others.
But if the situation is that you are discovering bugs in others, then it would be proper for them to listen to you.

And see today’s daf yomi (Sabbath 56b) about the rare greatness of Josiah, in that he retracted.

And it is proven from the Talmud there just how difficult and almost inhuman it is to retract completely!!

It does not seem human to me that Rabbi Michael Abraham—for the sake of the example, and not personally about him, but I’m hanging it on him because we started with him—is capable of retracting everything in all his books and thoughts if he were convinced that it was all vanity and a chasing after wind.

And if he does retract, we will say of him: “There is no one greater among penitents than Josiah in his generation—and one in our generation too, Rabbi Michael Abraham.”

Soon, good Sabbath.

The people who discover bugs in me I am not seeking under Rabbi Michael Abraham’s streetlamp, but throughout the whole world—and from that I have already concluded that, as of the writing of these lines, I am among the functioning thermometers!

Sabbath peace to you too, The Last Decisor.

Simple,
A bug is defined as something inconsistent, something containing an internal contradiction.
Whereas with you, it seems that a bug is anything that makes you feel uncomfortable.

Because when I proved to you beyond any shadow of a doubt that that “rabbi” with the video you brought lectures about the lofty spirituality of magic, at first you kept arguing and afterwards ignored it.
Bug.

The Last Decisor, hello again.

If you followed my words, I was speaking about a type of bug that cannot be empirically tested.

Regarding that rabbi (Yehoshua Inbal is his name in Israel),
I really didn’t look because it seemed unnecessary to me, but בלי נדר—without making a vow—I’ll look again, and if I have anything to say, I’ll say it.

As a Jew, it seemed unnecessary to you to discover something new and important that you didn’t know and had never imagined—about a rabbi you like listening to—that he believes magic is lofty spirituality?

Your cries of “wolf, wolf” kept me from examining it, and as I said, I’ll try to check when the time comes that my mind is at ease and I can examine the video without the insight that The Last Decisor tried to plant in my tiny brain.

I think I’ve presented my position. I’ll respond briefly to Simple’s summary, and with this I suggest we conclude.
Almost none of the clauses is accurate.
1. Not true. He definitely bears responsibility. He is simply not guilty and not liable to punishment. Like an insane pursuer or a minor.
2. It’s not that he failed to understand them, but that he does not agree with them. He thinks they are mistaken. And not only is he permitted to act; he is obligated to.
3. Not true. Sometimes one certainly should take this into account, and one’s position takes shape after having considered that factor too.
4. Indeed correct.
The summary: I am the only correct person on earth, not the only reasonable person.
As for your method, of course I have nothing to criticize. Presumably you are presenting your own position well enough.
And the rest—go and learn.