Q&A: Vows of Consecration
Vows of Consecration
Question
Hello Rabbi,
Rabbenu Nissim at the beginning of tractate Nedarim writes that a vow falls into one of two categories: vows of consecration and vows of prohibition. Under vows of consecration, Rabbenu Nissim includes both altar consecrations and Temple-maintenance consecrations, and it is clear from Rabbenu Nissim that vows of consecration are the act of consecration itself (apparently unlike the Ritva there, who held that a vow regarding consecration is the acceptance upon oneself, which precedes the consecration). People commonly explain that just as in vows of prohibition a person sets the object apart from use, so too in vows of consecration a person designates the object for the Most High.
On the other hand, Rabbi Chaim Brisker taught us, in resolving the contradiction between the Talmudic passages in Bava Kamma 76 (“Initially it is Reuven’s ox,” etc.) and 79 (“What difference is there whether he sold it to an ordinary person,” etc.), that altar consecrations and Temple-maintenance consecrations differ in the essence of their consecration. In altar consecrations, the one consecrating designates the animal for the altar, and through that holiness takes effect upon it; whereas in Temple-maintenance consecrations, the action of the one consecrating is a sale into the domain of the Temple treasury, and the holiness takes effect upon the object by virtue of the Temple treasury’s ownership.
As stated, Rabbenu Nissim explicitly included Temple-maintenance consecrations as well under vows of consecration, and at first glance this does not fit with Rabbi Chaim’s principle (can we really say that a sale is designating the object for the Most High?). What does the Rabbi think?
Answer
I didn’t understand the question. Even according to Rabbi Chaim, we are dealing with a sale to the Temple treasury that ends in holiness and a prohibition of use (beyond the ordinary prohibition of theft). So at least on the level of the result, there is setting it apart from private ownership. One should remember that there is a guilt-offering both for theft (a guilt-offering for thefts) and for misuse of consecrated property in konamot. In my opinion, the guilt-offering is brought for separation into a domain that is not his own (from which he is excluded). See my article, “What Is a Guilt-Offering?”.
Discussion on Answer
And I am arguing that the very distinction between the act of consecration and the result is not sharp. Both are separation from his domain, just as in theft regarding monetary property.
Certainly, but my question was about the level of the act of consecration. When one sees in Rabbenu Nissim that there is separation from private ownership, the intent is not the result but the act. After all, this is the law of vow involved here: the mode of consecration is done through separation and designation for the Most High, and simply not by means of a sale.