Sorry that I’m commenting again.
Of course, if that is the Magen Avraham’s intent, then the proof is understood as above. That’s not what bothers me.
What bothers me is the proof for the Magen Avraham’s own wording, that one is obligated to endure suffering so that his fellow not be killed. His wording clearly is not talking about a threat of suffering, but about an obligation to bring oneself into suffering in order to save.
And on that, I find the proof difficult.
As for the a fortiori argument, informing to the government is considered pursuing someone to kill him, as is known. To distinguish between a weapon and informing seems rather far-fetched to me. Does the weapon act by itself? It’s an inanimate object. Everything is done by the gentile’s judgment and choice and power.
In short, if you don’t accept this new approach in the words of the Magen Avraham, then I didn’t really ask anything, for the reason above—that he is not bound by the Ritva. Much success.

“To bring oneself into suffering” means not to yield under threat. That too is what the phrase means.
The distinction is only relevant to show that there is no a fortiori argument. Here you are making an analogy—and even that I doubt.

“To bring oneself into suffering” means not to yield under threat.
I didn’t understand.
There is a legal difference between my obligation to save someone else,
and the issue of causing or assisting in the murder of that other person.
Machatzit HaShekel understands the Magen Avraham—and so do you—that the issue is causing the other person to be murdered in order to save oneself from torture.
And on that I asked, from logic and also from the Ritva, that with regard to causing murder there is an obligation of “be killed rather than transgress,” and all the more so to accept torture.
Therefore I explain the Magen Avraham differently. The issue here is the obligation of rescue that a person has toward another. Is he obligated to suffer in order to save the other from death?
And now I understood the proof.
The issue in that story is not the suffering his wife would have had to endure so as not to betray Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, as above.
Rather, it is the suffering that Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai causes her by fleeing—because by fleeing he causes the Romans to torment and torture her so that she reveal where he is. And where does he get the right to do that? On this the Magen Avraham proves that she must, of necessity, be obligated to endure suffering so that he not be killed for nothing. For otherwise, he would have had no permission to flee and cause her this suffering.
With regard to this issue, of course she is not obligated to give her life to save him—your life takes precedence, and “who says your blood is redder?” But an obligation to suffer for the sake of rescue—yes, that she does have. And therefore from the outset he has permission to flee and cause her suffering, because that falls under her obligation to rescue him.
And this fits the wording of the Magen Avraham exactly. He wrote that one is “obligated to endure suffering so that his fellow not be killed for nothing,” and did not write “so as not to cause his fellow’s death.”
It also fits that he brought this as a continuation of what he first wrote, that one may flee when there is danger even though by doing so he causes suffering to another, and immediately continues that there is also an obligation to endure, etc. In other words, it is a continuation of the permission to flee. Study it well—it is appealing and elegant.

First, a few comments on what you wrote, regardless of how to understand the Magen Avraham:
1. Who says that causing murder falls under “be killed rather than transgress”? In my opinion, it does not. If they threaten me that I must kill, then I may not kill. But if they threaten me that I must do an act through which someone else will kill, then I may do that act. I referred you to column 257 on the Ketubot passage.
2. The phrase “to bring oneself into suffering” also describes a case of not yielding, not only actively entering a situation of suffering. That is rabbinic idiom. So when she does not submit to torture, she is bringing herself into a state of suffering.
3. Even according to my view, the phrase “so that his fellow not be killed for nothing” is more accurate than “to cause his fellow’s death.” She did not cause the death. She gave information, and the fellow was unjustly killed by someone else. Especially when the murderer is a person with understanding who makes a decision, one can definitely choose not to see me as the cause. (In the law of an informer they do view it that way, but it is unclear to me whether that is really indirect causation or some special law.)

As for the Magen Avraham’s intent, I looked at the text and I think he is saying two things: you are right about the first law and wrong about the second. His wording is:
“In Sabbath 33 we say: ‘Women are light-minded; perhaps they will torment them and they will reveal us,’ and they went and hid in the cave. This implies that one may flee when there is danger to life even though by doing so he causes suffering to another person, and it implies that one is obligated to endure suffering so that his fellow not be killed for nothing.”
The first law—that one may flee when it causes suffering—is indeed learned from the fact that he fled and thereby caused her to be tortured by the Romans.
But the second law—that one is obligated to endure suffering in order to prevent an unjust killing—is problematic. You wrote that the second follows from the first, that she must endure the suffering. I do not see that proof. The fact that he may flee does not mean that she must endure the suffering. It could be that he may flee, but she may reveal it and is not obligated to endure the suffering. There is no basis at all to prove one from the other. On the contrary, if she were obligated to endure the suffering, that would be a reason to forbid him to flee, because he is certainly bringing suffering upon her. If she is not obligated, then he may flee, because she can reveal it and avoid the suffering, and he has not caused her suffering.
In fact, one could have learned from the Talmud that she is permitted to reveal it in order to save herself from suffering, and then there is no proof that one may flee and cause suffering, because here he did not cause her suffering at all, since she is allowed to reveal it. Again, then, there is no proof from this passage for either of the two laws.
Therefore it seems obvious to me that the second law is not a result of the first. Rather, the words “and it implies” mean another conclusion from the Talmud itself: it all starts from “women are light-minded” as Machatzit HaShekel says. That is, the assumption is that she is obligated to remain silent and not reveal it, and only because women are light-minded is there concern that she will reveal it. From that it is proven that he may flee even though he causes suffering, because if she does not reveal it, as she is obligated not to, then he caused her suffering. And of course, if she were allowed to reveal it, then by fleeing he would not be causing her suffering.

[I hope I followed correctly. The first law is learned from the flight itself and not from the phrase “they are light-minded,” because the women do not know where they are, and presumably the Romans will not believe them until they torment them. From here we see that it is permitted to cause suffering in order to save oneself. Only the second law is inferred from the wording “light-minded,” and indeed the two laws are separate, because it could be that he is allowed to flee and she is allowed to reveal it. (This is a deontological issue, may he live and be well; with consequentialism you do not reach instructions like these.)]

Many thanks for the wonderful reply—you enlightened me.
But there is a difficulty: there is a contradiction in your words.
You opened by saying: “The first law (that one may flee when he thereby causes suffering) is indeed from the fact that he fled and caused her to be tortured by the Romans.” That means that if he flees, then in practice it won’t help if she reveals it—she will be tortured, because they won’t find him in the study hall, and it turns out she lied, so they will continue torturing her for no reason.
So how can you then continue and ask: “If she is not obligated, then he may flee because she can reveal it and avoid the suffering, and he did not cause her suffering”? “In fact, one could have learned from the Talmud that she is permitted to reveal it in order to save herself from suffering, and then there is no proof that one may flee and cause suffering, because here he did not cause her suffering (since she is allowed to reveal it). Again, then, there is no proof from the passage for either of the two laws.”
How is she avoiding suffering by revealing where he is, if she doesn’t know, because he fled elsewhere? She will then again receive endless suffering. So it is proven that if they fled and thereby cause suffering to the woman, then they are permitted to do so for the sake of saving their lives.
About the first law, no one disputes that this is the explanation, and Machatzit HaShekel explains it this way at the end of his words. Not as was quoted in his name in brackets, that the proof of the first law comes only from the inference from “they are light-minded.” That is not precise—look carefully at his wording there. That is, the proof is not from the fact that she is legally obligated to remain silent and not reveal it, but from the fact that they fled and caused suffering to the woman so that she would not know where they were and could not save herself from the suffering—assuming, of course, that the gentiles really would come to the woman.
And I generally did not understand your explanation—how is it proven that one may flee because there is a law forbidding revelation, and therefore there is suffering? On the contrary: they would not have fled if it had been a man who could endure the suffering and not reveal it. They fled only because she would reveal it. At the moment I don’t even care what the law is about whether it is permitted to reveal it or not, but only about the reality that she will suffer after they flee.
And how can you conclude by saying, “And of course, if she is permitted to reveal it, then by fleeing he causes no suffering”? Meaning that the second law is also proven, that it is forbidden to reveal it? Strange—how is there no suffering in the flight? What does it help that she can reveal what she does not know once they have fled?
In short, I do not believe these words were written by Rabbi Michael Abraham, or approved by him. There is a mistake in the calculation here.
The discussion is about the second law that the Magen Avraham derived.
You asked about my words: “I do not see the proof. The fact that he may flee does not mean that she must endure the suffering. It could be that he may flee but she may reveal it and is not obligated to endure the suffering. There is no basis at all to prove one from the other.”
Apparently my words were not properly understood.
I am not speaking at all about proving whether it is permitted to reveal it and not suffer, or not reveal it and suffer. To me that is clear as day from the Ritva, and I am sure the Magen Avraham also holds that way: it is forbidden to reveal it and thereby cause murder in order to save oneself from suffering, and it is even a case of “be killed rather than transgress.” That is not the issue at all according to my understanding, only according to Machatzit HaShekel’s understanding.
According to me, the issue is the opposite: does the woman have an obligation to save her husband from death by accepting suffering? If she has that obligation, then the husband has permission to flee and save himself from death and thereby cause suffering to the woman; she has no claim against him—“Why are you putting me into a situation of suffering by fleeing so that I won’t know where you are?” Because she has an obligation to save him by bodily suffering, and therefore, when she has no claim, he has permission. But if the woman had no obligation to suffer in order to save him, then she does have a claim against him: “Why are you fleeing and saving yourself from danger while causing me suffering?” And because of that claim, he would indeed not have fled. So the second law is proved by force of the first.
I hope I managed now to explain my words.

I wrote the above before I now saw Kardigano’s words above. It seems he didn’t quite follow correctly, and enough said.

[This is the last time I’m taking part here among people greater and better than I am.
Where exactly did I not follow correctly? Your long comment is what I wrote briefly at the beginning of my remarks—that after they fled she cannot escape the suffering by revealing it, because she no longer knows.
What I wrote is indeed not according to your understanding, but rather as Machatzit HaShekel and Rabbi Michael Abraham explained here, except for the question whether the first law depends on the phrase “they are light-minded.” And to me at least it seems very clear that this is the Magen Avraham’s intent, and his words are simple and clear as gently flowing water. (And by the way, the Magen Avraham deliberately stated the second law after the first, even though according to you the second law is really the reason for the first, because the first is proved from the body of the story, while the second comes only from precision in the wording.)

And what you just wrote does not seem plausible to me at all. You now wrote that it is certainly clear as day that she may not reveal it and must suffer if he did not flee, and nevertheless there is still a discussion whether she has no obligation from the outset to suffer and therefore whether he may flee.
That means the initial assumption was that she must give herself over to suffering so that they should not catch him, and yet he must give himself over to death so that they should not torture her. And the conclusion is that he does not have to give himself over to death so that they should not torture her.
That seems very strange to me. What difference does it make whether he gives himself over to death or whether she hands him over to death? It is exactly the same prohibition. Does he have more right to abandon himself to death than she has to abandon him to death? (Not fleeing is exactly like informing. Unless in your view everything hinges on the claim that “not fleeing” is passive omission, and therefore he must give himself over by sitting and doing nothing, even though she may not hand him over through the act of informing.)

With apologies, I’ve lost the thread and it’s already hard for me to keep following.

Dear and honored Kardigano,
Read my wording carefully—I said you did not follow quite correctly, not that you did not follow at all, only partially. And I already emphasized that I wrote that comment before seeing your words; for some reason I was in the middle of writing for a long time and your remark slipped in, but it had not yet appeared for me. Meaning: were it not for my latest comments, then indeed you would not have followed what had been written before, because they understood it differently—not like me and not like you. In other words, “to follow correctly” would mean summarizing that there are two interpretations here that differ fundamentally, and not only one view, which would also be my understanding of Machatzit HaShekel.
As for my own approach in explaining the Magen Avraham, I see no refutation of what I wrote from the way you concluded and explained.
And now let us add one more question to conclude my remarks. Why does the Magen Avraham write only that one may flee, even in a case where by fleeing he causes suffering to another? This implies that if by doing so he would cause death to another, then it would be forbidden, because he emphasized only suffering. But it seems that even if the other person will die as a result of his fleeing, he may still flee and save himself, like the rule decided in the case of two people walking in the desert—that your life takes precedence over your fellow’s. Just as he may drink the water alone and thereby cause his fellow to die of thirst, so too he may flee and cause his fellow to die, if this happens only because he is saving himself by fleeing.
This can be resolved, but that will have to wait.
And now I found in the book Imrei Binah, Orach Chaim [Auerbach], section 13, paragraph 5, that he addressed the words of the Magen Avraham somewhat along the lines of the two points I noted above; and according to what we have said, everything he raised there is very well resolved.

A. If you think it worthwhile to discuss it even with me, though I’m no Torah scholar at all, etc., then I’d certainly be happy.
B. I did not come to summarize but to express my opinion. And my opinion is indeed like your understanding of Machatzit HaShekel, but not like your own understanding of the Magen Avraham; I only commented briefly on Rabbi Michael Abraham’s words, just as you did at greater length.
C. I don’t have the book Imrei Binah.

D. As for your concluding question, one could say that since the death decree is directed specifically at him, there is room to say that he may not save himself at the cost of his fellow’s life, but only at the cost of his fellow’s suffering. That is unlike the case of two people in the desert, where death threatens them equally. There, according to the law, only an act of transgression is forbidden because of the reasoning “who says your blood is redder?” By the same token, one could answer your difficulty from the Ritva, by saying that specifically in the case of bandits, even if they singled out one person it is forbidden to hand him over; but if he is liable to death under the law of the kingdom, it would be permitted to hand him over.
Another possible answer is simply that perhaps indeed fleeing even if the fellow will die is legally permitted, but there is no proof for that from the passage in Sabbath, and the Magen Avraham did not come here to discuss the entire topic. Surely for that he would have brought medieval and later authorities with his usual strong hand and would not have decided it briefly from the Talmud alone. I recall, for example, that there is a responsum of the Radbaz saying that if they tell him, “Let us cut off your hand or we will kill your fellow,” he is not obligated to give up his hand. Even if the Magen Avraham distinguishes between suffering and surrendering a limb—as Rabbi Michael Abraham wrote above about a kidney—presumably he would have had to mention and distinguish or disagree. But instead he cited only the Talmud.

E. Since you confirmed that I understood your words correctly, as you wrote “as you concluded in your explanation,” I’ll continue.
According to your reading, in the second law the Magen Avraham is introducing a law but not stating what practical difference it makes. What practical difference is there in saying that the woman has a duty to accept suffering? The fact that Rabbi Shimon is permitted to flee was already learned from the first law, and that is forced by the Talmudic passage without room for speculation. The second law, according to your interpretation, certainly depends on reasoning and is not completely forced. So the main point is missing from the text.
But according to Machatzit HaShekel’s interpretation, the two are indeed separate laws: first, that one may flee. I still might have said that if he did not flee, she would be allowed to reveal it, and each person saves himself, even from suffering, however he can. (As for the difficulty from the Ritva, one could answer as I wrote above.) The novelty, then, is that she too is forbidden to reveal it.
From your hints it seems to me that you think the woman has an obligation to go out of her way and place herself in suffering in order to save Rabbi Shimon. And therefore Rabbi Shimon may even actively cause her suffering in order to save himself, because in your view even fleeing is an active deed. But if you come, for example, to infer from here that one may steal kidneys—and nuts—from his fellow in order to save himself, it is certainly impossible to rule such a severe law based on some slight difficulty that the Magen Avraham did not mention the Ritva, whose ruling I do not even know to be normative.

[And what I wrote about “following” was because, at the time of my first message, I had not opened the actual wording of the Magen Avraham and of Machatzit HaShekel, but relied only on the Magen Avraham quotation that Rabbi Michael brought here, and on what both of you had written throughout the discussion. So perhaps I had not correctly understood both of your positions, and how could I then express my opinion? In any case, before the second message I wrote—where I committed that this would be the last time I would write in this thread unless asked, though since you addressed me directly the commitment was void—I did open and look at the wording of the Magen Avraham itself and the wording of Machatzit HaShekel, and in my opinion, as stated, Machatzit HaShekel’s words are correct.
And so that this visit not be empty-handed, I’ll add one slight inference against your reading: according to you, why did the Magen Avraham quote from the Talmud the words “women are light-minded”? It should have been enough for him to quote “perhaps they will torment them and they will reveal us.” But according to Machatzit HaShekel’s reading, there is nothing lacking and nothing extra.]

Kardigano, many thanks for all your pleasant words.
What you asked—what practical difference there is in the second law—what more is needed than that very point, that one is obligated to save from murder even at the cost of suffering? Anyone who understands immediately sees the case and the practical difference. If a person sees someone chasing his fellow to kill him, and he can stop the pursuit only by physically blocking the pursuer and thereby receive blows as the pursuer tries to continue the chase—then he is obligated to do this, if that is the only thing he can do.
As for the law itself, it is compelled by the first law. And if the first law is proven from the Talmud, then the second necessarily follows from it as well. So what is missing from the main text?

As for the second question I asked, indeed the direction is like the first approach you wrote. There is a discussion here about causing the other person’s murder, not about an act of rescue. But one has to define when an act of fleeing is considered an act of saving oneself, and when it is considered causing the murder of one’s fellow. For example, the law is clear from the Jerusalem Talmud that if one sees a stream of water about to come to his field before it actually reaches it, he is allowed to set up a barrier for his own field even though by doing so the stream will go to his fellow’s field and damage it. That is only an act of rescue. But if it has already entered his field, then he may no longer divert it so that it goes on to his fellow’s field. Maybe, as you wrote, the test is whether the cause of death threatens both equally, or only one person, and only through this alleged act of rescue does he transfer the threat to the other. In that case it is not defined as rescue, in line with the Ritva. But if you disagree with the Ritva, then there is no room to forbid fleeing even though the result will be death to another, exactly like handing a weapon to a gentile in order to save oneself from death. As for your distinction that here he was liable to death by the law of the kingdom, a source is needed for that, especially if he was liable not according to true justice. After all, the Magen Avraham explicitly emphasized that his fellow should not be “killed for nothing,” which makes clear that what Rabbi Shimon incurred under the law of the kingdom is not considered a justified killing, but “for nothing.” See there.
The second approach is certainly unacceptable. If the Magen Avraham knew from somewhere that one may even flee at the cost of another’s death, then he would not have had to bother at all proving from the Talmud in Sabbath that one may flee at the cost of another’s suffering. It would be completely unnecessary. Necessarily he holds that what he is proving from the Talmud is indeed a novelty, and we have no prior knowledge of a greater novelty than that. And the question was why and how—after all, as a matter of logic it is no worse than Rabbi Akiva’s law. And the answer must therefore be that he distinguishes as in the first answer. Study it carefully.

On your last point, first things first.

A. What you wrote, that it is completely unnecessary to prove from the Talmud a law about suffering when there is already proof from the Ritva about death—this does not seem unnecessary to me at all, just as Rabbi Michael wrote above. Any proof that exists for a law from the Talmud must be brought; one cannot hide it. What, are the amoraim less than later writers? Can you say that this Ritva is accepted by all the medieval authorities? Are we talking about explicit statements or inferences from silence?

B. What do you mean, “if you disagree with the Ritva”—what was your assumption? The need I proposed was at the stage of the initial assumption: one might have said that specifically in the case of bandits it is forbidden to hand over a weapon even if one will die, as the Ritva says, but in the law of the kingdom it would be permitted to hand over a weapon in order not to die, and likewise permitted to inform in order not to suffer. The Talmudic passage then teaches that even under the law of the kingdom, it is forbidden to inform in a case where the government acts out of arbitrary evil, because that is an unjust killing. And that is what the Magen Avraham wrote. This is only a possible initial line of thought, to explain why it makes sense to bring proof from the Talmud in Sabbath even if the Ritva were as explicit as a Talmudic passage.
And now that we define this as unjust killing, the law reverts to the Ritva, that one must even give himself over to death rather than inform, even though there is room to distinguish somewhat between speech and handing over a weapon, as Rabbi Michael wrote above.

C. So you are indeed saying that from this Talmudic passage the Magen Avraham learned that a person must go out of his way and place himself into a situation of suffering, and that a person may even actively place his fellow into a situation of suffering in order to save himself. In my opinion, not only should the Magen Avraham have spelled out any such far-reaching ruling—not like Machatzit HaShekel’s understanding, which is certainly simpler and more explicit, and from your earlier remarks it also seems that Imrei Binah understood the Magen Avraham that way, and Rabbi Michael likewise understood the main point of the Magen Avraham that way—but the proof is also very weak. It depends on the reasoning that if a person does not have to go out of his way and place himself in suffering, then the endangered person may not flee and place him in suffering. But where did the Magen Avraham get such a foundational assumption?
The distinction is obvious: when a person flees, he is saving himself in a manner permitted to him, like the one who drinks his own water in the desert—what you called “an act of rescue”—and the damage to his fellow comes about on its own. You cannot bring a proof from there to an act that is entirely one of actively causing suffering to one’s fellow, and then impose on the sufferer a duty to place himself into such suffering.
There is certainly room to say that suffering does not override the prohibition of “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” as Rabbi Michael wrote above. But if there is an initial assumption that a person is not obligated to suffer, then one cannot prove from the Talmud in Sabbath that he is obligated, because the proof can easily be rejected, as stated.
And according to you, saving oneself at the cost of another’s suffering is permitted. If so, I am puzzled how the medieval authorities were silent about saving oneself at the cost of another’s money, as cited in the source Rabbi Michael referred to above. And who measured the amounts of suffering, to distinguish between torture at the hands of the cruel Romans and cutting off someone else’s hand to save oneself? I certainly have never heard that such would be the law, and the Radbaz, as mentioned, says one is not obligated. If so, then would an utterly destitute pauper also be allowed to kidnap a man and sell him into slavery to support himself? These are enormous laws, and the whole proof is based on the fact that the Magen Avraham did not mention the Ritva, together with a logical argument that otherwise fleeing would be forbidden? It is beyond me.
Still, it seems to me that the positions have now been clarified.

D. Thank you for the nice citation from the Jerusalem Talmud.

[ E. By the way, I can’t refrain from noting that all this I’m writing from a halakhic point of view. But for myself, as a matter of external reasoning, I see no difference whatsoever between active doing and passive omission, and no difference between rescue and causing harm. Everything is judged solely by the result. Once you decide which result is preferable, everyone is obligated to bring it about, and how matters happen to unfold in the world is of no practical difference at all. But Jewish law certainly judges the act itself—and therefore, on the basis of “who says your blood is redder,” it is forbidden to commit an act of murder. In my opinion, on the contrary: since in any case someone will die, and “who says your blood is redder,” what difference does it make whether he kills with his own hands or gives himself over to death? Where there is no moral difference, a person may look after himself. That is what I referred to earlier as consequentialism, as opposed to deontology. And within Jewish law one must distinguish, as you brought from the Jerusalem Talmud, between whether the damage has already come upon him or not.
And there before you is the trolley dilemma, in which people illustrate all the distinctions stated here in various forms. As for me, in this matter my thinking is crude and rough, and were it not for Jewish law I would, as stated, see no dilemma at all in any such trolley case.]

Well said and blessings to you. It is evident from your words that you are a serious Torah scholar, whereas I am clearly an ignoramus trying to understand. I need to enter the matter more seriously in order to discuss all your points. For now, thank you for all the effort. These are fine and deep matters. Fortunate are you.
Just to let you know: I don’t understand a single foreign word. I am a product of Lithuanian yeshivot. So I did not understand part of the above at all, and won’t until it is translated into ordinary language. My apologies. Again, thank you for all the help in understanding Machatzit HaShekel.

After such a long back-and-forth, are we to part on such a mocking note? I’m amazed. In any case, you can keep your view, and I will stand where I stand.
I explained the meaning of the two foreign words I used, and what else is there for me to translate when the entire internet is full of them? Go read on Google.

There is no mocking tone here at all. I was serious in what I wrote. Maybe you don’t believe it or aren’t used to it. Again, thank you for everything you taught me. What more do you want than that? For now, I agree with your explanation of Machatzit HaShekel.

Now it occurs to me that according to my approach in understanding the Magen Avraham, one can resolve the comment of Rabbi Moshe Shlomo Amar, may he live long, in his book Shema Shlomo, where he left this unresolved. What is the Magen Avraham’s proof that a person is obligated to accept suffering in order to save his fellow from mortal danger? Perhaps in general he is not obligated to do so, but here it is different, because in the act of revealing where Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai is, there is an element of causing Rabbi Shimon’s murder and death, and that is certainly forbidden. Yet the Magen Avraham’s wording is that one is obligated to endure suffering so that his fellow not be killed for nothing, and he does not limit his language to a case where without the suffering there would be informing on one’s fellow to the authorities. So where did he derive his rule?
But according to our approach in understanding the Magen Avraham, it is wonderful: the issue here is not from the woman’s side, whether she is permitted to reveal it or not, because that is obvious—she may not reveal it, because that causes murder, and it is a case of “be killed rather than transgress.” Rather, the issue and the proof come from the very permission Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai has to flee and thereby cause suffering to the woman. Where does that permission come from? Even for the sake of saving himself, it cannot come at another person’s expense unless that other person has a duty to endure suffering for the sake of saving him. Only then can he exercise his right to flee and save himself from danger. Study this carefully.

A. Now it occurs to me to raise a difficulty according to your words. Since the woman is forbidden to reveal it—clear as day, etc.—then what does it matter to her whether Rabbi Shimon is in the study hall or in the cave? It is like one who destroys his fellow’s object from which benefit is forbidden. For according to you, the initial assumption is that Rabbi Shimon would sit in the study hall. Of course, surrendering himself is forbidden to him, since it is no better than informing on his fellow. The Romans would come and torment the woman, and although she could reveal it, she is forbidden to reveal it even though she suffers, even under threat of death.
And even according to Machatzit HaShekel’s interpretation, one can ask similarly: once the second law has been established—that she is obligated to endure suffering and forbidden to reveal it—then the first law falls away, because the flight does not generate any new suffering that she would not have been obligated to endure even without the flight.
There are possible answers, of course, but they seem forced to me.

B. Another difficulty on the Magen Avraham, according to all interpretations: the woman too could flee to the cave, and that is certainly her obligation under “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” since by doing so she would also enable Rabbi Shimon to flee without placing suffering on her. So the suffering is in her own hands to avoid. And if you say the suffering and effort of fleeing to the cave—that is certainly also obligatory upon her under “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” because anyone who rushes to save his fellow makes an effort in the rescue.

C. As for the difficulty raised in Shema Shlomo, it seems to me that indeed we do not learn from here that one is obligated to endure suffering if he can avoid it permissibly, and there is nothing in the Magen Avraham beyond what is in the Talmud. Admittedly, this is the first difficulty I have heard here that tips the scales a bit in favor of your interpretation of the Magen Avraham against Machatzit HaShekel. But there is still a difficulty on the Magen Avraham himself: where did he get it from?—as I wrote above in section C.

And I hereby respond.

A. I too had noticed this point, though in a different formulation. Why does Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai need a right of claim against her, under the law of rescue, that she must endure suffering for his salvation? In any case she is already obligated to endure the suffering in order not to hand him over to the authorities, because of causing murder. If so, that itself should automatically give him permission to flee, even if it causes her bodily suffering.
At first I thought to answer this by saying that it is not correct to reason that way, because we do not care at all that she has a duty, in terms of her own prohibitions, to endure suffering. That is not enough to grant him permission to cause her that very suffering.
But there is no need to come to that here in our case, and in truth the difficulty is no difficulty at all. For here, in the case of Rabbi Shimon’s wife, the Talmud explicitly says that women are light-minded, and by nature they will prefer to reveal it rather than withstand the pain and suffering of torture. Therefore, the whole issue of causing murder does not hold up for them against torture. So Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai cannot remain in his place in the study hall; he must flee. And by doing so he necessarily causes his wife bodily pain and suffering, because now it will no longer help if she reveals it—there is nothing for her to reveal. According to this, there is permission to flee only if she is obligated, under the law of saving him, to endure the suffering that he causes her by his act of rescue through fleeing.
On the other hand, if it had been a man and not a woman, then the issue would already have begun with the first flight to the study hall, because even that causes suffering to the fellow who knows his hiding place. He would then have been forbidden to flee there, and should rather have remained where he was together with his good friend, and thus would not have caused him any suffering, since he would not be put into a situation of revealing or not revealing. But since it is clear that he may flee and cause suffering, it necessarily follows that the fellow too has an obligation to endure suffering in order to save him. Then he can even flee to a place whose location is known, because certainly the fellow will not reveal it due to the prohibition of causing murder, for which one must be killed rather than transgress.

B. And indeed, the difficulty he raised according to Machatzit HaShekel’s understanding is also no difficulty at all, and it is astonishing that he asked it according to that understanding. The two laws are completely separate. The second law, that she is obligated to endure suffering and not reveal it, is learned from the fact that it was precisely because women are light-minded and would reveal it that he fled; but had it been a man, he would not have fled at all, because that is the law—that one may not reveal where he is but must endure the suffering. But the first law, that one may flee, is learned specifically from the case of women who are light-minded, where if he does not flee and she reveals it, she will suffer no pain, but if he does flee then she will suffer. So it is proven that he may flee.

C. As for the question on the Magen Avraham according to everyone—why didn’t the woman flee as well under “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” thereby solving all the problems—I do not understand why this is a question on the Magen Avraham and not on the historical event itself. But according to what we said above, this too is no difficulty at all. As has already been discussed, Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai said that because women are light-minded, they will not withstand the test of torture and suffering, and from the outset they will not enter such a trial, even if the law requires otherwise. And if you mean fleeing to the cave, where she would suffer even more—thirteen years in a cave together with Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai—well, that is baffling.

D. As for his rejection of my point from Shema Shlomo: this style of rejection reminds me of the claim already raised above against me—how do we know that the Magen Avraham agrees with the Ritva that it is forbidden to cause murder even under threat that one himself will be killed otherwise? This style of questioning is not common among us, as far as I remember. To us it is obvious that if the Magen Avraham does not mention such a ruling as a leniency anywhere in his rulings—and especially here, where he is discussing and innovating that suffering one is indeed obligated to endure, which by implication would mean death one is not obligated to endure—then if that were his whole novelty, in contrast to murder, he should have said so explicitly. If he did not mention it, then it is obvious that it is forbidden, and therefore that is not the issue in his words here. And generally it is obvious that if there is such a Ritva in the Talmudic literature prohibiting it, the Magen Avraham would not disagree without explicitly ruling against it in his halakhic writings, unless it is shown that the Ritva’s novellae were not before him.
Likewise regarding that rejection: it cannot be that the Magen Avraham came only to tell us what is explicit in the Talmud, namely that in that exact case one may do so. Why would it be forbidden, if Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai was allowed to do it? The Magen Avraham came to derive a new law implicit in that story in the Talmud. That is why he brings it as a halakhic ruling implied by the Talmud, not as an explicit copy-and-paste of what the Talmud says. So it must be that he was not merely saying that one must endure suffering so as not to cause another’s death by informing to the authorities, or any other act that in the setting of suffering causes death. It is clear as day that he came to innovate a rule emerging from that story: that a person has an obligation to save his fellow even if, by doing so, he brings suffering and pain upon himself.

A. The answer you first gave—that even though she is forbidden the “benefit” of revealing it, Rabbi Shimon is still forbidden to prevent her from having the possibility of transgressing—that is also what I had thought to answer, and I hinted at it through the law of destroying another’s prohibited-benefit object. But in my opinion it is forced. Not only is the reasoning itself forced, but if so then all we learn from this Talmudic passage is a limited rule: that one may flee only in a case where, according to the law, he has taken from her no right at all, but merely prevented her from benefiting through a prohibition. And we should not add beyond that.
You then offered another answer, that the difficulty was no difficulty to begin with, because she would in fact transgress and reveal it, and therefore by fleeing he prevented her from having the possibility to reveal it. I did not understand how that is more of an answer than the first.
The first flight to the study hall was before the decree had intensified, and they thought the Romans would not exert themselves so much to search, and the matter would soon die down. For otherwise they would catch the woman, torment her, she would reveal it, and they would catch Rabbi Shimon.

B. That is not how Machatzit HaShekel understood it. The first law of the Magen Avraham—that one may flee and thereby cause suffering—is learned from the flight itself and does not depend on the case of women being light-minded. Only the second law of the Magen Avraham—that one is obligated to endure suffering and not reveal—is learned from the phrase “women are light-minded.” And to that I say: once she is obligated to endure suffering even without the flight, because of the second law, then what does it matter to her that Rabbi Shimon flees? It is no more than destroying another person’s prohibited-benefit object—that is, until now he was forbidden to benefit from it, and now that it has been destroyed he cannot benefit from it even if he wants to transgress. And the fact that she is light-minded and would transgress is irrelevant, since she has no right in that matter, as stated. If one wants, one can of course answer as above, that even so she still has the ability to transgress and one has no right to take that option away from her. But that is the very same difficulty, and I was surprised that you were surprised at it. Unless I did not understand your intention.

C. My question about fleeing to the cave was about the effort involved—an effort that a person is obligated to make under “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” like one who saves a drowning man through his actions. It is in no way comparable to torture by the Romans. So even if we grant that one may not flee and cause the suffering of torture to his fellow when that fellow has not fled, still, since the fellow is obligated to flee—at least in order to enable him to flee—it follows that he himself may flee too, even if the fellow has not yet fled. And I will add that she does not have to flee specifically to the cave or for thirteen years. Rabbi Shimon and his son were well-known people; if they fled to another city, word would spread in no time. But Rabbi Shimon’s wife—“all the glory of the king’s daughter is inward”—if she fled, who would know her and who would know where she was, and why would the Romans think that if she were in another city she would know where her husband had fled, such that they would send men to search for her at the ends of the earth?
I’m not questioning the actual event, but the laws one can derive from it, as explained.
Still, if in your eyes there is no difficulty, then fine. In truth, it is not such a strong difficulty for me either.

D. The difficulty from Shema Shlomo is indeed strong in my eyes, and because of it I am almost inclined to accept your interpretation of the Magen Avraham over Machatzit HaShekel’s. Still, it requires more thought.
What you said at the end, that the Magen Avraham would not simply repeat a law already explicit in the Talmud—I do not see that as an argument, because according to Machatzit HaShekel the law is inferred from a nuance in the wording “they are light-minded” and from the story details, not from the core subject of the passage itself, and so it is certainly a novel point. According to Machatzit HaShekel, one learns from it that a person is obligated to endure suffering.
(By the way, I note that in order to raise a difficulty, the questioner must show that the book of the Ritva was in the Magen Avraham’s possession and that he cites it elsewhere, not the other way around.)

~~
To Rabbi Michi, if by chance you glance here:
it seems there may be evidence from the Magen Avraham for what you called “territorial considerations.”
The Magen Avraham concludes—regarding the second law, according to Machatzit HaShekel’s interpretation—that if they torture someone so that he reveal where a certain person is hiding, and then they will kill that person, then the tortured party must endure the suffering and not reveal it. And he also concludes—the first law—that the hidden person may flee, and by doing so deny his fellow the possibility of revealing his whereabouts in order to save himself from the suffering, even though they will then torture the fellow.
If there are no such “territorial considerations” in the world, then the fleeing is obviously permitted and needs no further discussion, because it has not created any new suffering for the fellow, since even without the fleeing the fellow is obligated to suffer and forbidden to reveal it, by the second law. So what difference does it make to the fellow whether the man flees?
Rather, the fleeing changes the possibility of escaping the suffering by revealing it from something “forbidden” into something “impossible.”
And here we learn that fleeing is permitted. One might have said that in the laws of a pursuer there are no territorial considerations, and whatever the fellow is obligated to do one may “force” him to do—like saving oneself with another’s property and then paying for it. But it seems the Magen Avraham learns from here a general law: that one may save himself at the cost of causing suffering to his fellow, even in a place where, had he not fled, no suffering at all would have come to the fellow, and only he himself would have been killed. So we see that for the Magen Avraham these “territorial considerations” are a fundamental principle, and not all fleeing is the same. Specifically fleeing is permitted because a person is acting on himself to save himself and has not invaded his fellow’s domain.

And I respond once more.

A. It indeed seems that you did not get to the bottom of my intention. At first I answered this way: even if there is no possibility of transgressing the prohibition not to reveal—hypothetically—and she is obligated to endure suffering and not reveal, that suffering and pain is from her own legal system before Heaven, that she not violate the prohibition of causing murder. That alone cannot supply Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai with permission to flee and cause her that suffering. These are two separate systems. He wants to perform an act of self-rescue by fleeing. If that comes at another’s expense in suffering, then he must have, within the legal system of rescue, a right to cause the other suffering, and the other must have an obligation to accept the suffering for the purpose of his rescue. In other words, the other must be obligated, within the legal system of rescue, to endure the suffering. The fact that she already has an independent obligation to endure מצד her own prohibition of causing murder does not help him build on that and act on that basis in the legal framework of rescue. They are two separate legal systems. That is how it seems to me, though I do not know how to explain it better.
But in a different and simpler way, I wrote to resolve it: insofar as we are discussing whether there is proof for the second law from the story mentioned in the Talmud in Sabbath, there is no difficulty at all from the fact that the law forbids revealing a hiding place and thereby causing murder. That simply does not interest us in the actual story with a woman regarding whom Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai himself said and testified that women are light-minded, and she would in fact reveal it and transgress the prohibition rather than endure the suffering. Therefore, if he has no right over her that she endure suffering for the sake of his rescue when he flees, then he has absolutely no permission to flee and cause her bodily suffering. And in that case he would not flee, she would reveal it, and she would endure no suffering at all. Since he did flee, it is therefore proven that he does have such a right, etc.

But the formulation you proposed is a third approach: analogous to preventing someone from enjoying a prohibited benefit from an object by destroying it. Here he prevents her from having the option to choose the illicit “benefit” of avoiding pain and suffering by revealing it. In my opinion, this is not merely preventing a forbidden benefit; it is imposing real positive pain and suffering, which in actual reality would not have come upon her at all without the flight, regardless of the circumstances that would have prevented it. And indeed, one who damages prohibited-benefit objects is exempt. So your difficulty is only on your own approach. According to us there is no difficulty, because in the end he caused her suffering that in reality would not have reached her were it not for his flight. So necessarily he has a right to do so in every situation and place, even where there is no prohibition of revelation, and not only a permission to flee. There is no great difficulty.

What I added about the first and second flights is not necessarily about the exact historical event, only a hypothetical case and a practical application for another case that might be similar with a man rather than a woman.

B. As for Machatzit HaShekel, the difficulty clearly does not arise from the outset, and it is not like the difficulty on my approach. In Machatzit HaShekel’s approach, we are not dealing with rights and claims between one person and another, but only with whether it is forbidden to cause suffering to another by fleeing from danger or whether it is permitted. If we see in this story that Rabbi Shimon indeed fled, and by doing so caused suffering to the woman because she now could not reveal it—and we are not concerned whether revealing is forbidden or permitted—and had he not fled, she certainly would have revealed it—this is what I meant when I said that the first law is learned specifically from the fact that it was a woman, and not from a fine inference from the phrase “they are light-minded,” as you thought I meant—then it follows that in reality he caused her suffering, and therefore it must be permitted.

I missed this—sorry for the delay.
It seems you are right about this.
Thank you, and much appreciated.

We seem to have a “tied bundle” here.
The questioner brought a Ritva and asked a question on the Magen Avraham. Later he asked another question. Then: “Again I found in Imrei Binah, etc., somewhat along the lines of what I noted, etc., and according to our words everything he raised there is very well resolved.” After that he also brought a Jerusalem Talmud. Then: “Now it occurs to me to resolve, according to my approach in understanding the Magen Avraham, the comment of Rabbi Moshe Shlomo Amar, may he live and be well, in his book Shema Shlomo, where he left it unresolved.” And in general he showed excellent command of the entire topic in all its sides and corners.

In Otzar HaChochma, in the memorial volume Ateret Shlomo, part 3, year 5758 (1998), pages 139–229, there is a long and complex article—whose major principles in deontology hang upon this very topic—85 pages by Rabbi A. Yungreis, who and our present questioner are clearly of one zodiac and cling to one another like brothers. Almost everything said here is there. The discussion of the Magen Avraham begins there in article 42. And there too, in article 45, the author also “again found in Imrei Binah.” The Jerusalem Talmud is there in article 44. I did not now find Rabbi Moshe Shlomo Amar’s comment there.

There is no practical difference and no complaint here, but some of the things are a bit strange—what led him to do this? Still, the words testify about their writer that he is a Torah scholar, and may his strength and wisdom continue to sustain him—may he increase and burst forth.

Correction to the quotation from the questioner’s wording: “Again, I have now found in the book Imrei Binah, etc.”

And I forgot to mention the obvious: the actual novelty itself, and the whole give-and-take in the questioner’s words, had already all been written there in that lovely treatment from 1998.