Haim, see the corrections to the article that were published here on the site.

I’m not necessarily claiming that there is a moral problem here (I’m not completely sure there really isn’t one); I’m claiming that God defines the matter as a spiritual abomination and as an act that must not be done, and it sounds to me at least from the wording “abomination” that this is an act that must not be done in any sweeping, categorical way.
Beyond that—even if there is a moral difficulty regarding such people because they cannot build a family, is Jewish law supposed to subordinate itself to morality? After all, the Rabbi himself says that Jewish law comes to add commands with spiritual value that may conflict with morality, which is “only” meant to create order in this world. If so, then we should have interpreted every halakhic commandment as fitting with morality, and then morality and Jewish law really would overlap—but it seems clear that this is not so.
We could say the same thing about the wife of a priest who was raped and make a very strained interpretive move that “she has to leave her husband only if she doesn’t love him,” and other forced readings that drain Jewish law of all its value.
All this is without even addressing the fact that it is obvious to any sensible person that there are a great many problems (social, moral, etc.) with this phenomenon. True, there is a moral difficulty, since those people want to build families, but there are also many other “human” values against permitting such a thing (that is, considerations that do not stem from Torah values).

It doesn’t sound that way to me. Certainly there is no necessity for that.
He brought this point correctly in the interview (as opposed to other points). I said that if there are two possible halakhic interpretations and one of them is more moral, there is no reason not to choose it. Not because Jewish law is necessarily moral, but because there is no reason to create conflicts where there is no need. Like the principle “Rabbi Shimon is worthy to be relied upon in pressing circumstances.” The fact that it is a pressing circumstance does not mean that the law follows Rabbi Shimon. But if halakhically one may act in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, then pressing circumstances are a reason to do so.

So basically, according to the Rabbi, when a Sanhedrin is established it should always find a way to subordinate Jewish law to morality by means of an interpretation that resolves the moral problem in the law. That sounds very problematic to me, and in effect empties of content the whole distinction the Rabbi makes between Jewish law and morality.

That is not what I wrote. Read it again.

“I said that if there are two possible halakhic interpretations and one of them is more moral, there is no reason not to choose it.” (quoting the Rabbi).
In the case of homosexuals, the Rabbi proposes another interpretation in order to avoid the moral problem that arises in that case.
In principle, one could propose an interpretation in every case of anti-moral Jewish law, and then I’m back again at a preference for the moral interpretation over the non-moral one.

You can propose whatever you want. The question is how plausible it is. I am not talking about make-believe games, but about an interpretation that is plausible on its own terms. If there is a plausible proposal, then indeed there is room to consider it.

What does plausible mean? Plausible in terms of learning from the plain meaning of the Torah? Plausible in terms of fitting morality and common sense?

Plausible as an interpretation of the verses and of the Sages’ laws. Criteria of plausibility include both considerations of reasoning and considerations of interpretation (language, etc.).

Well, that is an absurd interpretation.
After all, the Torah could not have imposed punishments only on someone who is also attracted to women, because those are matters of the heart, and a religious court cannot punish on that basis.
And if the Sages had thought so, we would not have had to arrive at the principle of splitting testimony in the case of “So-and-so sodomized me willingly” (because maybe I am not attracted to women while that other person is).

But inadvertence, lack of intent, or an unneeded labor on the Sabbath are also matters of a person’s inner state. So too the intention to accept the commandments in conversion, or the intentions that accompany a contract (things that are in his heart and in the heart of every person). In various contexts, Jewish law sees it as the role of a religious court to assess what is in a person’s heart. If we are talking about an openly gay person who has lived that way his entire life, then apparently this is not an evil impulse to sin but a different orientation. You do not need a whole day of study for that, nor to examine the kidneys and the heart.

It seems that Lev was talking about the religious court, and therefore inadvertence, lack of intent, and an unneeded labor on the Sabbath are indeed not something on the basis of which the court can execute, unless it is proven as clearly as one can prove anything—for example, someone who extinguishes a lamp for the sake of the oil, where his intention really was for the oil, and incidentally, according to Rabbi Yehuda, that is forbidden at the Torah level.
As for homosexuality, Lev’s proof from splitting testimony in the case of “So-and-so sodomized me” seems like a strong proof. After all, it would have been possible to present the passive partner as someone attracted only to men, since he is an openly gay person who has lived that way his whole life, and then we would not have had to arrive at the striking novelty of splitting testimony.

I was also talking about the religious court. They have to decide whether to execute or not, and whether to accept a convert or not.
The proof there is weak. A. It is possible that the Sages did not grasp that there are people for whom this is nature and not impulse. B. They did not think this involved an interpretive restriction like that one, and there is no need for it anyway. There is a convincing explanation there and everything is fine. The splitting is not a novelty created by a difficulty. It is an independent principle that appears in other places too (like Bar Binitos on page 25 and elsewhere).

It could be permitted on the grounds of coercion, since “the Merciful One exempts one who is coerced.”

“But to the young woman you shall do nothing; the young woman has not committed a sin deserving death, for just as when a man rises against his fellow and murders him, so is this matter.”

And the sexual impulse that is drawn to the same sex has murdered the sexual impulse that is drawn to the other sex, and he is coerced, and the Merciful One exempts one who is coerced.