Q&A: A Moral Value That Overrides Torah Law
A Moral Value That Overrides Torah Law
Question
The Talmud in Sabbath 81b (and more broadly Berakhot 19b–20a) says: “Great is human dignity, for it overrides a prohibition in the Torah.” The main derivation is in Bava Metzia 30b regarding an elderly person for whom it is beneath his dignity.
Does the Rabbi have a clear definition of this rule, and why don’t we learn from here to all the prohibitions in the Torah? For example, if human dignity has changed—in matters that in the past were not considered issues of human dignity, at least not at the level common today—does that provide a basis to override a prohibition in favor of the value of human dignity? And if not, then what is the definition?
Answer
I didn’t understand the question. Human dignity overrides a Torah-level prohibition only through passive omission, or else a rabbinic prohibition. Clearly, human dignity is determined according to today’s circumstances and norms, not those of the Sages’ time.
Discussion on Answer
Human dignity is not a positive commandment but a moral and human value. Usually this refers to my own human dignity (as in the case of an elderly person for whom it is beneath his dignity). There is no positive commandment to preserve my own dignity.
True, it isn’t a positive commandment. But the idea behind a positive commandment overriding a prohibition—at least according to the view (I think Rav Nissim Gaon) that where there is a positive commandment there is no prohibition—is that this is God’s will in such a clash. If so, why not say the same regarding human dignity: that the clash creates a situation in which the prohibition simply is not there at all? And even though human dignity is stated with regard to the person himself, still, “what is hateful to you…” etc.
Because Rav Nissim Gaon said that about a positive commandment. According to his view, where there is a positive commandment there is no prohibition. But who told you that where there is human dignity there is no prohibition? What’s the connection? Why not say that where there is a prohibition there is no positive commandment? Because the Torah teaches us that the rule goes the other way. The Torah does not teach us that where there is human dignity there is no prohibition, so it is hard to assume that. And the reasoning also seems very sensible to me, as I explained.
Why only through passive omission? After all, a positive commandment overrides even a prohibition in a case of positive action. So if the value of human dignity is important, why shouldn’t it also override a prohibition that involves an active deed? (Especially according to the side that says when a positive commandment overrides a prohibition, the prohibition is simply not there.)
Why not say that the value of “and you shall do what is right and good” is what overrides the prohibition, even if it involves an action?