Q&A: Human Dignity
Human Dignity
Question
Hello Rabbi,
Regarding human dignity versus a positive commandment in a case of passive omission, according to Jewish law do we rule leniently like the view of most of the medieval authorities, or stringently like Maimonides in Kilayim, chapter 10, halakha 29, where he did not include the permission based on human dignity in a case where it overrides a positive commandment through passive omission? Thank you, Rabbi.
Answer
First, a small correction in phrasing: the later authorities discussed whether what the Talmud says — that human dignity overrides a Torah prohibition through passive omission — means any neglect of a positive commandment (even if the neglect comes through active conduct), or any transgression committed through passive omission (even if it is a prohibition). See Noda B’Yehuda, Kovetz Shiurim in the Kuntres, and others.
As for the practical Jewish law ruling, quite a number of decisors wrote that it overrides even a Torah prohibition in a case of passive omission. But I don’t understand the question: you yourself mentioned that many wrote that it does override, so what difference would it make to you what I write regarding the halakhic ruling?
By the way, Maimonides’ wording there is not unequivocal. He writes that human dignity does not override a prohibition explicitly stated in the Torah (and not a prohibition explicitly stated in the Torah), but it does override a prohibition of rabbinic origin. He does not address a positive commandment prohibition. True, one could argue “he should have distinguished and taught that case itself,” but perhaps the qualification regarding rabbinic prohibitions is only because they too are prohibitions, so one might have thought human dignity overrides them. But with a positive commandment, perhaps it does not override. Still, it requires further analysis why he did not mention this explicitly.
Discussion on Answer
1. Possibly. There is evidence both ways, discussed by the later authorities mentioned above. In any case, as far as I remember, their claim is that this is a dispute between Maimonides and the Rosh, and you can check whether that is consistent.
2. I have no idea. If you’re asking about Maimonides’ view, I don’t understand what answer you expect. Are you asking what the later authorities said within his approach? In any case, that is their reasoning, not his. Beyond that, I didn’t understand the question, since you yourself said that from his words it appears that this overrides only a prohibition in passive omission.
I’m asking whether there is some line that has been accepted in practical Jewish law among contemporary decisors — the Mishnah Berurah, Arukh HaShulchan, Rabbi Ovadia, Rabbi Auerbach, the Hazon Ish?
I have no idea. According to your understanding, Maimonides holds that it does not override a prohibition in passive omission, and certainly not through active conduct. As for contemporary decisors, I think it is commonly assumed that it does override a prohibition in passive omission (I can’t say whether that means only a positive commandment or also a prohibition). But that is not necessarily specifically connected to Maimonides.
I found a certain formulation in the Mishnah Berurah:
Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim, Laws of Tzitzit, siman 13, סעיף 3
If on the Sabbath, while he is in a karmelit, he becomes aware that the tallit he is wearing is invalid, he should not remove it until he reaches his house, because human dignity is great. Gloss: and even a small tallit worn under his clothing need not be removed. The same applies if one of the fringes tore and he would be embarrassed to sit without a tallit — he may wear it without a blessing by virtue of human dignity (Beit Yosef in the name of the responsum). And this is specifically on the Sabbath, because it is forbidden to make tzitzit then, but on a weekday, in such a case, it is forbidden.
Mishnah Berurah, siman 13, se’if katan 9
(15) “And specifically on the Sabbath” — meaning, because on the Sabbath there is only a rabbinic prohibition, as above; but on a weekday, when he transgresses a Torah prohibition at every moment… even a Torah prohibition that is only this kind of passive omission, where he is withholding himself from a commandment, is not overridden because of human dignity unless there is great disgrace. Therefore it is forbidden to wear a large tallit when he sees that it has no tzitzit, because the Rema holds that sitting without a tallit is only considered a minor disgrace.
I don’t see any definition here from which you can learn anything concrete, and certainly not about Maimonides’ view. It is apparent from his words that in his opinion human dignity does override a prohibition in passive omission, and that already is not like Maimonides according to your understanding, but it is in line with what is commonly accepted among decisors. Except that if we are dealing with a Torah prohibition, he writes that there must be great disgrace. What exactly counts as great disgrace? I don’t know. I seem to remember that Rabbi Asher Weiss discusses this at length in Minchat Asher: https://minchasasher.com/he/shiur/%D7%A4%D7%A8%D7%A9%D7%94-%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%92%D7%93%D7%95%D7%9C-%D7%9B%D7%91%D7%95%D7%93-%D7%94%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%AA%D7%A9%D7%A2%D7%95/
Thank you very much
Thank you very much, Rabbi, for what you wrote:
1. Regarding Maimonides, in my humble opinion it actually is explicit, because he said: “And why is it set aside in the case of returning a lost object? Because it is a monetary prohibition.” Seemingly, he should have said something even stronger: because it is passive omission, and that would include prohibitions as well. And also later in his words he speaks specifically about someone who would forgo the Passover offering in favor of impurity for a neglected corpse, and not generally, as might perhaps be understood from the Talmud, in every case of passive omission.
2. Regarding the range of how far the leniency goes, I saw in the Macropedia that there are views that even a prohibition is overridden through active conduct: “And medieval and later authorities wrote that according to the Jerusalem Talmud, human dignity overrides a Torah prohibition even through active conduct (Eshkol [Ratzba], Laws of Priestly Impurity, p. 178; the commentary of Rabbi Shlomo Sirilio and Pnei Moshe on Berakhot 3, end of halakha 1, in their understanding of the Jerusalem Talmud there; Rosh, Laws of Mixed Garments 6, in his understanding of the Jerusalem Talmud in Kilayim there; She’elat Ya’avetz 2:178, and others).
And some of the medieval authorities wrote that even according to the Jerusalem Talmud, human dignity does not override a Torah prohibition through active conduct (Or Zarua, part 1, Laws of Kilayim 299), and that when they permitted a priest to become impure with Torah-level impurity for the honor of the public, they did not permit definite impurity but only doubtful impurity (commentary by the author of Sefer Haredim on the Jerusalem Talmud there).
And I’m only asking what is accepted in practical Jewish law: like Maimonides, who as I understand it did not permit even a positive commandment in passive omission, or like the lenient views that it overrides even a prohibition through active conduct. In short, how far is the canvas stretched in practice? Thank you very much, Rabbi.