Q&A: A Moral Value That Overrides a Torah Prohibition
A Moral Value That Overrides a Torah Prohibition
Question
In the Talmud, Shabbat 94b, it is explained regarding the rule that human dignity is so great that it overrides a prohibition in the Torah, that this was stated even with respect to another person’s dignity, unlike the source of the rule, which is stated regarding returning a lost object in the case of an elderly person for whom doing so would be beneath his dignity.
In the attached responsum, https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%d7%a2%d7%a8%d7%9A-%d7%9E%d7%95%d7%A1%d7%A8%D7%99-%d7%94%d7%92%D7%95%D7%91%D7%A8-%d7%A2%d7%9C-%d7%93%d7%99%D7%9F-%d7%AA%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%94
the Rabbi took the position that this rule is said primarily with respect to the person himself and not with respect to another person. Here, however, it is explained that it applies even with respect to another person. More than that, the Talmud here is discussing the dignity of the dead.
The question is: why should this not be said in every clash between morality and a Torah prohibition—that human dignity is so great, etc.—especially since here we are talking about a transgression through positive action, such as carrying the dead from one domain to another? This is unlike returning a lost object, where it is a passive omission.
(This distinction too, between passive omission and positive action, would not work here.)
Answer
First of all, I explicitly wrote there that this is not the case. I wrote that usually it is my own dignity, but not necessarily. There are lengthy discussions about this in Kehillot Yaakov on Berakhot and in Noda B'Yehuda, which depend on the dispute between the Tosafot’s explanations in Shevuot and the dispute between Maimonides and the Rosh regarding what counts as positive action in the context of human dignity, and in general. He also discussed this at length in the booklet. If you want, there is a long discussion of this in our article on the sixth root.