I saw what you wrote in column 175:
“On what basis is this libertarian decision made? On no basis. It is a creation ex nihilo, just like in a value decision. If there were a cause that produced this result, or if there were some basis on which a calculation was conducted that led to this conclusion, then this would not be a decision but a mechanical calculation.”

Meaning, if let’s say I have pizza and a hamburger in front of me, and I want to choose whether to eat this or that, and I choose pizza—is that just for no reason?
If afterward someone asks me why I chose pizza, is there even any point to the question? After all, I just chose it for no reason.
I’d also appreciate clarification of what it means that environment and education and so on affect the result. If with their help I changed my choice, then they are the cause; if not, then they aren’t the cause.

In any case, if in the end I chose because of something without a cause, how can that be explained as judgment?
Thanks.

Yair. Just so you know, the Rabbi has no option of holding that there is no free choice. He’s forced to think there is. Otherwise all his theories would fall apart. And he’d rather insist that there is free choice than upset ancient theories.

I explained to you that you could ask the exact same thing about a value choice. Why are you picking specifically on judgment? If a person chooses to care for his mother and not go out to fight the Nazis, is that done ex nihilo or from something? In my view there is a choice of a value scale here, and from there the practical calculation is made. The choice of the value scale is ex nihilo. The same applies to judgment. If I have before me a value-laden choice between pizza and a hamburger, or a scientific dilemma (which theory is correct), I have to weigh in my mind what is more plausible. I do this in light of various plausibility considerations, which are themselves freely chosen (that is, they are not dictated to me), just as values are freely chosen. I chose for the sake of a purpose and not because of a cause. That is the difference between choice and indeterminism. I elaborated on this in my book The Science of Freedom (and also in an article here on the site).
As for the influence of the environment, I really don’t understand your question. There is a mountain and a valley around me, and I choose to climb the mountain (because there is a beautiful view) or go down into the valley (because it is easier). Is the existence of the mountain the cause that produced my decision? That’s nonsense. I decided freely, but the existence of a mountain or valley influenced the decision. Under different circumstances I might perhaps (!) have decided differently.

Regarding a scientific dilemma, usually people have an intuition that model A is more correct than model B. That intuition is not the result of any judgment, but simply an understanding that comes naturally. Like the intuition that the principle of causality or induction is correct even though there is no conclusive proof for it. Where does judgment exist here?

Not everywhere is there judgment, but there are situations in which there is judgment. Einstein assumed that God does not play dice and rejected quantum theory (or its common interpretations). That is judgment that is unrelated to empiricism. On the contrary, he insisted on pushing against the empirical evidence.

Following up on this question, I seem to remember that you once argued that you agree with the Radbaz that a person is compelled in his opinions. Meaning, if a person adopts a certain worldview about religion or something else, then there is no point judging him for it because he is compelled to think the way he thinks. But here you are arguing that there is some freedom of judgment. If so, then why would a person be considered compelled in his opinions? Why can’t he be judged, negatively or positively, on the basis of his intellectual judgment?

First, even in a value choice and not only in factual judgment there are situations of compulsion (“an impulse that cannot be overcome”). Beyond that, even if a person sometimes has judgment, the data available to him may not allow him to reach the correct decision, and that does not depend on his judgment. A person will not be judged for not arriving on his own at Einstein’s theory of relativity, even though that is a matter of judgment and thought.

And what about situations where a person did have the data needed to reach the correct decision, and he failed in his judgment? Would he then deserve to be judged for that?

If he failed in judgment because he was negligent, then he bears blame for it (he is like one who sins unintentionally, not like one acting under compulsion). If it was intentional and conscious because of his inclination, then he is deliberate.

If so, are secular people nowadays considered unintentional sinners or compelled?

It depends on the person. It is hard to draw a sharp distinction. If a person, given the data before him, has no chance of reaching the correct conclusion, and in fact no chance of even thinking to search in the religious direction, then he is compelled. An extreme unintentional error is also compulsion in the Talmud (see, for example, Shevuot 26—not extreme at all—and elsewhere).