Q&A: The Rape of a Beautiful Captive for Soldiers (Weekly Torah Portion)
The Rape of a Beautiful Captive for Soldiers (Weekly Torah Portion)
Question
Is the permission regarding a beautiful captive said only in a situation where the soldier is absolutely compelled? For the sake of discussion, let us assume that the permission to violate a beautiful captive exists because the fate of the entire war depends on permitting soldiers to rape a female captive. Or perhaps it is some kind of concession to soldiers for some reason in the heat of battle (especially since rape in the Torah is not treated as all that severe, aside from the fact that here we are also dealing with a gentile woman, and today’s Daf Yomi explained that the only ones who remain in Gehinnom are those who have relations with gentile women).
And if we really assume that what is at stake here is the fate of the war and all of us, versus the fate of our captives, then in such a case the ruling of Jewish law seems entirely reasonable and correct. That does not make the act moral, but any sane person understands that morality here must give way to considerations of survival. Just as killing is not a moral act, and yet it is required in order to win a war. True, here we are not talking about soldiers but about uninvolved female captives. So from my perspective, if there is no choice, then those who should bear the consequences are their uninvolved people, not ours.
The question is why we would not say the same in every case of saving a life where there is a prohibition of theft, or of bodily injury, such as anesthetizing one’s fellow and taking his kidney for the sake of one’s own survival.
A. Is the permission of the beautiful captive only in such a case?
B. If not, then what is the logic behind it?
C. If the principle of survival is what permits it, how is this different from stealing something from someone else in order to save oneself?
D. Perhaps this falls under the category of a transgression for the sake of Heaven, like with Jael; and if so, then we have a source for a transgression for the sake of Heaven, a kind of “overridden” rather than fully permitted.
Good Sabbath and many thanks.
Answer
There is a difference between someone who belongs to the enemy, even if not personally involved, and someone who is a third party. See my article on the collective and the individual, and the Defensive Shield dilemma.
This is not a transgression for the sake of Heaven, since the Torah permitted it. How is this different from any prohibition that is permitted in a life-threatening situation? A transgression for the sake of Heaven is a decision a person makes on his own, not a decision established in Jewish law. If Jael’s act were brought in the Shulchan Arukh, it would stop being a transgression for the sake of Heaven and become a halakhic permission.
Discussion on Answer
First of all, thank you. I assumed your premise from Column 15 and asked based on that; indeed I should have mentioned that particular excellent column.
But regarding the point that the discussion focuses on the gentile woman without addressing the interpersonal aspect, it seems to me you did not address that, and that is what I was asking. Also, regarding a transgression for the sake of Heaven: even if the Torah permitted it in the sense of something overridden, the point is that the harm is still done and there is no choice, a kind of coercive necessity—like when firefighters break down a door to save someone: didn’t the door still get broken? Obviously it would have been preferable had they not needed to do it.
With God’s help, eve of the holy Sabbath, “and she shall be your wife,” 5780
To Tam — greetings,
The Torah regards an act of rape as murder, as it says: “For just as a man rises against his fellow and murders him, so is this matter.” Israeli society’s attitude toward rape was as toward murder requiring blood vengeance. Thus Simeon and Levi avenge their sister by killing the rapist and his accomplices, and thus Absalom avenges his sister by killing the rapist.
The Torah, just as it allowed severe bodily injury to be converted from corporal punishment into monetary compensation that would help the victim’s rehabilitation, allowed this as well for the grave injury of rape, and imposed a heavy monetary fine and the possibility of binding the rapist, with no possibility of divorce, to marry the raped woman if that was her wish—something that could be in her interest, since her chances of finding a spouse were extremely slim.
In the section about the beautiful captive, the possibility of forced intercourse is not mentioned at all. On the contrary, it is explained that the captor wants to marry the captive woman, and even that is not permitted to him until after she undergoes a “cooling-off period” of a full month. And this is indeed the halakhic position taken by Rabbi Yohanan and Nachmanides.
Even according to the opinion that the first intercourse in wartime was permitted, it is clear that this is a rare, one-time exception, where the goal is that he marry her as a free woman. And if he decides not to marry her, the Torah requires him to send her away free, expressing its disapproval of this conduct when it says: “You shall not abuse her, because you have afflicted her” (and according to Rabbi Eliezer of Metz, even the first intercourse in wartime was permitted only with her consent).
In a world in which a female captive is a slave whom the master may exploit as he wishes, the Torah stands up for the rights of the captive woman and forbids the master to touch her unless he wishes to free her and marry her as a free wife with all the rights of a free woman.
It was not for nothing that Justice Salim Joubran expressed amazement and said that he did not see in the Torah any permission for rape. See my comment: “Justice Joubran Is Right” (on Column 15).
With blessings, Shatz,
Indeed, Rabbi Shatz, my intention was in the sense of “according to your view,” directed at the Rabbi who claimed several times that one has to work very hard to find a prohibition of rape in the Torah, and in that column he presented the possibility that the fate of the war depends on this. About that I asked: how is this different from taking someone else’s kidney when the taker’s fate depends on his fellow’s kidney? And I was not answered. I also asked whether, according to that hypothetical side—that our victory and future depend on this—perhaps this should be seen as a kind of transgression for the sake of Heaven.
Thanks again, and good Sabbath.
I wonder whether this is a problem of eyesight or a problem in reading comprehension. This requires further consideration.
There is absolutely no permission to rape a beautiful captive.
A person would have to be evil and sick—and certainly not innocent—to infer from the verses any permission to rape a woman.
By the way, as I wrote in the columns you quote (without mentioning them), I noted that the problem the Sages saw with the beautiful captive was not the rape but intercourse with a gentile woman. So offenses between one person and another are not the issue here.