Q&A: In What Case Does This Apply — Do Chazal Knowingly Distort the Teachings of Those Who Came Before Them?
In What Case Does This Apply — Do Chazal Knowingly Distort the Teachings of Those Who Came Before Them?
Question
Rabbi:
Hi, my name is C’. I have a very fundamental question in understanding the Talmud (which also carries over to halakhic decisors and to day-to-day learning with a study partner — all of which are probably influenced by what seems to be the Talmudic mode of learning).
on a personal level, I get frustrated when learning a new book, and stating what the words of the book seem to indicate, and if it’s (what is perceived to be) a novel thought often my study partner (at whatever time) will try desperately to ignore what the author is saying and “shoe-horn” / force it into some pre-existing approach that they’re aware of. Intuitively that seems dishonest (or worse).
However, it would appear that the Talmud does the same thing.
See the link below, where I posted the question more clearly and with an example from the Talmud. Still haven’t received an answer that I’m satisfied with and was wondering what you knew/thought?
https://judaism.stackexchange.com/questions/114106/why-do-we-try-to-reconcile-machlokes
If this is in fact allowed — where does it end? If you force new statements to conform to old ones, how can there ever be something new — even when clearly stated, it’ll be reinterpreted to conform?
Or is my understanding incorrect, and they aren’t twisting the others’ words.
My modern Hebrew is not very good (I’m fine reading from classical books, but modern Hebrew I have difficulty with, especially when desperate to fully understand, and not myself superimpose my thoughts on your words). However, if it’s better for you to answer in Hebrew, I can have it translated for me.
thanks so much!
Answer
With God’s help,
I find it hard to write at length in English (though I still manage with reading). So forgive me for writing in Hebrew. I hope you’ll be able to manage with it.
Let me begin by laying out my starting point: in my view, interpretation has to fit what is written in the text. Someone who “abuses” the text so that it fits some other understanding he already has is not intellectually honest, and it is not right to do that — not with the Torah, not with the Talmud, and not with any other text. That is why I very much dislike homiletic interpretations, because they are not trying to interpret the text; they are using it in order to preach a message whose conclusion is already known in advance.
After saying that, I’ll present a few points that may help you:
- First, it might be worthwhile for you to read my article on ukimtot (in Hebrew). It deals with a certain aspect of this point, and I think it offers a fairly good explanation.
- You assume that the reader is always fitting the text to his a priori ideas. But in my opinion it is usually the opposite: he is trying to fit it to his understanding of what ought to be found in the text itself. That is, from our familiarity with the Talmudic whole, we understand the mode of thought, and therefore when we encounter a text we decipher it both in light of what is written in it and according to the context (the significance of the entire Talmudic corpus). That sometimes requires an interpretation that seems a bit ill-suited to the text. But someone who thinks that the correct interpretation of a text is the simple meaning of the words is mistaken. Reasoning and context always take part in interpretation, even interpretation according to the plain meaning. For example, when the Torah says that the Holy One, blessed be He, raised His hand, it is clear to us from various sources that He does not have a hand, and therefore we interpret this metaphorically. If we find in a text a halakhic instruction that contradicts some Talmudic rule, we will interpret it in a way that fits the Talmudic rule.
- The Mishnah in Avot instructs us to judge our fellow favorably. The commentators on the Mishnah (Maimonides, Rabbenu Yonah) explain that this does not mean something crooked, but something demanded by the context. For example, you see an elderly righteous man chasing a young and beautiful girl down the street with a knife in his hand. If he were a reckless young man, you would say he wanted to rape her. But you know him to be a supremely righteous person, so you interpret the situation differently: she is his housekeeper who forgot the knife at his home, and he is chasing after her to return it to her. That is a strained interpretation, but the context dictates that this is the correct interpretation.
- Sometimes the strained interpretation, far from the plain meaning of the text, is in the category of midrashic exposition, and it stands alongside the plain-sense interpretation; it is only added to it, not substituted for it. This is relevant mainly with respect to interpreting the Written Torah, and less so with respect to a Talmudic text.
I quickly read through the link you sent me.
I do not agree with your premise. It is not true that this is always done. On the contrary, in my opinion these are esoteric examples, and as I wrote to you, you must not take an esoteric example and turn it into a rule. If someone, no matter how important he is, writes something illogical, then don’t accept it. That does not mean that this is the way of the Talmud. As is well known, Talmudic learning has no problem at all with dispute. More than that: even if you find such a statement in a certain commentator (such as the author of Halikhot Olam whom you cited), that is not law given to Moses at Sinai. You may disagree with him if he does not seem logical to you.
It is true that there is a principle of “we do not unnecessarily multiply disputes” (what you cited from the author of Halikhot Olam, and it appears in other commentators as well), but it is important to understand that there is definitely logic to it. When two intelligent people who belong to the same study hall, the same discipline, and the same tradition (the tradition of the Oral Torah) disagree with one another, it is more reasonable to minimize the dispute as much as possible. For example, if you discover that between two Amoraim who disagree in a certain case, some analysis yields the conclusion that there are really two different disputes there, you would prefer the analysis that leaves them with only one dispute. This is Occam’s razor (why posit two disputes if there is an explanation that establishes only one?). But of course it makes sense to do this only when the second possibility is fairly reasonable, and when it is reasonable that on this point there really was no disagreement between them. Just as Occam’s razor applies only between two theories that both withstand the test of facts and reason. If you have two such theories, you prefer the simpler one. But simplicity in itself does not prove correctness, of course (quantum theory and relativity are not the simplest theories. Newtonian mechanics is simpler).
I suggest that if you want to continue the discussion, present one specific example and we can discuss it.
Discussion on Answer
Have a good week.
It’s hard for me to address this in detail, especially after so much time. I’ll respond briefly.
When I wrote that this is an esoteric case, I meant a rare one.
Rabbi Hutner’s explanations do not seem convincing to me, because the Talmud’s relation to the Mishnah is not like that. It does not seem that they intentionally distorted the wording of the Mishnah, and it also does not seem plausible to me that they would have done so.
Occam’s razor is a logical principle, so it does not matter what its source is or what it was used for there. By the way, on my site there is a relatively new column (308, https://mikyab.net/posts/67138) with a good example of this kind of discussion. If you want, it would be worthwhile to read it.
I do not think that the multiplicity of approaches and disputes changes the logic of “not unnecessarily multiplying disputes.” To the extent necessary, we posit dispute. Not where it isn’t necessary. And again, I am talking about a situation where there is a reasonable alternative explanation. Obviously, if the more logical explanation is that there are two points of dispute, then one can adopt that.
In this context, you might also be interested in reading another article of mine about the dichotomy of yeshiva-style conceptual investigations: https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%99%D7%99%D7%91-%D7%91%D7%9E%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%96%D7%99%D7%A7-%D7%9C%D7%9E%D7%94%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%9F-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%97%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA
Have a good week.
thanks for clearing up those questions on “esoteric” and Rav Hutner’s approach.
I started reading the article about conceptual investigations, seems interesting — looking forward.
Re: Occam’s Razor — why is a solution that makes one assumption more “logical” than one that makes 2 assumptions? What is not “logical” about something that is inefficient, lacking elegance, or the result of many (or an infinite) number of fundamental forces that cannot be “cut with a razor” into more primary/fundamental reason(s)? Isn’t that a “problem” of being not “scientific,” not monotheistic — both of which assume that there is ultimately a single cause (or a very, very limited number of causes) behind the natural world. Thus, given that assumption, it’s logical to favor the solution with fewer assumptions. However, I feel that the “single source” assumption is violated when discussing different people’s opinions (not the truth of their opinions, but rather the content of the opinions themselves). Since their opinions were formed out of different experiences, education, mental abilities, desire/perseverance to drill deeper — what’s illogical about assuming that to the degree these factors differ, their resulting opinions will differ (and should not be forced together)? Likewise, Maimonides in the introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah:
“For if two people are equal in understanding, analysis, and knowledge of the principles by which things are derived, there will be no disagreement between them regarding what is learned through one of the hermeneutical principles in any way; and if there is, it will be slight — just as we do not find disputes between Shammai and Hillel except in a few laws, because the methods of their learning in everything they learned through one of the hermeneutical principles were close to one another, and the correct principles that one had were also possessed by the other. But when the learning of their students diminished, etc.”
Doesn’t this Maimonides imply that to the degree people differ, dispute is a logical outcome (and perhaps even to be expected), and therefore after the students of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, and all the more so afterward, it is expected and logical that two Jews means three opinions?
(by the way — I value your time. If at any point you don’t feel the desire to continue this conversation, just say so — or perhaps a key phrase like “more power to you” 🙂 and I’ll understand and won’t be insulted. I’ve pursued this point — “logic” / Occam’s razor — because it’s the only point you’ve made that I feel may be incorrect. But I don’t want to take up your time, and would rather save it for more important questions that I may have in the future.)
thanks,
In my opinion, Occam’s razor is indeed a logical principle and not just a useful rule. I wrote about that here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%93-%D7%91%D7%A2%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%AA%D7%A2%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%90%D7%95%D7%A7%D7%94%D7%90%D7%9D
Moreover, even where dispute is abundant (“two Jews, three opinions”), there is still a preference for the interpretation that minimizes it. For example, even where there are two very complex scientific theories, the simpler one is preferable.
Rabbi:
Thank you so much for taking the time to answer my questions. My apologies for taking so long to respond — I wanted first to read through your piece on ukimtot and also to have a specific case to address. Though I didn’t get to the specific examples, here are some questions/comments on your explanation of ukimtot that you linked to.
Re: your piece on ukimtot:
The underlying difficulty with accepting intellectual dishonesty (for other goals) is exactly what was bothering me regarding forcing a plain reading in order to avoid dispute, and I couldn’t have worded it better. Your explanations about ukimtot specifically gave me something to think about, and I look forward to “testing” it as I learn, since it has great intuitive appeal. I don’t have anything worthwhile to ask on ukimtot, but I did find that
(a) incorrect footnote reference? — in one of your footnotes (#3) you reference Rav Hutner’s Pachad Yitzchak on Hanukkah, so I learned through it a couple of times, and you summarized (there) his approach as “in order to prevent laymen from getting involved and trying to understand the matter,” however it seemed that although his approach was that it was intentionally made unclear, it was not to keep it from the layman but rather to keep it exclusive to the Jewish people and a private Torah-covenant between us and Hashem — one that, even after being written down, still requires an orally transmitted explanation — and one worth sacrificing one’s life to keep private.
(b) What do you mean by esoteric? — regardless of whether he explains the goal as excluding laymen or non-Jews, it is meant to exclude — so why do you describe it as “esoteric”? i.e. can you explain what you mean by “esoteric”?
(c) What is your issue with Rav Hutner’s approach? — i.e. you dismissed the existing approaches on the grounds that it is illogical that the important purpose of the Mishnah as Jewish law would be sacrificed, since that requires clarity. This would address the reasons given of additional intentions regarding exposition and esoteric teaching, or mnemonic reasons. However, how does it address the explanation of keeping it oral — i.e. the ukimtot are passed down orally and serve as a key to understanding the Mishnah, thus keeping the teaching private. If the intention is to keep it hidden, isn’t the lack of clarity (without the oral key needed to unlock the meaning) understandable/explained? (Note — I did not learn at Yeshivas Chaim Berlin, nor did I know Rav Hutner of blessed memory, I just appreciate his approach here, and how it also explains “something is missing here and this is what it should say” and inconsistencies in the Mishnayot as well, also answering the question of: comparing the Talmud to the Mishnah, you can see so much that is not clearly stated in the Mishnah, and if they sought to prevent the Torah from being forgotten and therefore allowed it to be written, you would think that once it was permitted, it was entirely permitted, and they should write down as much as possible, being as verbose as possible — why be “stingy” with words (Rav Hutner points out that more than even complete sections of law are left out of the Mishnayot entirely) and risk the main objective of losing the accurate transmission? Rather, it seems that they held that even after it was permitted, there was still a MAJOR need to leave things out — all addressed with a single approach, and thus appealing via Occam’s razor.)
Speaking of Occam’s Razor: you used it to answer my question on dispute (or why there is a strong presumption that it doesn’t exist) — namely that assuming fewer opinions would fall under that idea. However, (a) I think that Occam’s razor is based on a single (monotheistic) source (William of Ockham was a friar), such that to explain the results of this single Source — if you assume that said Source values elegance or perhaps efficiency — then the approach which explains the observation with fewer assumptions (separate rules/powers/forces) is preferred. This, from what I understand, is also (b) when the various approaches make the same prediction — when explaining how a single power/creator got from point A to point B, it was probably done in the simplest/most elegant way (why would He do otherwise if not needed). However, it wouldn’t apply to explaining statements “created” by separate sources (thus failing the monotheistic / single creator-power assumption) which state opposite things (thus akin to explaining different observations).
Context is itself the basis of the question regarding dispute — regarding your main point/answer that written/spoken words must be taken in context and not only in their literal sense. I definitely agree with that; on the contrary, that’s the basis of my question — namely, if the context of post-Tannaitic statements is a world of “many disputes” (starting with the students of Shammai and Hillel), and our eyes see bookstores filled with tons of different approaches, then the context should change to a presumption of dispute, or at the very least, any presumption of uniformity should carry very little weight, and certainly not enough on its own to force a plain reading against what the statement actually says. Hence my example in Bava Metzia 10b — where it was discussing something said by Amoraim (though your explanation of ukimtot can perhaps explain that passage, where one says: a minor girl does not have a courtyard and does not have four cubits, and the other says: a minor girl does have a courtyard and does have four cubits — by learning that even though each gave an abstract rule, intentionally leaving out the real-world details/side issues, they were said in totally opposite language — “she has” vs. “she does not have” — implying that even though the ukimta can reconcile both into effectively saying the same thing, one of them had something more abstract in mind that required the opposite language, though I don’t know what that is.)
Anyway, thanks again — not only do I appreciate you taking the time for me, but I also gained a great deal from your help