Q&A: Practical Difference Between Permitted and Overridden
Practical Difference Between Permitted and Overridden
Question
Hello Rabbi Michi,
How are you?
I listened this evening to Monday’s lecture. When you spoke about whether Sabbath prohibitions are fully permitted or merely overridden in cases of saving a life, you brought the practical difference people suggest—whether repentance is required or not—and you rejected it completely, rightly so.
It seems to me that one could suggest a practical difference that is close but not identical: whether atonement is needed for Sabbath desecration. Atonement is a concept that relates to the impurity created by a sinful act. If we say it is fully permitted, then there is no problematic act here, no impurity, and no need for atonement. But if we say it is only overridden, then there is a price for that override—the impurity that comes from desecrating the Sabbath—and although you are righteous for having saved a life, and did exactly what needed to be done, and that is what you should do next time as well, still the act remains a desecration of the Sabbath and requires atonement.
It seems to me that this is almost the very definition of the conceptual inquiry itself.
It seems to me that my point is understandable, but still there is an analogy I always think of in the context of object-status and person-obligation, which I think explains the matter here too. Medicines are not a healthy thing. If a person is ill, Heaven forbid, he must take the medicines that will save his life, but once he recovers we would advise him from now on to take far fewer medicines, cleanse the body, and so on.
By contrast, if a person ran a red light because he was hurrying urgently to the hospital, since the prohibition against driving through a red light is conventional and arbitrary—problematic in the situation, not problematic in itself, or in other words, on the person rather than on the object.
It seems that this practical difference is valid regarding whether it is permitted or overridden as well.
What do you think of this practical difference?
Good night
Answer
It seems to me that I said in the lecture that there is no necessity to say that the two sides of the conceptual inquiry are identical (as the positivists claim), and that is if we assume there are metaphysical dimensions to transgressions. In such a situation, it is possible—though of course not necessary—that something is damaged even if I did it permissibly.
What you are describing is very similar, but I still do not see a halakhic practical difference here. If you mean to say that the person is supposed to do something for the sake of atonement, then that would be a halakhic practical difference. But aside from repentance, I do not see what act could be required of him to do (a sacrifice clearly is not brought in such a case). Therefore, there may indeed be a difference between the two sides—as I too said—but I still do not see a practical difference. Brisker-style conceptual discussions deal with halakhic practical differences, not with metaphysical or meta-halakhic discussions. The discussion of whether it is permitted or overridden takes place in the study hall in the analytical study session, not in the ethics session.
Incidentally, the Ben Ish Hai writes in two places that when a person did something permissibly, or even unintentionally, there are no metaphysical consequences. He innovatively writes that even if a person wore invalid tefillin his entire life unintentionally (because he did not know they were invalid), he fulfilled the commandment of tefillin—not merely that he failed to fulfill it under compulsion. See my remarks here (in section 6, after note 20):
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%94%D7%A0%D7%96%D7%A7-%D7%91%D7%90%D7%9B%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%AA-%D7%97%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%AA-%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%91%D7%A4%D7%A1%D7%97-%D7%91%D7%9C%D7%99-%D7%99%D7%93%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%94
Good night,