Answer

Hello Rabbi A.,
Good to hear from you. I hope he is well, and as is his way, increasing the forces of Torah and reverence.
 
Regarding his question, I will write briefly and off the cuff.
One must distinguish between a situation in which he acts according to my intention (like the case of a minor acting according to his father's intention in the Mishnah in tractate Sabbath, chapter “All the Sacred Writings”); there such a situation is considered as though it were an act that I myself perform. And Maimonides in the laws of forbidden mixtures of species and parallels wrote that there is a prohibition of feeding/providing a prohibition to an adult, when the one being caused to consume is inadvertent; the one who causes it transgresses a Torah prohibition. And from what Maimonides wrote there, that the one who causes it is flogged—it is proven from this that in his view the prohibition is not "do not place a stumbling block" but the actual prohibition of forbidden mixtures itself (for there are no lashes for "do not place a stumbling block").
However, the Mishnah in Sabbath establishes that a gentile acts for his own sake, but it seems to me that in our case it is different, and the requested person is indeed doing it plainly for me and because of me. For one can discuss whether in such a case this is considered actual direct causing by one’s own hands, or only causing someone to stumble. In my humble opinion, it is no different from telling a minor to extinguish something, which is prohibited because he acts according to his father's intention. True, one may push this aside according to Rashba (at the beginning of the chapter “One Who Was Overtaken by Darkness”), who explained that there it is a special law on the Sabbath (the resting of one’s son), and it implies that in his view one is not liable in such a case when he asks someone to do something for him under the rubric of direct causing in other prohibitions (aside from the Sabbath). And this has practical relevance also for the Sabbath where it is not his son, over whom that resting obligation does not apply: according to Rashba it is not prohibited, and according to the other commentators it is prohibited. From here it appears that Rashba assumes that telling/requesting is not direct causing. But according to most decisors, who understood the case of telling him to extinguish in terms of direct causing, it would appear that asking someone to do something for me is like direct causing.
In conclusion, in my humble opinion there is a Torah prohibition here.
And that is what seems correct to me.
And I will close with a longing to see you soon.
From me, your one who seeks your welfare, may your honor live long and well,
Rabbi and head of the religious court of the holy community of Lod and its surroundings
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Questioner:

Thank you.
I wanted to clarify your view, and it has indeed become clear.
Still, your proofs deserve further examination.
The proof from forbidden mixtures can be questioned because the reasons for this law in Maimonides are many, and chiefly they are specific to the prohibition of forbidden mixtures (“you shall not wear” — “you shall not make [someone else] wear”; prohibition on the result, etc.; and perhaps one should add the analogy to mixed seeds, where there is also a prohibition of maintaining them—and if one sees forbidden mixtures on his teacher in the marketplace he must tear them off him, and analyze this carefully).
So transferring the law of forbidden mixtures to the prohibition of Sabbath is open to question.
Also, causing someone to wear is not similar to inviting. It would seem that according to Maimonides, if the one causing the clothing were merely to invite the wearer to wear it, certainly the one inviting would not receive lashes (since he did not dress him, only invited him), but would only violate "do not place a stumbling block" (as in the case where the wearer is intentional).
And the proof from a minor as well, aside from the qualification you yourself made, an adult is not comparable to a minor, and that is obvious.
In any case, thank you for the clarification.

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Rabbi:
1. Maimonides himself applies this to additional prohibitions as well (the impurity of a priest and a Nazirite, even though regarding a Nazirite there is a special derivation to exclude him). See Kovetz Mefarshim in the Frankel edition there. Thus most of his commentators understood him (especially the Rosh, who wondered about him what his source was). One should add here Rashi’s well-known words at the beginning of the chapter of Mattot regarding one who causes his fellow to stumble: he enters under punishment in his place. There it is certainly in all prohibitions (after all, he is speaking about a vow).
2. As for the comparison between dressing someone and inviting, that is not similar—unless you mean inviting a person to do something for him (=for the inviter. Like a minor and a gentile who come to extinguish for me). To invite someone to wear forbidden mixtures himself is certainly not direct causing by one’s own hands. Especially in the case of one who is not obligated, who certainly will do it, and therefore there is strong reasoning that he is doing it for me and not because of his own decision to sin. In my opinion there is no difference between a minor and an adult in this matter, except that a minor always acts according to his father's intention, while an adult usually acts according to his own intention. But if the case should arise that an adult acts according to my intention, then again there will be a prohibition upon me just as with a minor.
However, in the case of a gentile who acts for his own sake, that is because he thinks he will gain something else from it. But if someone does something for me out of friendship, it is hard to say that the gain of friendship counts as acting for his own sake.

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Questioner:

According to the best of my investigation—I did not find anyone who explains that the prohibition applies to the one causing the clothing because of causing someone to stumble or direct causing by one’s own hands—the reasons for Maimonides are what I wrote above (a special exposition).
 
And with respect to the additional cases (I am relying on your word that—), there is a special exposition for each case.
 
Also, I return to ask: according to your view, if the sinner’s transgression is not a transgression (because he is not obligated in the commandments), and one who causes him to stumble commits no prohibition, why should direct causing by one’s own hands be considered a prohibition? Especially in light of your citing Rashi’s words from the portion of Mattot. Does someone who feeds a gentile something prohibited (which the gentile is not forbidden to eat) violate a prohibition?
 
Also, you say there is a distinction between direct causing by one’s own hands and inviting: that inviting counts as direct causing only if he does the thing for the inviter. From where do you derive this innovation? Only from a minor—there is no example of this at all with an adult.
And to say that with an adult sometimes he does it for me and sometimes not, and in the cases where he does it for me it is considered as though I myself did it—about the first matter we are already struggling to understand it (the law of a minor that it is considered as though he himself acted), and now you are adding to us a law about an adult as well?
And also factually, there is no doubt that someone invited to lecture has his own interests too. About a minor one can say that he is subordinate to his father (and it seems to me that this is only with his son); with an adult that is simply not true, at least in the reality familiar to me.

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Rabbi:
Indeed, on second thought, inviting someone to lecture seems like acting for his own sake. And according to my view one can discuss whether there is a prohibition of benefiting from Sabbath labor in the product of an atheist (simply speaking, it seems to me that his status is no different from the product of Sabbath labor done by one under compulsion).
As for direct causing with respect to a gentile, it is certainly not comparable to our case. After all, a Jew, even if he is an atheist, even according to my view is obligated in the commandments, except that he cannot fulfill his obligation. The gentile is exempt. It is like causing a cat to stumble (of course, not to compare).

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Questioner:

Now that you’ve come to this, I’ll suggest a doubt that is not according to your view.
You mentioned the product of Sabbath labor.
Seemingly there is no product of Sabbath labor here—there is no object that can be prohibited.
True, many medieval authorities (not according to Ritva’s view) held that even when no change was made in the object there is still a prohibition of the product of Sabbath labor (as in carrying out or transporting an object).
But that is with an object—would we say this also about a person? A person traveled on the Sabbath—very severe. But would it be prohibited to benefit from him on the Sabbath? There is a logical argument for it (if the rabbinic prohibition on the product of Sabbath labor comes to prevent motivation to commit Sabbath prohibitions, so too here with a person)—but there is no anchor in Jewish law. Besides, the benefit from the lecturer is only voice, appearance, and smell, which have no substance…

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Rabbi:
I know the dispute, but I mentioned a practical implication on the assumption that there is a prohibition of benefiting from the product of Sabbath labor in such a case. I will add that I do not see the logic in the view you mentioned, that there is no prohibition of the product of Sabbath labor with something that is not an object (the Mishnah Berurah brings this in the name of Chayei Adam), and by the same token I do not see a difference between bringing an object (one who brings gifts from outside the Sabbath boundary) and traveling in order to give a lecture. True, one can discuss whether this is benefit from the person who traveled, and he is the object that created the benefit, or whether there is no object here (below I will suggest that perhaps the lecture is the object from which one benefits).
In any event, even if one adopts the second way, it still seems to me like the transition between betrothing a woman by giving an object and betrothing her through the benefit of an act (“dance before me”). Both this and that are benefit. True, the thing from which one benefits is seemingly different (here it is an object that crossed beyond the Sabbath boundary or from one domain to another, and here it is a lecture from a person who traveled), but logically I do not see a difference.
Moreover, there is room for the reasoning that a lecture is not like a benefit that has no object and no substance. The lecture is an object (which indeed has no substance, but it is still an object), unlike the appearance of honey and the smell of an apple in Maimonides, Laws of Sale. All of those are properties and not entities. Certainly in the terminology of Rabbi Chaim of Brisk one can say that just as there is an object of prayer, so too there is an object of a lecture (something like this in my article in Techumin 25 regarding intellectual property). It was created for me, and I am forbidden to benefit from it. Now I think that this is like benefiting from television or radio broadcasts on the Sabbath.