Q&A: Does Lack of Knowledge Justify Leniency?
Does Lack of Knowledge Justify Leniency?
Question
In today’s Daf Yomi, Eruvin 65a: Reish Lakish and the students of Rabbi Hanina happened to come to a certain inn. There was no owner there, but there was someone who rented it out. They said: what is the law regarding renting from him? Wherever he cannot evict him, you need not ask, for certainly we do not rent from him. The question is only where he can evict him—what is the law? Since he can evict him, do we rent from him, or perhaps, at this moment at least, he has not evicted him? Reish Lakish said to them: Let us rent, and when we reach our rabbis in the South, we will ask them. They came and asked Rabbi Aphes, and he said to them: You did well to rent.
It is explained here that the Amoraim had a legal doubt, and they ruled leniently. Their doubt was due to lack of knowledge of what the law is in such a case. So can anyone who does not know what the Jewish law is in rabbinic matters be lenient?! This is not even a dispute among great authorities—just plain lack of knowledge!
Answer
In principle, every doubt is a lack of knowledge. However, when there is an established halakhic ruling that has already been decided, and you simply do not know how it was decided, some halakhic decisors say that one may not be lenient in such a case. Though even about that there is room for discussion. I will answer you on two levels now:
- It is not clear whether this was a case of ignorance of already-settled law, or a halakhic doubt with two possible sides. In the second case, it is a doubt like any other doubt (after all, every doubt is lack of knowledge). It may be that this was a doubt between two sides of the issue (that is how it is presented in the Talmud), and therefore they decided to ask their rabbis in the South to resolve it for them. Even when they reached the South, it is not necessarily the case that they were told an already-settled law; rather, their rabbis may simply have told them their opinion and convinced them.
- According to Netivot HaMishpat, section 234, in rabbinic law, if you do not know what the law is, then even if there is an established ruling, when you transgressed unintentionally you have committed no offense. Later authorities explained his view as follows: a rabbinic prohibition is not inherent in the object or act itself, but rather is a rebellion against the Sages. And when you act unintentionally, it is not rebellion, and therefore there is no offense here. And as is known, Netivot HaMishpat’s proof is from the Talmud in Eruvin regarding one who sees his rabbi violating a rabbinic prohibition—he lets him continue, and only afterward do we raise the difficulty against him.
Discussion on Answer
Why does it matter what exactly he was talking about? When a person does not know and violates the prohibition, there is no rebellion here. Beyond that, an unintentional violation is lack of knowledge. What is the difference between them? If you mean the distinction I made in my remarks, then I already said that.
The link you referred me to doesn’t work.
According to what you’re saying, is there any chance that it would be better not to study rabbinic law?
There is such a possibility, but it is not correct. A. Because observing rabbinic law is a value in itself, not only something done out of fear of punishment (from Heaven), and therefore even if you would be exempt, there is still value in observing it. B. This would be a case of deliberately placing oneself in a situation of compulsion, and in such a case he is indeed rebelling and violating a prohibition.
Copy the entire link (including the .pdf) into the address bar. Or google “doubt due to lack of knowledge Tal Haim” (a numbered section by Rabbi Shmuel Tal).
If someone violates a rabbinic prohibition knowing that it exists, but does so because of the evil inclination, is that considered rebellion? Any practical difference regarding punishment?
The evil inclination is not rebellion, but desire. About one who rebels against the words of the Sages it is written that a snake will bite him, and he is liable to death.
Obviously it is an offense. That is precisely how, and the only way, one violates rabbinic prohibitions. After all, in an unintentional case—at least according to Netivot HaMishpat—one does not transgress. Therefore the only way to violate a rabbinic prohibition is intentionally.
Thank you.
Are there halakhic decisors who permit being lenient in rabbinic law when there is lack of knowledge?
2. Netivot was speaking about an unintentional violation, not about lack of knowledge.