Q&A: Question
Question
Question
In the responsa of Maharit (Choshen Mishpat, sec. 118) he was asked about a case in which Reuven rented a house to Shimon for a period of twelve months, and the tenant swore not to leave the house during that time, and that if he did leave he would pay the full rent for all twelve months. During the rental period a quarrel broke out between them, because the tenant demanded that the landlord make some repair in the house. The landlord became angry at the tenant and said to him, “Leave the house.” Now Shimon wants to leave, saying that the landlord has already waived his claim and released him from his oath and obligation. But the landlord says that the obligation still stands, because what he told him was merely said in anger, as a general statement. And Maharik wrote to infer from the wording of Maimonides (Laws of Sale 5:13) who wrote: “Therefore, if he said, ‘I said it wholeheartedly, and I fully resolved to do this,’ he needs nothing further at all.” It is clear from his words that wherever there is reason to suspect that he did not waive it willingly and did not truly resolve it in his heart, an act of acquisition is required, or else he must say, “I said it wholeheartedly, and I fully resolved.” But in this case, where he spoke in the course of a quarrel and out of resentment, it is evident that he did not truly decide to waive it, for this is the way of people: in anger, a person says such things to his fellow.
Answer
This is the kind of discussion for which there is no point in bringing sources and precedents. We are dealing with an assessment of the landlord’s / waiving party’s intent. That obviously depends on the situation and on the people involved, and therefore only a religious court that is hearing this specific case can determine the ruling. There is no general rule here for all cases of waiver made in anger.
Beyond that, one must discuss whether the uncertainty is about the question of whether a waiver made in anger counts as a waiver, or whether the uncertainty was whether this was in fact said in anger at all, or whether it was a genuine statement. In Maharit it appears to be the second possibility. And it is obvious to him that a waiver in anger is not a waiver. In any event, both discussions are questions of factual assessment, not halakhic questions.
If so, we are left to discuss a situation in which we are in doubt: do we say, “the burden of proof rests on the one seeking to extract money from another,” meaning that the landlord must prove that his waiver was made in anger; or perhaps the tenant, who swore and obligated himself to pay, must prove that his obligation was voided, that is, that there was a genuine waiver? At first glance, the second side seems more likely, for this is like one who says, “I do not know whether I paid you,” and not “I do not know whether I ever became obligated.” This is certainly the rule if we say that waiver is like saying, “I have received payment.”
However, there is still room to discuss here the rule of unexpressed intentions. After all, verbally he said that he waives it, and only now does he claim that in his heart he did not mean that. And if he did not make such a condition verbally, this would be a case of unexpressed intentions, which are legally disregarded. It seems, however, that here this is not in the category of “what is in his heart and in everyone’s heart” (as Tosafot in Kiddushin 49 wrote, proving that in such a case there is no need to stipulate it explicitly), because if we are uncertain about it, that itself proves that it is not something that is in his heart and in everyone’s heart. Consequently, he is not believed on the basis of unexpressed intentions to overturn what he said verbally, for unexpressed intentions are legally disregarded.