Question

I listened to the Rabbi’s interesting series of lectures on Jewish law and morality. It was clarified in the lectures that morality too has a divine source, and therefore our obligation to it is equivalent to our obligation to Jewish law. In light of the words of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim, Part I, Chapter 8, about “nomian religion,” I wanted to ask:
1) If that is indeed the case, that the moral obligation is equivalent to the obligation to Jewish law, which morality obligates us? Is everything that now appears to us to be moral on par with a halakhic source? But tomorrow it may become clear to us that what we considered moral until now was actually a moral flaw.
2) In most cases there is no precise definition of the most correct moral act, especially when you get down to the details of time, place, and context. (What I mean is that every person with moral awareness is aware of moral values such as kindness, truth, and the like, but usually he cannot decide in a precise and objective way when one should favor one action or another in the context of those values. For example, a person who is late for work sees ahead of him an elderly woman who is having difficulty crossing the street—should he help her or not?) If so, how can we decide what the moral act is when we get down to practical details? (This is unlike Jewish law, which goes into exacting detail and gives definitions of time, place, and context.)