What about moral actions? An active and successful thief says to me: help me steal twenty shekels from so-and-so, and in return I commit never to steal again for the rest of my life. And knowing him and being familiar with him, I estimate that he will keep his commitment.

[And even though no one asked me, I’ll jump in headfirst to note that the correct answer is of course that it is a great and precious commandment to help him in every possible way to steal the twenty from so-and-so, and anyone lax about this bears an unbearably great sin and should be rebuked]

Seemingly, that’s the distinction between the deontological approach and the teleological approach, no?

Indeed, but even a deontologist can sometimes consider teleological considerations, and this whole topic here started from the fact that Jewish law weighed mountains on a scale: one desecration by one person versus many observances by another. I understand the consideration, “This is extortion and one must not give in to it,” as an even-broader, more elevated teleological consideration.

Hello. I wanted to know what the source is for the halakha of “Desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may keep many Sabbaths” (Yoma 85b). Is it a law given to Moses at Sinai, or a verse from the Prophets, or actually from the Mishnah? In any case, the Torah forbade desecrating the Sabbath, so how did a rule emerge that permits desecrating the Sabbath in order to sanctify the goal—what is its source? How can a rule cited in the name of even the greatest Tanna contradict an explicit command in the Torah?

First, from the course of the passage there it is clear that the permission to desecrate the Sabbath משום saving a life was not introduced there; it was already known. The scriptural derivations they look for are supporting proofs, not creative sources. Second, there is a simple logic here that it is preferable to give up one Sabbath in order to gain many other Sabbaths. What is wrong with that logic? In all the verses of the Torah we interpret and observe them according to our interpretations.

Maimonides, Laws of Rebels, chapter 2, halakha 4: A religious court… if they see that the needs of the time require temporarily nullifying a positive commandment or violating a prohibition in order to bring many back to the faith or to save many in Israel from stumbling in other matters—they act according to what the time requires. Just as a doctor amputates this person’s hand or leg so that his whole body may live, so too a religious court may, at certain times, instruct people to violate some commandments temporarily so that all of them may be upheld, in the way the early Sages said: “Desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may keep many Sabbaths.”
And in the responsa Ginat Veradim (Orach Chayim 2:26) it is written: “It is a time to act for the Lord; they have violated Your Torah.”

However, it seems to me that what the Sages said, “Desecrate so that he may observe,” applies to the matter itself—namely saving a life. But in the example brought above (Nadav), of a father commanding his son, and likewise in the second example (N), of a thief asking for help, it would seem that “a person is not told: sin so that your fellow may benefit” (Sabbath 4a—and I am surprised that this consideration was not mentioned).

*And indeed we do find in certain places that one does say to a person, “Sin so that your fellow may benefit,” such as one who is being taken for forced apostasy, a great commandment, where he is not to blame for his situation, and the like—but that is not relevant to the questions above.

What have you added?
A. The claim that “Desecrate for him so that he may observe” applies only in life-and-death situations—that is exactly the whole question here. To say that saving a life is required and that the likelihood of gaining fewer desecrations is not enough (you desecrate one Sabbath and he will keep many Sabbaths), you first have to explain why. What is the point of simply taking one side of the question and declaring, “I have an answer”?
B. I was arguing from a moral standpoint. If you have another line of reasoning, then please, please try to explain it.
C. This question was sent when the site was displaying an entire series of columns dealing wholly with the issue of “sin so that your fellow may benefit.” True, it is in the background (and at the basis of the answer that it is forbidden to desecrate), but mentioning it will not help here, because in the case of saving a life we do say, “Desecrate so that he may keep many.” Maybe you’ll also wonder why they didn’t mention that the Torah says, “You shall keep My Sabbaths.”

A. Shahar Shmuelevitz asked above: how can this “rule” contradict an explicit command? And he was answered: by “logic.” (Which I think you also hold, and from that the question arises.)
It seems to me that from Maimonides’ words we learned much more than that: that the Sages have the power to “contradict” Torah law in order to bring “many” back to the faith or save “many” in Israel from stumbling in other matters. The Sages would not “contradict” Torah law for the sake of an individual.
Saving a life—aside from the fact that it appears explicitly in connection with the “rule” in the passages in Yoma (85) and in Sabbath (151)—is a need of the many. But we have not found that a religious court would apply the above rule for the sake of an individual (the one desecrating the Sabbath).
B. I do not understand whether you wish to reject the argument, “A person is not told: sin so that your fellow may benefit,” on moral grounds?
C. Forgive me. I did not see the columns. I will try to look at them as soon as possible.

Please—could you point me to a specific column?

A. He was answered that the “logic” of the Sages has the power to limit and shape explicit commandments. Especially here, where the limitation on the explicit commandment (the explicit commandment that it is forbidden to desecrate the Sabbath, and the limitation that in life-and-death situations it is permitted) apparently came from tradition, and they only looked for “reasoning” after the fact—so it was not the reasoning that limited the explicit commandment, but the tradition. (In the passage there, there is a whole series of rationales for the rule that saving a life overrides the Sabbath. That implies that the rule is given, and they are looking for an explanation after the fact.)

Maimonides is not relevant to the matter. He is speaking about a *temporary* *violation* of Torah law, not about an interpretive definition of what Torah law itself is (which is what we are dealing with here, where the Sages’ reasoning determines for us the Torah-level law itself).

“Desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may keep many Sabbaths” was said regarding the life-threatening situation of an individual.

B. I was discussing the moral question itself. After one knows what the desired answer is (that is, the moral one), one must find a halakhic route. And if we do not find such a route, then at least the secular reader will know and will make sure to steal as recommended there. If you like, you can frame it as stealing from a gentile, according to the view (I think such a view exists) that there is no halakhic prohibition in that case, only moral reasoning (the law of justice).

C. Columns 357, 358, 359.

A. Indeed, you were right. I was completely mistaken. And not only that, but Maimonides also provides support for your position.