“Sense that there is no coercion” — how can one sense what is not there? Can you see what is not there?

Rabbi Michi cannot be right.
Even if they discover in the future that there is free choice, Michi still would not turn out to be right. Because his consideration from the outset was based on feeling and desire, not on an intellectual argument. And considerations based on feeling and desire cannot be right; they are only bets that either hit or miss. So if Michi’s bet succeeds, good for him. In the meantime there is no serious reason to think that there is anything about choice that is different from the rest of nature.

Question, are you serious? Have you ever seen that you are standing somewhere alone and there is nobody next to you? When you walk on the road, have you ever felt that nobody is pushing you?

In both of these examples, I do not see what is not there, but what is there, and since it is within my field of vision I infer that if I did not see it, apparently it is not there. There is no such thing as “you felt that nobody is pushing you,” but rather “you did not feel that someone was pushing you.” If I was not supposed to feel a possible case of pushing, then my sensation or lack of sensation teaches me nothing about reality.
And in our case, if I do not “feel freedom” but only “feel that there is no coercion,” then before inferring from this the existence of free will, one has to clarify whether the coercion is within the range of my sensation.

And clearly external coercion is within the range of my sensation, but coercion that comes from my brain—it is quite reasonable that I would not be able to feel it.

Now you are raising a different claim: not that one cannot perceive an absence, but that there are things that are hard or impossible to sense. So in my opinion there is no principled problem with sensing this. You are begging the question when you identify the forces that push/coerce with the self that is being pushed/coerced.

I am not talking about the transcendental “self,” but about the part of the brain that is responsible for sensations, including the sensation of freedom. It is possible that the part responsible for sensations is no more “internal” than the coercive forces, and therefore it should not be expected to sense them as external. We should ask the brain researchers.

The honorable Rabbi wrote that intuition does not say that we have choice, so from where are you aware that there is choice?
Because you simply sense it? No? Like the intuition that there is a chair in front of you.

I wrote that about the question, which spoke about picking. About that I wrote that intuition does not say we have choice in situations of picking, but only that there is no coercion. In situations of choosing, it certainly indicates that we have choice.