Q&A: Questions About the First Being
Questions About the First Being
Question
I’ll try to write something specific that’s bothering me.
At the end of The First Being, you lead the reader from deism to theism.
To my disappointment, precisely in that section—the one that bothered me more than anything—I did not agree with your arguments.
But at the moment I don’t have the book in front of me (I lent it to someone), so I’ll rely on the fifth booklet.
You begin with the assumption that, in your view, it is unlikely that the purpose of creation is morality, because if the purpose is to perfect ourselves, then it would have been better not to create anything in the first place. You assume that “the role of morality is to repair creation and the human society that lives and acts within it. That is, morality is a means for the completion of creation and of human society, and therefore it cannot serve as a teleological explanation for its very existence.” It seems far more reasonable to me to assume that morality itself is the religious purpose for which the world was created. By the way, you wrote an article in which you elaborated at length on the importance of process, so here too one could say that the moral work is itself the reason—but that isn’t important.
You also argue that even if we say morality is the purpose, it still requires revelation, because otherwise it would be teleological instead of deontological. But reality has shown that people arrived at a deontological conception of morality without any form of revelation. When a person makes a voluntary moral decision, usually it comes from some purpose (I myself experienced a moral decision a few weeks ago; the decision required me to restrain a very strong urge of curiosity, and also to refuse my parents. I am almost certain I was not aiming at any outcome).
Even afterward, when you write that we were created for a religious purpose, you do not claim to know or understand what that purpose is. At a later stage, you assume that the commandments have some hidden religious purpose. The very same thing—only with greater probability, in my opinion—can be said about morality. The purpose of creation was that hidden religious goal, and morality was created in such a way that human beings would know what the concept of “good” is, would recognize good deeds as desirable, all alongside free choice. The whole notion of an idea of the good that is agreed upon by almost all human beings, alongside weakness of will that interferes with our choosing the good, expresses to me a mystery of powerful significance.
After that, you assume that if there is a purpose and an end, one should expect some sort of divine revelation that will reveal that purpose to human beings, and therefore the historical reports of the giving of the Torah gain added force. Here too, the superiority of the thesis I presented earlier stands out. The purpose is morality, and God planted it in the heart of each person in an astonishing way, so there is also no need to assume that God is racist and chose one nation for some reason. I do not mean at the moment a moral judgment of God (is there such a thing? Abraham is a precedent), but rather to show that this is less likely than identifying morality—which is universal—as the religious purpose of creation, so that it belongs to every person regardless of race or sex.
In the end we always arrive at the point where it is said: there is no way to fathom the mind of God. His religious purposes are hidden from us; why He chose one nation over all the others, and why specifically the people of Israel, that too is unclear. In my opinion, one should choose the option that raises the fewest questions of that sort. Especially since the whole discussion is based on a hidden assumption that His mode of thought is similar to ours and His mode of action is identical. This is of course a common scientific assumption (the laws of physics are the same everywhere), but it is much less well founded here (because from the outset we are speaking about an entity that precedes the world, precedes the known laws, and perhaps even precedes the laws of logic). Some would say that this is a genuine cognitive fallacy.
That is the end of the first part of the fifth booklet.
I really don’t like corresponding in writing; I prefer speaking face to face.
If you have any time when we could talk, then better to spare the correspondence and speak.
If there isn’t time, then we’ll continue like this (I still have many more questions).
Answer
You address each argument separately, but as I wrote there, this is a combination of arguments whose strength lies in the combination. We have a tradition of revelation that comes down to us, and from the outset I expect there to be such a thing. And especially since on the philosophical plane we reached the conclusion that there is a God who created the world and us, all this combines into a good probability. Now I’ll move on to discuss each argument separately.
At the base of your claim is one thing: that morality can indeed serve as an ultimate purpose of creation. Everything else is a consequence of that. So I’ll focus on that. It is quite clear that morality is a means for repairing society, even if one does it as a response and commitment to a divine command. Therefore it is unlikely to be the ultimate purpose, since one could simply not create us and then there would be no need to demand the repair of society. If the moral process is a purpose in itself, then some divine disclosure is required for that. That is possible, but less likely. When the focus is on a process, there has to be some source that provides a basis for it.
By the way, people did not arrive at deontological morality without revelation. Some of them may think there was no revelation, but they are mistaken. That is what brought this concept to us despite their denial. Without God there is no morality and no obligation to it.
Also regarding the example you described about the moral decision you made—in my opinion you are mistaken that you did not do it for a purpose. The purpose is moral perfection itself, and that itself is not trivial. Without revelation and God, this does not exist.
In the end, the discussion of whether there are additional purposes beyond morality is not conducted in a vacuum. A clear tradition has come down to us saying that there is something else. You are conducting the discussion a priori (and, as stated, even a priori I do not agree with your conclusions).
As for the question whether one can discuss God in our language, I claim that one can. But if you think not—then what are we talking about? The assumption that if someone or something creates something, it has purposes, seems simple to me. Whoever claims that there are objects that do not operate that way bears the burden of proof. Especially since, as a matter of fact, creation as a whole tells us the opposite (the physico-theological proof).
The fact that He precedes the world does not change anything for our purposes. He created the world, and it is reasonable that He created it in His image. Why assume otherwise? Especially when all the arguments combine into one coherent picture.
Discussion on Answer
But this is not a matter of several arguments; it is a structure whose different layers reinforce one another. For this to be a compounded doubt, it would logically require that the arguments need to combine together and only all of them together (an “and” operation among them) yield the conclusion. In that case, if you have doubt about each of them, a compounded doubt is created. But here, the doubts about argument A are weakened in light of argument B. The arguments here are in the category of “or,” not in the category of “and.” From this you will understand that, contrary to what you said, I do not believe the tradition because of a priori considerations. Those considerations join the historical considerations. Therefore all the purposes you suggested at the end of the email should not be discussed on the level of whether they are logical or not. Even if they have logic to them, a different tradition has come down to us that strengthens the conclusion that the commandments are the purpose.
I do not assume that the purpose must be irrational. Not at all. My assumption is that morality is not the purpose; in fact, anything intended to improve the condition of a person or of human beings in general is not the purpose.
Regarding morality, I wrote my view. It can be understood without revelation because it is imprinted within me. But without belief in God there is no morality. And if you regard morality as a purpose in itself and not as improving people’s condition, then in my opinion that requires revelation, because that is not its simple meaning.
A purpose of self-perfection cannot stand on its own. The question is: what does it mean to perfect oneself? For that, revelation is required (and commandments).
You see these as arguments that integrate with one another and create a strong overall case. I see it as a multiple compounded doubt. Each stage on its own seems unlikely to me (though not absurd), and therefore the final picture is highly doubtful.
Do you accept as a religious purpose (of the Creator) only commandments that lack any rationale? That is, because morality also has an earthly and rational purpose of repairing society, it therefore cannot serve as a purpose?
In fact, there are two consistent approaches here: you assume religious purposes that in human eyes are irrational, and therefore revelation is needed, and therefore you believe the historical story of the giving of the Torah. I assume a religious purpose that also has a human rationale, and precisely because of that the Creator planted it in the hearts of His creatures, and therefore there is no message the Creator would need to convey through revelation, and therefore the historical report of the giving of the Torah seems dubious to me.
I also have another argument in my favor that just occurred to me: if God was looking for a way to convey His message to the Jews—that is, His religious purposes—why did He choose a way that is so easy to doubt? Or, to put it rhetorically, how can He come to me with complaints if the religious obligation is so poorly grounded?
Regarding deontological morality—you’re the expert. Does Kant’s morality require revelation? I know that it derives its force from God, but without any revelation. I’m not very familiar with the figures and the methods, but the fact is (I’m writing this from intuition; I do not know this “fact” for certain) that there are primitive societies with morality (usually with some values different from ours). As for what I wrote about myself, there really is room to investigate the moral feeling. As best as I remember, it was simply a clear knowledge that I could not do such a thing.
You believe the tradition as a result of a priori considerations; I, because of different a priori considerations, do not believe the tradition.
Regarding the use of language, you are absolutely right—that is the basis of the dispute. But one must be careful not to anthropomorphize God too strongly, though it does not seem to me that any of your arguments can be called overly crude anthropomorphism.
What I currently think is this: if morality is indeed the religious purpose, then people who obey morality and choose the good are not intending to fulfill the obligation of the commandment. This requires consideration: whether such an act (assuming morality is the religious purpose of creation) has religious value. Seemingly, here too we will split according to our respective views. I will argue that since God implanted morality within us and choosing it is the purpose, then clearly we are required to choose the good, and not necessarily to choose the religious value. You will argue that there is no value to an unconscious choice.
But aside from that, there are many ideas and approaches as to why God created the world. What I remember right now: perfection and self-perfection, to bestow good upon His creatures, that His creatures should know Him, and so on and so on. It may be that the purpose is one of these (or something like them), and through our actions (faith, choosing the good, or whatever else) we help bring the destiny to completion.
Doesn’t that make sense?