Q&A: A question about the Urim and Tumim and the difference between ritual prohibition/permission and monetary or capital law
A question about the Urim and Tumim and the difference between ritual prohibition/permission and monetary or capital law
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I wanted to ask the Rabbi for help in sharpening the distinction between “prohibition and permission” and “monetary law and capital law.”
I’m dealing a bit with the topic of asking a question through the Urim and Tumim.
1. I came across a dispute about whether it is possible to ask the Urim and Tumim about monetary law or capital law that the judges were unable to resolve. It seems fairly agreed that questions of prohibition and permission cannot be asked through the Urim and Tumim, and so my question is:
Don’t capital law and monetary law fall under the category of “prohibition and permission”? After all, in the end, the ruling in monetary or capital law defines a normative directive (it is forbidden to pay, there is a commandment/obligation to pay, there is a commandment to kill, it is forbidden to kill), very similar to a ruling in laws of prohibition and permission.
If they really are included under the definition of “prohibition and permission,” then by definition anyone who says that monetary/capital law may be asked, while prohibition and permission may not, is mistaken. Right?
2. There are approaches that say one may ask questions of “clarifying reality” (= clarifying facts) through the Urim and Tumim. According to the conceptual analysis the Rabbi gave in Thursday’s shiur (the previous one), would there then be no authority to the Urim and Tumim’s answer on that? (Or is that only one kind of authority?) What about questions about the future? Does that also fall under the category of a factual question?
Thank you very much!
Answer
1. I’m not familiar with this dispute, but it seems very strange to me. “It is not in heaven.” There is a special permission to consult the Urim and Tumim regarding war. I do not see why there would be such permission in monetary or capital cases. You are right that this is part of prohibition and permission.
2. I’ve heard this said regarding Elijah (the acronym behind “teiku”), not regarding the Urim and Tumim. But perhaps it really is possible, since facts are not Torah. This is not connected to the question of authority, because I accept the Urim and Tumim not because of (formal) authority but because they know the facts (substantive authority). Like the authority of an expert in some factual field.
As for a question about the future, if it has practical implications for some law, I don’t see a difference. But if it is mere divination, then perhaps there is even a prohibition involved of “you shall not practice divination.” Though one could distinguish, since the Urim and Tumim comes from the Holy One, blessed be He, and is like asking a prophet.
Discussion on Answer
Monetary law is subject to waiver, and in that sense it is certainly different from prohibition and permission. That is why one can make stipulations in monetary law, among other differences. So it is clear that if they agreed, there is no problem, since anyone can give gifts, and so there is nothing novel here. They can also accept upon themselves the ruling of the squid from the Olympics. The main novelty in his words is the very reasoning that the litigants accepted this upon themselves, and that seems rather shaky to me.
Your reasoning that the Urim and Tumim does not operate on the field of halakhic instruction seems definitely correct.
Does a religious court that sits by virtue of “they accepted it upon themselves” have special laws, as opposed to the squid from the Olympics or a friend serving as arbitrator between two sides?
Is it a “halakhic” religious court with all that implies, or is it simply judges/decisors who are not judging on the halakhic playing field (just as even a cattle-herder could)?
For that matter,
I assume the squid does not have to begin hearing monetary cases by day… does the respected court that sits by virtue of “they accepted it upon themselves” have to begin judging by day like all monetary cases?
Thank you very much,
Perhaps there is a case of acceptance by the entire public, like the gentile courts in Syria. There perhaps one could discuss it. But acceptance by two specific litigants has no restrictions at all.
There are no rules at all. Simply put, “they accepted it upon themselves” is a gift that I obligate myself to give you. Just as cattle-herders are possible, so too at night and with a panel of two or 52 judges, or a squid.
This should not be confused with each side choosing one arbitrator, which is a procedure for selecting judges in a regular halakhic court.
The whole matter of the Urim and Tumim is a severe Torah prohibition. It belongs to the realm of sorcery.
Apparently a typo in the Pentateuch:
“And he shall stand before Eleazar the priest, who shall inquire for him by the judgment of the Urim before the Lord. By his word they shall go out, and by his word they shall come in, he and all the children of Israel with him, even all the congregation.”
They have a tradition of deceiving in order to gain control
“And he took it from their hands, fashioned it with a graving tool, and made it into a molten calf; and they said, ‘These are your gods, O Israel, who brought you up out of the land of Egypt.’”
Our patriarch Jacob warned us about the corrupt ones
“Simeon and Levi are brothers; instruments of violence are their wares. Let my soul not enter their council; let my honor not be united with their assembly. For in their anger they slew a man, and in their self-will they hamstrung an ox. Cursed be their anger, for it was fierce, and their wrath, for it was harsh. I will divide them in Jacob and scatter them in Israel.”
So please don’t fall into the trap.
It seems that only in monetary law does one ask the Urim and Tumim, for in matters of prohibition and permission one should ask the Kereti U-Feleti 🙂
Best regards, Eibschutz
With God’s help, 19 Adar 5781
Perhaps the function of asking the Urim and Tumim is not the clarification of Jewish law itself, which is generally entrusted to the sages, but rather the public benefit that would result from the question, since “one asks only on behalf of the public,” namely preventing strife and serious dispute.
Therefore, perhaps there is a distinction between prohibition and permission, which are generally matters entrusted to the individual and do not cause public controversy, as opposed to monetary law, where disputes are common and lead to quarrels and serious conflict. Therefore there may be room to turn to the Urim and Tumim in order to quiet the quarrel and restore public peace.
Best regards, Yaron Fisch”l Korinaldi
Rabbi Ovadia Yosef once wondered: why is it that when a person comes to a rabbi with a question about a bird and the rabbi rules it non-kosher, the questioner accepts it lovingly even though he suffers financial loss; whereas when he loses in monetary litigation, he is bitter and angry at the judges?
Rabbi Ovadia Yosef answered that a person is willing to lose money for the sake of Jewish law, but when he loses and the other person gains, his heart rebels.
In my humble opinion there is another reason for this. In a dispute between a person and his fellow, a person has an intuition about what is just, and therefore when the judge rules otherwise, the litigant rebels. By contrast, in the laws of animal defects rendering them non-kosher, the questioner has no intuition at all as to what the law is, and he awaits the rabbi’s ruling like a tabula rasa, with no prior opinion.
This matter appears in the responsa Divrei Yisrael (Collected Responsa, siman 1), and already within the responsum itself the editor of the responsa disagrees with the author.
The early source is Targum Yonatan (Exodus 28:15): “the breastplate of judgment, by which the judgments of Israel that are hidden from the judges are made known,” and likewise Deuteronomy 27:21:
“And before Eleazar the priest he shall minister, and when a matter is hidden from him he shall ask for him by the judgment of the Urim before the Lord; by the word of Eleazar the priest they shall go out to arrange the battles, and by his word they shall come in to judge judgment, he and all the children of Israel with him and all the congregation.”
By the way, he brings from Maharatz Chayot, who explains how Rabbi Elazar issued rulings on his deathbed from the upper chamber:
Maharatz Chayot, tractate Bava Metzia 84b
We do not judge based on divine inspiration, nor based on prophecy, nor by the Urim and Tumim, nor by a true dream, as I elaborated in my book Torat Nevi’im, chapter 1. And perhaps monetary law is different, since once the litigants listened to the statement heard from the upper chamber, it is as if they consented to it; and money is subject to waiver. But obviously in matters of prohibition and permission they need not listen to him. This requires further elaboration, but this is not the place.
Could it be that because money is subject to waiver, monetary law is not really prohibition and permission?
By the way, regarding what the Rabbi mentioned: “a special permission for war.” I tend to think there is no special permission in war to use the Urim and Tumim as a substitute for halakhic clarification.
First of all, one must use human reason for the sake of halakhic clarification. Of course, that is in a case where there really is a halakhic question of prohibition and permission (“Is it permitted to endanger oneself in such a situation?”, “Is it permitted to wage war on the Sabbath?”, “Is one obligated to go to war so that they won’t attack again?” and the like).
Only if the conclusion of the halakhic clarification is that there is permission to go to war can one move on to the next stage and ask the Urim and Tumim whether it is advisable to go to war.
If the halakhic authority prohibited war or commanded war, there is no meaning to asking the Urim and Tumim, and one cannot proceed to the stage of asking it.
That is, asking the Urim and Tumim applies only in discretionary matters.