Q&A: On the Topic of Classes on Doubt and Statistics
On the Topic of Classes on Doubt and Statistics
Question
I’ve recently been listening to the classes on doubt and statistics, and a few questions or possible extensions came up that I’d like to understand.
I’ll ask two of them here, but I’d also be happy if there’s a general way to ask questions on each class separately.
In class 32 there was a discussion about the laws of doubt, with an emphasis on whether a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently by Torah law or only rabbinically.
One point I felt was missing is the interaction between the different approaches and the Talmudic rule, “Whatever the Rabbis enacted, they enacted in the likeness of Torah law.” In my humble opinion, this makes it harder to explain Maimonides the way the Rabbi explained him, and perhaps it opens a way to understand the laws of double doubt even according to Maimonides’ view.
In addition, the Rabbi said that Maimonides derives the rule that a Torah-level doubt is treated leniently from the case of a mamzer. On further thought about the exposition, it seems to me that one could derive the rule, in line with Maimonides, only for cases where the definition of the prohibition is inherently halakhic and not factual in nature—such as a mamzer, forbidden fat, or blood—but not for prohibitions like forbidden meat, whose essence is factual.
In class 33 the Rabbi mentions that guilt-offerings are brought for a reality that is not necessarily a sin. I’d be glad to know how that fits with the Mishnah at the end of Keritot or in tractate Yoma, which says that Yom Kippur atones only for those liable for guilt-offerings and not for those liable for sin-offerings. How does the concept of atonement apply where there is no sin?
Thank you in advance.
Shlomo Gevirtzman
Answer
1. I didn’t understand the question. The very distinction that with Torah law we go stringently and with rabbinic law leniently is itself a distinction that is not “in the likeness of Torah law.” What is there to explain here beyond that? That rule is not categorical, and it has many exceptions. If there is logic to making a distinction between Torah law and rabbinic law, then one does so. If not, then one tries to make it parallel to Torah law.
2. Maimonides himself (in a responsum) writes that he learned it from there. Your distinction is possible, but by no means necessary. You can ask of all the approaches why they compare factual doubt to legal doubt, but the fact is that they do compare them. This is not specifically connected to Maimonides.
3. In a guilt-offering there is something problematic, and that is what is atoned for (otherwise why bring an offering at all?!). My claim is that there is no halakhic prohibition there. I have an article that explains this in great detail. As I explained there, guilt-offerings come to repair a flaw in reality and not a sin in the formal halakhic sense. According to this, Yom Kippur atones for or repairs such flaws. I don’t see a problem here.
Here is the article: https://www.google.com/url?client=internal-element-cse&cx=f18e4f052adde49eb&q=https://mikyab.net/%25D7%259B%25D7%25AA%25D7%2591%25D7%2599%25D7%259D/%25D7%259E%25D7%2590%25D7%259E%25D7%25A8%25D7%2599%25D7%259D/%25D7%259E%25D7%2594%25D7%2595%25D7%25AA%25D7%2595-%25D7%25A9%25D7%259C-%25D7%25A7%25D7%25A8%25D7%2591%25D7%259F-%25D7%2590%25D7%25A9%25D7%259D/&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwjTmu78zM-CAxV3UKQEHZeeBScQFnoECAIQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2xnjmumC-ASOlmzL8G6VrY
Discussion on Answer
Thanks for the answer.
Regarding the issue of “Whatever the Rabbis enacted, they enacted in the likeness of Torah law,” I think I need to sharpen the point.
A. First and foremost, if there are many exceptions, that sharpens the need to understand the rule better. So if you have a comprehensive explanation, I’d be glad to know it.
B. As I understand it, the rule basically imposes a limitation on the Rabbis’ legislative power. The intent of the rule is that the Rabbis’ power to enact is limited to extending Torah laws to new realities on a rabbinic level. That is to say: the prohibition of poultry cooked in milk is really the prohibition of meat cooked in milk, with all its details, applied to poultry.
Under this understanding, it seems impossible to say that treating a Torah-level doubt stringently on a rabbinic level basically describes a reality in which one is permitted to enter a doubtful situation but cannot claim duress. Because there is no such recognized prohibition in the Torah. Either the prohibition is a definite prohibition in a case of doubt (and therefore double doubt is permitted), or there is a prohibition on entering doubt, whose nature I admit I do not know, but it must rely on some other existing prohibition. I’d be glad to know where the gap is in my logic here.
The gap is that there is no basis at all for this theory. You’re taking this rule too far. There is a rule that one tries to model rabbinic enactments after Torah law. That’s all. Obviously the Rabbis can innovate laws that are not extensions of Torah law.
The rule that rabbinic doubt is treated leniently itself contradicts that principle, certainly according to the approaches that disagree with Maimonides.
On the contrary, see Ketav VehaKabbalah on the issue of “do not add”—he explains that in order not to equate rabbinic decrees and prohibitions with Torah prohibitions, which would violate “do not add,” it is necessary to be lenient in cases of doubt. If so, the wording of Maimonides in the Laws of Rebels, that one who says meat and milk is forbidden by the Torah violates “do not add”—and according to this, Maimonides’ intent in being stringent with doubts concerning decrees, like a Torah prohibition, is along these lines.
That may perhaps be the reason for the view that the very day itself atones and one does not need to repent. It is not a sin, but a flaw in reality.