Q&A: Suspensive Guilt-Offering
Suspensive Guilt-Offering
Question
Hello Rabbi,
The Talmud in Horayot (11a) is uncertain about the law in a case where someone ate doubtful forbidden fat while he was an ordinary person, and it became known to him only after he was appointed as nasi, according to Rabbi Shimon. Its wording is: “Since with regard to certainty his status changed, did it also change with regard to doubt? Or perhaps when it changed with regard to certainty—that is because his sacrifice changed, but here, where his sacrifice did not change, we should say that he brings a suspensive guilt-offering.”
I haven’t found a good explanation for why he should not be liable for a suspensive guilt-offering, since he is not excluded from it. Two possible directions occurred to me: A. his doubtful case should not be more stringent than his certain case (this is what Keren Orah writes); I’d be glad if the Rabbi has an explanation of that rule. B. I thought perhaps one could say that the doubtful case is defined through the category of a suspensive guilt-offering: does it come as the beginning of atonement on some level or another, and therefore is it connected to the definite sacrifice (which differs before his appointment and after his appointment). But this is only an initial direction and not very sharp yet.
I’d be glad if the Rabbi could give a good explanation of the matter, and also share his opinion about the second explanation (and perhaps refine it if the direction is correct). Thank you very much
Answer
If we understand that the nasi’s liability for a suspensive guilt-offering is different from that of an ordinary person, except that both are liable to bring the same sacrifice, then it is simple. Perhaps the doubt is precisely about this itself: is the nasi’s liability for a suspensive guilt-offering a different liability, or the same liability as that of an ordinary person? But from the wording of Keren Orah it seems he understood otherwise: if in a definite case he is exempt in such a situation, then in a doubtful case it cannot be that he is liable. However, that rule is internally contradicted, since a nasi who both sinned and had it become known to him while serving as nasi is liable for a suspensive guilt-offering and exempt from a definite sin-offering; we see that there is a situation in which the doubtful case is more stringent than the definite one. Therefore his words require further analysis, and it seems as I wrote.
I did not understand your suggestion—do you mean what I wrote, or something else? If you want to exempt him from a suspensive guilt-offering because in his definite case he would not be liable for a sin-offering, and the suspensive guilt-offering is the beginning of atonement for the sin-offering (when it becomes known to him), that does not work for the same reason I rejected Keren Orah. According to your approach, a nasi who sinned would not be liable for a suspensive guilt-offering, since he is not liable for a definite sin-offering.
Discussion on Answer
What is Keren Orah?
Keren Orah. The name of a book.
Indeed. I meant something different. After all, this is according to Rabbi Shimon, and he holds that the nasi is exempt if he sinned as an ordinary person and it became known to him as nasi. In that case he is indeed completely exempt.
Indeed, I meant the Rabbi’s principle, that the nasi’s liability for a suspensive guilt-offering is different from that of an ordinary person, but I meant to try to answer the difficulty Avishai raised: what reason would there be to say such a thing? So the direction was that the suspensive guilt-offering is a branch of the fixed sin-offering, where the nasi’s liability is certainly different.
Regarding the rejection of Keren Orah — a nasi who sinned and had it become known to him while he was nasi brings a sin-offering (except that he brings a he-goat and not a ewe or a she-goat), no?
And I think the questioner’s point is: what reason would there be to say that the nasi’s liability for a suspensive guilt-offering is different from that of an ordinary person, seeing that both bring the same sacrifice.