Q&A: The Law of Doubt in the Torah
The Law of Doubt in the Torah
Question
Hello Rabbi! A friend asked me a question. I’m not sure whether it’s valid, and it is indeed difficult, but I’d be happy to hear the Rabbi’s opinion on the matter.
How is it possible to discuss the laws of doubt in the Torah? After all, the divine command does not turn me into God’s representative to arrange creation for Him. The command is a specific statement directed at me: for example, when I stand before forbidden fat, I may not eat it. So if I am standing before an object and I do not know what it is, how would there arise an obligation for me to clarify its nature, or at least to refrain from eating because of the doubt? Seemingly there is nothing here that would generate such an obligation for me, because I do not know what it is, so the divine voice prohibiting the eating of forbidden fat is not addressing me right now. Just as no questions arise for me about the laws of the Sabbath or circumcision when I see that same piece, so too I would have no need to clarify whether it is forbidden fat. Even if that is more likely, still, if it is not established in my consciousness that this is forbidden fat, no question is created for me as to whether it is forbidden fat or not. As far as I’m concerned, it is an unidentified object that I want to eat, and God can sort out the forbidden fats He created.
As stated, I have a few directions for resolving the question, but I would be glad to hear what the Rabbi’s opinion is.
Answer
I don’t see a question here. If the truth is that it is forbidden fat, then you may not eat it. And if you do not know, then find out, so as not to stumble into a prohibition.
Of course, if there is a source or tradition to prohibit a Torah-level doubt, then the question does not arise at all.
Discussion on Answer
It seems to me this is just sheer stubbornness. There isn’t the slightest difficulty here. I’ve exhausted the point.
It would seem plausible to suggest that the dispute between Maimonides and Rashba regarding a Torah-level doubt — whether one must be stringent by Torah law or only rabbinically — depends on this question.
For Maimonides, the system of prohibitions is a system of commands directed at a person’s decision-making.
For Rashba, prohibitions are something that exists in the ontological reality of the forbidden object itself, and the person is bound by reality to act in accordance with the prohibition inherent in the object. Therefore, in a case of doubt one cannot be lenient, in line with the Rabbi’s reasoning.
This question is asked by Rabbi Shimon Shkop in Sha’arei Yosher, Gate 1, and elsewhere, and he answers that indeed there is no prohibition in a case of doubt, since “there is no warning in a case of doubt.” It is only because, in the end, aside from the warning itself there is also an intrinsically forbidden object that depends on reality, something like poison, that a person should weigh the matter and be careful.
And he further adds that the dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) over whether a Torah-level doubt must be treated stringently by Torah law depends on the question whether the Torah imposed a novel prohibition against entering a state of doubt. But according to all views, there is a forbidden object that may exist.
It was precisely about this part — “find out” — that my question was. What imposes on me the obligation to clarify? When it is definitely forbidden fat, the prohibition against forbidden fat immediately applies to me. But when it is doubtful, seemingly there is nothing that would trigger the prohibition of forbidden fat, because as far as I’m concerned it is not forbidden fat. Clarify? Why should I clarify? I was told not to eat forbidden fat; when I know that it is forbidden fat, I’ll refrain from eating it. If I don’t know, then no. At the moment no prohibition is incumbent upon me, seemingly.
As for a Torah-level doubt being treated stringently — yes indeed, the question is what generates a discussion of doubt. The rule of Torah-level doubt, etc., applies when a state of doubt arises for me; then the Jewish law is to act stringently in that case. But the question is: what is a state of doubt, and why does it exist at all?