Fine, I’ll read that column.
Just for now I’ll note: the fact that an unintended act is permitted apparently contradicts the rule that in a Torah-level doubt one must be stringent. That seems totally obvious and clear.
Why, in the case of a piece that is doubtfully forbidden fat or permitted fat, do we say that a Torah-level doubt requires stringency, whereas when you are uncertain whether dragging the chair will make a furrow, it is permitted, or whether locking the box will trap something, it is permitted?

And it’s not like people aren’t talking about this. For example, the Hazon Ish in section 50, subsection 1, and the Bi’ur Halakhah in section 316 when he challenges the Taz, who permits a former inevitable result.
And everyone gave his own answer, and I too suggested a distinction, which for some reason seems more logical to me, both more than the Hazon Ish’s explanation and more than others’.
Why, according to your approach, is there no question? Where did the doubt go in a Torah-level issue?

Neither simple nor clear. Just plain ignorance. There is no connection at all between an unintended act and the laws of doubt. That’s my opening line in every lecture I give on this topic. When you drag a bench and a furrow is made without it being an inevitable result, you are exempt not because of the laws of doubt but because you did not intend the prohibited act. In principle that is true even when the prohibited result happens in a case of inevitable result. The novelty is that nevertheless, despite the lack of intent, if it is an inevitable result then you are liable. In any event, you can see that inevitable result does not come to move us from doubt to certainty. Look at a labor not needed for its own purpose—digging a pit and needing only the dirt—and you’ll see that even though a prohibited act definitely occurs, Rabbi Shimon still exempts. An unintended act is a similar exemption.

All right, I printed it out and I’ll read it.
But before that:
A. Ignorance? And the Hazon Ish and the Bi’ur Halakhah didn’t grasp that?
B. And what you’re claiming—that because he doesn’t intend it, it has nothing to do with the laws of doubt—if a piece of forbidden fat perhaps fell into pot A or perhaps into pot B, and I do not intend to eat the forbidden fat but only the contents of the pot, would it be permitted for me, with no laws of doubt involved? Obviously the laws of doubt do apply. So too with dragging the chair, where it is doubtful that it will make a furrow: even if I do not intend the furrowing, it is like eating from a pot that may contain forbidden fat even if I do not intend the forbidden fat.

And as for a labor not needed for its own purpose, the reason for the exemption indeed has nothing to do with the laws of doubt, because there there really is no doubt, since it will certainly happen and he also intends the act, he just does not need it for that purpose. It is like other laws that have nothing to do with the laws of doubt, such as indirect causation, destructive action, and so on.

But intent and lack of intent are connected to the laws of doubt, as in the example I gave from the pot.

C. Just in general, why is this called a doubtful inevitable result? How is it different from the standard inevitable result?

A. I didn’t see the passages you’re attributing to them. But even if it appears there, that’s ignorance. I very much doubt that either of them wrote to equate an unintended act with the laws of doubt.
B. When you drag a bench and do not intend the furrow, you are exempt with no connection at all to the laws of doubt. After all, based on the laws of doubt you ought to be stringent and forbid it, because it is a Torah-level doubt. I don’t understand what you want. Clearly there is a substantive permission here that has nothing to do with doubt; even if a furrow is made, the matter is permitted, and here it is not even a doubt. The furrow was in fact made; I just did not know beforehand that it would be made. That is at most inadvertent violation, not doubt. And after the furrow has already begun to be made, it is not even inadvertence anymore.
Therefore I brought you the example of a labor not needed for its own purpose. You yourself understand that the exemption there is not because of the laws of doubt, since there is no doubt there. So why is he exempt? After all, he dug a pit. So what if he needs only the dirt? Rather, if he digs but for a different purpose, he is completely exempt, because this is not considered performing a prohibited labor. The same applies when one drags a bench and his purpose is something else: he is completely exempt, and not because of the laws of doubt. This is not the normal form of performing prohibited labor. In both cases the result occurred, but in a way that does not count as performing prohibited labor. There is not the slightest connection to the laws of doubt, and anyone who says otherwise is speaking out of ignorance.
As for the piece of forbidden fat that fell into a pot, there are many distinctions. The paper would wear out, but they would not finish. First, this is not one action with two results, but two actions happening together. You are eating this and that. So in the simple sense you intend both; you just don’t know whether the forbidden fat is here or there. Beyond that, in eating there is the principle that one benefits. Beyond that, you are in a state of doubt and it is forbidden for you to eat. If you ate, you transgressed the prohibition of doubt. And after the fact, it is an inadvertent violation. Like the law of one piece out of two pieces: one is forbidden initially from eating, and if he ate he brings a provisional guilt-offering, and if it becomes clear that he ate the forbidden one he brings a sin-offering. And of course according to Rabbi Akiva Eger, in such a case it is in fact a doubtful inevitable result, since if he ate the pot with the forbidden fat, then he necessarily also ate forbidden fat.

Last night I read all the posts from 322–326.

C. Why aren’t you answering point C?

A. Hazon Ish, section 50, subsection 3:
“It must therefore be said that according to the Arukh, for Rabbi Shimon an unintended act is permitted in a case of doubt, even though in every doubt we go stringently and one should have had to worry about dragging a bed lest it make a furrow… and according to this one should have permitted even an inevitable result, for what difference is there between certainty and doubt, since even a doubtful prohibition is, by Torah law, treated stringently…”
Bi’ur Halakhah 316, s.v. ‘Therefore’:
“Behold, the Taz introduced here a novel idea regarding inevitable result, namely… that just as where we are uncertain whether the prohibition will occur or not, we say that an unintended act is permitted… so too where we are uncertain whether there is any prohibition in the act he is doing, and he does not intend the prohibition, that too is permitted… And were it not for his words, logic would suggest the opposite: if the prohibition will definitely be produced by the act [that is, the locking], but it is doubtful whether there is a prohibition here [that is, something trapped], then it should be a Torah-level doubt; whereas in the case of dragging, it is different, since there our uncertainty concerns something else.”

B. You wrote to me, “After all, based on the laws of doubt you ought to be stringent and forbid it, because it is a Torah-level doubt. I don’t understand what you want.” You somewhat reversed things. That is exactly what I want to know—namely, why do we permit it when it is not an inevitable result (not why we forbid it when it is an inevitable result), when based on the laws of doubt we should be stringent, even if it is unintended.

You also wrote, “And here it is not even a doubt. The furrow was in fact made; I just did not know beforehand that it would be made. That is at most inadvertence and not doubt.” But we are discussing the matter before he comes to drag the chair, so at that point it is still only a doubt.
[And likewise in the Taz’s example of locking the box: the doubt is indeed something that can be clarified one way or the other, but right now I, the one locking it, am uncertain whether there are flies there or not there. And as is known, Jewish law does not always require checking. Or if you prefer: the doubt is whether, when I lock it, I will transgress a prohibition, just as if, when I drag, I will violate plowing, and just as with the piece of forbidden fat, the doubt is whether, when I eat from the pot, I will be eating the forbidden fat.]

And again, I didn’t understand your comparison. So what if the exemption in a labor not needed for its own purpose has nothing to do with the laws of doubt? I agree; I already wrote to you that destructive action and indirect causation and so on also have nothing to do with the laws of doubt. But an unintended act does relate to the laws of doubt. Yes, even though a labor not needed for its own purpose has nothing to do with the laws of doubt—I don’t know why you paired them up. There is some connection between them in that sometimes it is unclear why a given thing is classified as unintended action and not as a labor not needed for its own purpose, and then the halakhic authorities give various definitions according to their own approaches. Therefore Rabbi Akiva Eger, who wants to obligate when the doubt is about the past—by what rule exactly does he obligate? By the laws of doubt, as the Bi’ur Halakhah says.

And you also wrote that regarding the doubtful piece of forbidden fat, “this is not one action with two results, but two actions happening together. You are eating this and that. So in the simple sense you intend both; you just don’t know whether the forbidden fat is here or there.” That’s your wording. You can also view making a furrow by dragging a chair over soft dirt as one action. And aside from that, this does not require any difference between one action and two actions. The Minḥat Asher, vol. 2, p. 49 n., tries to distinguish between the laws of doubt, where we are stringent—such as in the above case of the piece of forbidden fat—and doubt in dragging a chair, and therefore wants to rule like Rabbi Akiva Eger. But from the Meiri’s commentary in the Talmudic passage about tilting during marital relations, he says it is proven like the Taz. And then your explanation and his explanation—distinguishing between one action and two actions—basically fall away, and it follows that my explanation that I wrote you above at the beginning of the question is the most on target. I’m waiting to hear what you think of my distinctions.

D. I didn’t understand in post 325 why you are so sure that: “An unintended act in halakhic language is not what we call in ordinary language lack of intention, meaning acting absentmindedly. In halakhic terminology, acting absentmindedly is called being preoccupied. An unintended act, by contrast, refers to a completely intentional action, since the person knows and is aware that when he drags the bench a furrow may be formed, and nevertheless he does not bother to avoid it. Therefore it is clear that we are dealing here with an exemption due to the absence of a transgression, not an exemption due to lack of culpability or duress. Intention is a condition for the act to count as a transgression, not a condition for guilt and punishment. This means that an act done unintentionally is not a transgressive act at all, and therefore even if the person could have foreseen that this result would occur—that is, even if he bears blame for what happened—there is still no transgression here and it is permitted.”

Indeed, “unintended” is as you said—not an absentminded action—but it is still lack of intention, and in that respect it is not as you said. That is, his intention in dragging the chair is not to make the furrow, but it is not absentminded; it is done with awareness. And therefore it is quite legitimate to understand that this is also a condition of culpability, and to say that one who does not intend is exempt because you cannot obligate as long as there is no intent. Consequently, an inevitable result is liable because it is considered as though he intended it, because he should have taken it into account. And Rabbi Akiva Eger holds that when the doubt is about the past, there is no permission, and it is considered as though he intended it, like an inevitable result.

Listen, we’re wasting our time. You bring me the Hazon Ish and the Bi’ur Halakhah, who write exactly what I said—as I guessed—as proof against me? They write explicitly that even though there is doubt here and we should have gone stringently, here we go leniently because this is not based on the laws of doubt. It’s like bringing proof that we do invoke a plea of “since” to extract money from someone from a commentator who asks why we do not invoke a plea of “since” to extract money.
As for the comments you have on those columns, I suggest you post them there one by one.

It is clear that the understanding in the responsum is that here it is not based on the laws of doubt—the fact is that we are not stringent in a case of an unintended act. The only question was: why?
I understood from your words that there is no question at all why we do not say that in a Torah-level doubt one should be lenient, because there is no intention—see your wording above. They do not start from such an assumption.
Rather, they understand that there is a question and they give an answer. And I also noted that, in my opinion, my answer quoted above is more understandable.
Actually, now I realize that you didn’t understand what I meant. You thought I meant that all the laws of unintended action are really laws of doubt.
About that it can be said: in passing, you didn’t read carefully. Given the overload, that’s not blameworthy, and maybe even praiseworthy.