Q&A: Kesef Mishneh on the Laws of Rebels
Kesef Mishneh on the Laws of Rebels
Question
Hello and blessings,
First of all, a huge thank-you for all of the Rabbi’s blessed activity. I really enjoy the many books and articles that the Rabbi produces, in addition to the fascinating lectures. It is a pure delight. I would like to note that the Rabbi has personally strengthened my faith and my sense of belonging and connection to Judaism to an indescribable degree, to the point of being meticulous with commandments, minor and major alike, at the most stringent level imaginable (maybe the Rabbi didn’t expect that mutation…).
I wanted to ask the Rabbi about something he wrote: the Rabbi wrote that the Talmud has authority, as Maimonides wrote, because it has the force of a religious court, and therefore we do not disagree with the Talmud, unlike the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim), etc. (and even regarding the Talmud, all this is only in matters of Jewish law). Now, I happened to look a bit at the pamphlet Divrei Sofrim by Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman, and there his debate with the Chazon Ish on this whole issue appears. And there the reasoning is mentioned that we accepted the religious court upon ourselves because they are wiser than we are, and therefore we do not disagree with them. That is to say, the explanation for this whole acceptance of the court is the assumption that the generations are in decline, and therefore we accepted not to disagree. According to this, there is an implicit assumption that there really is a decline of the generations, and therefore we do not disagree, and the implication is that accordingly we also cannot disagree with the medieval authorities (Rishonim) because of this assumption of decline of the generations.
I wanted to know whether the Rabbi agrees, and what his opinion is regarding the above-mentioned pamphlet Divrei Sofrim and the words of the Chazon Ish (if I remember correctly, I once heard the Rabbi mention them in a lecture, but I did not find it).
I would be happy if you could expand on the subject. Thank you.
Answer
Hello,
I don’t remember at the moment exactly what is being discussed there. If you want to discuss it, please bring the relevant passage.
Meticulousness in commandments and in Jewish law is definitely something I expect and want. I did not understand why you call that a mutation according to my approach.
The question of why we accepted some authority upon ourselves is not relevant. Even if the reason was the decline of the generations (and I do not think so, both because the assumption itself regarding decline of the generations seems quite doubtful to me, and also because there are other reasons for that acceptance—the desire to create a binding framework before the dispersion to the ends of the world in exile), still, the acceptance remains in force.
Discussion on Answer
Not true. Once we accepted, we accepted. If we did not accept their authority, then even if we reach the conclusion that they are greater than we are, that does not mean they have formal authority. The laws of the Knesset derive their force from the fact that the Knesset is authorized to legislate, not from the fact that it is especially wise. And on the other hand, a correct law—like not going through a red light—is not binding as long as it has not been legislated, even though it is correct.
Thanks, so you do not agree with Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman’s claim that the authority is substantive; rather, you argue that it is formal.
Not *only* substantive, but *also* formal. Obviously, in general there is a substantive component, and without it they would not have accepted the formal authority, but the formal authority is sweeping and absolute, whereas the substantive one is particular and subject to examination.
The word “authority” is vague. No person has authority over anything.
We are talking about rules that some accept and some do not.
The goal was to preserve the Torah from extinction.
And what authority do those who accept have over me?
A. I think he meant that the mutation was that his sense of belonging was strengthened.
B. Why is the reason not relevant? If it is valid in another case, then in that other case there should also be authority.