Thank you very much, honorable Rabbi. It’s such a pleasure to hear your answers. I have follow-up questions, with your permission.

So the vast majority of the people, effectively the whole of it, accepted upon themselves that the path of Jewish law for the Jewish people is founded on the path of the Mishnah and the Talmud. Until when is that acceptance valid, who can change it, and what is the source for that? Can another public acceptance cancel the previous one, and if so under what conditions?

According to your method and according to the Mishnah and the Talmud, how should I relate to kabbalistic claims when I examine Jewish law?

According to your method, suppose I found that the path of Jewish law regarding something is such-and-such, but in all current literature they recommend otherwise, even if they do not obligate it (“blessings upon him,” “recommended,” “one who does so will merit long life”…). How should I relate to that if I found no basis for it in my intellect other than spiritual recommendations that are above reason?

Thanks again for all your hard work!

Reason says that if a consensus is formed among those committed to Jewish law, they can change it. The mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted. The public acceptance of today is worth no less than the public acceptance of the past.

As for kabbalistic claims, that is a matter of personal taste. You can ignore them completely if you don’t believe in that. I personally tend to think that the kabbalists (the genuine ones) have some kind of spiritual intuition, but I wouldn’t take the details too seriously.

Nothing written nowadays is binding. Today there is no Sanhedrin and no ordained sages. Still, if there is broad consensus among all halakhic decisors, I would take that seriously and not dispute it lightly.
Recommendations that are not Jewish law are not binding, and that is certainly left to your judgment.

“Reason says that if a consensus is formed among those committed to Jewish law, they can change it. The mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted. The public acceptance of today is worth no less than the public acceptance of the past.”

I had been sure, in my understanding, that accepting “the mishnaic path” includes within it certain conditions for accepting another acceptance (I’m not expert in what exactly that means, but my understanding is that these are things that cannot exist today—ordination and a Sanhedrin).

Now, the likelihood that a halakhic path different from “the mishnaic path” would be accepted today is slim, but doesn’t the paragraph you wrote essentially mean that within “the mishnaic path” some particular halakhic line could be accepted by the whole public and then it would bind, like for example the framework of the Shulchan Arukh (including the Rema, if we generalize), since the overwhelming majority of the Orthodox world follows it today, even the Yemenites? The whole public basically accepted it. Or for example if tomorrow a new Jewish law book came out and all the rabbis followed it.

I didn’t understand what you were so sure about or why. I wrote what I think.
If the Shulchan Arukh had been accepted like the Talmud really was, its status would be similar. But it was not accepted in the same way. Even its commentaries disagree with it. It itself writes what the Rosh wrote, that the last absolutely binding authority was the Talmud. True, it carries significant weight, but it is not absolute authority.

If so, is it correct to say that the overwhelming majority (not half plus a bit) of the Jewish people accepted the Talmud as binding as absolute authority, and nothing else (a path different from the Talmud or a particular path within the Talmud like the Shulchan Arukh) can bind as absolute authority unless the overwhelming majority of the Jewish people accepts it as absolute and binding authority (and that also includes those who today are not Orthodox religious, meaning secular Jews, Karaites, Reform, etc.)

I feel that you are trying to extract from me an exact mathematical doctrine on this matter. Well, I don’t have one. As I wrote, someone who is not committed to Jewish law is not in the game.

I’m truly sorry for all the trouble. I’m just trying to find some intellectual foothold from which to start moving in the right direction…

If all the signs indicate that the overwhelming majority of the Jewish people accepted the absolute authority of the Talmud as binding, I see a clear logical continuation of that line in saying that only if the Jewish people (in all its shades) overwhelmingly decides to undertake a different absolute authority will it be accepted.

Beyond that logical continuation, I see only advantages in it, for example:

Suppose tomorrow the Orthodox religious part of the Jewish people accepts upon itself that it accepts the Shulchan Arukh as absolute authority. That still would not obligate me (and would cause me to give up on your halakhic approach, which I so much want to investigate deeply).

Suppose tomorrow the entire Jewish people in all its shades accepts upon itself… that would certainly be such a wise authority if it managed to unite and bind under it so much diversity.

That is, why in your opinion is this binding, and what benefit is there in saying that from now on the overwhelming majority of the Jewish people for the purpose of such acceptance counts only within the Orthodox religious part (which unfortunately—and I hope this doesn’t sound disrespectful—seems in my eyes to act wrongly many times, often doesn’t know what Jewish law even is, is steeped in a lot of confusion of faith and Jewish law, etc., and it’s not for nothing that your books and teachings try to change that)

Doesn’t sound*

I do not see why these details are important in order to start moving. If you accept that public acceptance is valid, then it is valid. Whether it requires 60% or 85% really makes no difference, and there is no answer to that anyway.
I don’t deal at all with the question of the advantages or disadvantages of any given thesis. For me the question is whether it is true or not.
The relevant majority is only within the part committed to Jewish law, since the others are not in the game. I don’t see what there is to add here.

Thank you, honorable Rabbi

Rabbi, you wrote –

“For some reason, people are not troubled by the authority of the Knesset or professional guilds.”

The point is this: the laws of the Knesset I can change. I have influence over them. That is the source of their authority. If I lived in a dictatorial state, even a very ancient one, thousands of years old, one that all my ancestors were accustomed to obeying—I would not accept its formal authority.

If indeed the mandate of the Talmud, since there were no ordained sages and no Sanhedrin, is based only on the fact that my ancestors accepted it, then that mandate is parallel to the mandate supposedly held by the Emperor of China just because the ancestors of the Chinese accepted obedience to the imperial establishment.

Why should that obligate me?

That is only a technical difference. The fact that it can be changed does not mean it obligates me. Why should the law obligate me? The fact that if a majority gathers it can change the law does not really interest me if I don’t want to keep it now. And even if it did interest me, the basic comparison still stands. It shows that a situation is possible in which a law I did not accept upon myself obligates me. Now there are nuances in the details as to whether it can be changed or not.
By the way, if someone decides that it does not obligate him, then he will not do it. He also will not be punished, because if he truly thinks that, then he is under compulsion. True, Jewish law sees him as someone who is in principle obligated, but this discussion is empty of real practical content.
And one more difference. When the commander is the Holy One, blessed be He, the command has force simply by virtue of the fact that He commanded it. True, there was also public acceptance in addition, but it is not like a state law. There is room for the claim that with the commands of the Holy One, blessed be He, the obligation exists and there is no way to escape it, unlike state law.
As for acceptance of the Talmud, that can certainly change, so I don’t see a question. If there is a consensus that decides to cancel the acceptance, it will be canceled.

Meaning, if it turned out that today’s secular Jews are actually believing Jews who see themselves as part of the system, and they simply “vote” in favor of canceling acceptance of the Talmud—then in your view the authority of the Talmud is nullified?

Even if it turns out that the Hindus are actually hidden Jews and God-fearing people who observe every minor and major commandment, then if they oppose the Talmud its authority is nullified. And the same goes for stray cats.

Suppose that in two weeks there is a referendum, and every Jew can put in a “yes” or “no” slip regarding the question whether to abolish the authority of the Talmud.
Two questions:
1. Who gets voting rights?
2. What would you personally vote? (I’d specifically like to hear your own personal answer, though of course this “you” is generic.)

These questions have to be answered.

If there is no way to answer question 1, that means there can be no way to hold such a referendum, and therefore in practice, contrary to what you explained, acceptance of the Talmud is not really something that can change.

If there is no way to answer question 2, that means that even if it were possible to declare such a referendum, it would be worthless because no one would show up to vote. In practice the result is the same. If you observe substantive commandments only because of the authority of the Gemara, and not for some other fundamental reason (as I understand you personally indeed do), then what reason could you have to vote in favor or against? If you vote against abolishing the authority, that means that in practice you had some hidden motivation all along to observe commandments that does not stem only from the authority of the Gemara. As I understand, you usually say that you don’t have such a motivation. So seemingly it follows that you would vote in favor of abolishing the authority. But if that is the case, why don’t we start a party and promote the matter in order to get rid of the burden in a valid and elegant way?

Or am I missing something basic?

You only forgot to add “which is what was to be proved” at the end. It’s obvious you’re a mathematician. But with all the appreciation I have for algorithms and mathematics, one has to recognize their limits. Mathematics does not know how to define a “heap” and vague everyday concepts. That doesn’t mean they aren’t useful or don’t have meaning. It only means they are hard to handle with precise tools.
As for your questions, recognition of the Talmud did not happen through a referendum but through the crystallization of an undefined social process. I assume that is also what could reverse the situation. I do not know how to define who participates in the vote and how much weight each one has (do prominent rabbis have the same weight as an ordinary Jew? Maimonides, for example, makes the renewal of ordination depend on the agreement of “all the sages of the Land of Israel,” not all the Jewish people). When a situation arises in which the agreement exists, I assume we will know it. Programming it mechanically is not the way.
I personally would vote in favor of preserving the authority of the Talmud, not because I’m happy about it (I really am not), but because I don’t see an alternative. An agreed-upon union of rabbis established today is not a reasonable substitute.
In the last column (669) I spoke about a utopian halakhic state, and I wrote that if and when it comes into being we will understand what it means and be able to formulate a position regarding how it should function. I also wrote that I assume that when such a state comes into being there will also be responsible and sensible religious leadership (not like what we have today). All of that is true here as well.
You can see that my answer refutes both paragraphs in your remarks, which teaches you the limits of logical argument. As I have said and written more than once, I am a great believer in logic, and I am sure that a valid logical argument is an important tool in our thinking and its conclusion cannot be undermined unless you undermine the premise or the mode of inference. The problem is that the formalization that moves us from reality and the issue under discussion into logical formalism is prone to hidden assumptions, and therefore one must be careful with it. See columns 50 and 318, for example.

Thanks for the response. Of course, I wasn’t pretending to make a formal argument here. It’s just a style.

What do you mean that you don’t see an alternative? An alternative for what?

I would very much like to succeed in conceptualizing in words the psychological/philosophical motivation that you (or anyone else) have behind such a metaphorical vote in favor of continuing the authority of the Talmud. It seems there must be some such external motivation (in your case there certainly must be, since you really do vote in favor. And unlike a certain politician who justified his opposition to cannabis legalization with “because it’s illegal,” you, as is known, have pretty decent logical skill.)

The very necessary existence of such a motivation somewhat challenges your thin theses regarding Jewish thought. Obviously such a motivation is a personal matter and one cannot obligate other people to initially hold the same motivation when they arrive at the ballot box (otherwise elections are pointless altogether). But it is still very interesting to investigate and delve into it. It surely has great significance.

You say you don’t see an alternative. Why do you need an alternative? For example, is it important to you a priori that the Jewish people have a uniform code? Is religious unity of the people important to you in itself? That throws us directly into Jewish thought.

I do not see an alternative that would replace the Talmud as a binding framework. Today there is no body of rabbis to whom I would entrust this (to constitute a Sanhedrin). In the absence of an alternative, I prefer the Talmud to remain. I have written here more than once about the importance of the Talmud, about the genius of its structure and of its having been chosen as the binding framework, and about the fact that without it we would not be here today.
I did not understand what this has to do with the question of thin Jewish thought.

What bothers you about there being no binding framework? Let everyone act according to his own understanding. Do you have an ideology that there should be a uniform law? If so, what is that ideology based on?

If that ideology is based on some Jewish law you learn that says there needs to be a general law, then the moment we abolish the authority of the Talmud that law too is no longer valid, so the ideology can be given up.

If that ideology is not based on such-and-such a law, then what is it based on?

This very discussion—of what could cause us to support an ideology that requires a uniform law for all Israel—is a discussion that thematically is usually placed under the heading “Jewish thought.” If we need it, then apparently we do belong to that world of content

Basically I’m trying to cautiously raise the suspicion that even before, for present purposes, you accept the authority of Jewish law, you have a non-halakhic ideology that the Jewish people should be here. Today. As you wrote: “…and about the fact that without it we would not be here today.” That is, you want us to be here today, as a people. And psychologically that creates in you an ideology that we should exist as a people, and therefore you have an interest in some uniform binding authority. You wouldn’t give that up, but not because of Jewish law itself.

Or something along those lines.

I do not engage in psychologizing. I’ll leave that to my researchers. I’m telling you that this is a position I formulated. Does it come from deep inside my desires? I don’t think so, but it also doesn’t interest me very much.
I have no interest whatsoever in physical survival. There is interest in the survival of the Torah and its fulfillment by the Jewish people. That is the name of the game here. In any case, I do not see the Talmud as having merely instrumental value (for the sake of survival). But it also has such value, and for the authority it received, that is mainly the value.
We absolutely do not need uniform Jewish law; on the contrary, in my opinion it is desirable that we not have it. But there needs to be a framework for Jewish law within which the discussion and disputes are conducted, and boundaries of the field, otherwise things fall apart. The Talmud fills that need, and I have elaborated on this more than once. Except that this framework has lost some of its significance over the generations, and therefore it would be desirable to have another framework. But there is no alternative, as stated.
There is such a field as meta-halakhah, and I have dealt with it more than once. Jewish thought is something else.

Just to make sure I understand, let me rephrase in my own words, with your permission. Do I understand correctly? –

Basically you write that there is an ideological-philosophical interest in the Jewish people keeping the commandments of the Torah. That is what matters.

Meaning, it is not that what matters is “to keep the Torah,” but “that the Jewish people keep the Torah.” There is a difference. And as far as we know, that is the will of God.

In order to realize this goal, the Jewish people needs a framework within which discussion and disputes are conducted, a framework and boundaries. Otherwise things fall apart, and then there will not be such a thing as the Jewish people keeping the Torah. Maybe there will be individuals and groups who keep Torah commandments, perhaps even every minor and major one, but there will not be the group “the Jewish people” that keeps the Torah. And that is contrary to the will of God, for apparently it matters to Him that there actually be such a distinct group.

Indeed.

But the moment one accepts that the will of God is that the Jewish people keep the Torah, that means there is a pre-halakhic definition of what “the Jewish people” means. Maybe there are also Talmudic laws on this topic, but alongside the Talmudic laws there is also some essentialist definition that does not depend on them. There has to be.

That means there is great room for reasoning, the Kuzari-style sort for example, according to which the Jewish people really expresses some kind of collective psychological consciousness. And in general there is great room to engage in investigating that collective psychological consciousness. Or if one rejects the psychological direction, then in general this essentialist mode of being. As I understand it, that investigation is exactly the field called Jewish thought.

I have completely lost the thread in this eclectic discussion. No, it absolutely does not mean such a thing. The Jewish people is defined ethnically through the mother and through conversion, and essentially through commitment to Jewish law. And there is interest that the ethnic group fulfill the essence. That’s all. No Kuzari, no mysticism, and no “in the image.” And of course no need for pre-halakhic definitions.

Talmudic Jewish law defines the Jewish people ethnically through the mother and through conversion. Talmudic Jewish law is not relevant here, because we are hypothetically assuming that one can vote in favor of abolishing its authority. To define the Jewish people through the law it is supposed to keep is a circular argument—that is, regarding commitment to Jewish law.

If the acceptance wants “the Jewish people to keep Torah,” then the term “the Jewish people” has meaning even without the Torah. And you can’t use the Torah to define it.

If you do use the Talmudic determination to define in the first place what the Jewish people is, then that means the Jewish people can never decide that it no longer accepts the Talmud. It would have to stop being the Jewish people.

Likewise regarding commitment to Jewish law*

In another formulation—let I(x) denote the predicate “x is part of the Jewish people.” Let T(x) denote the predicate “x keeps the commandments of the Torah.”

You confirmed to me that indeed, in your understanding, God wants the Jewish people to keep the Torah. That is, God wants the following statement to have truth value true:

∀x: I(x)–>T(x)

These predicates are independent. You cannot appeal to the Torah in order to define the people.

Sorry for the consecutive messages. Wait, let me correct for precision—you can appeal to the Torah to define the people, theoretically. But you can’t appeal to the Talmud. Certainly you can’t see a Talmudic determination as the only definition of what the nature of the group is.

I didn’t understand what the formalization added. Your assumption that the predicates are independent is also far from necessary. I don’t see why the Torah cannot determine who the Jewish people is and impose tasks on it to fulfill it. Just as Israeli law can determine who is an Israeli who is bound by that law.
In any case, of course I can also resort to the Talmud and not only to the Torah. That is the halakhic definition of the Jewish people. If they decide to abolish the authority of the Talmud and establish different Jewish law, then fine. For now, this is the Jewish law, even if its source is in the Talmud. Beyond that, the Talmud only records the earlier Jewish law, and it is not correct to say that every law appearing in it is necessarily Talmudic law. If you have other information, we can talk about it.
With respect, this looks like mere insistence. I don’t see any logical problem or other problem here.

Maybe that was the gap on my side. When people say that the authority of the Talmud stems from public acceptance, they actually mean only the “Talmudic part” within it. There are also things in it that obligate us regardless of that act of public acceptance. In particular, the definition of who, in practice, the public is. Technically that definition is given within the Talmud, but essentially it belongs to the “non-Talmudic” part of it.

Am I understanding correctly?

If so, how do we distinguish between the “Talmudic” part and the part that is simply a record of earlier laws, which technically appears as part of the Talmud?

You deal with these issues in your books, but apparently I didn’t fully understand.

For example, for our purposes the question is really who is a Jew and what is a valid conversion (*and perhaps also who is a Torah scholar), when I insist that one cannot decide specifically on these issues on the basis of the “Talmudic” part, since we need to know who is a Jew before we address the question of what the Jewish public accepted and what it did not (*if, as you wrote earlier in the thread, perhaps Torah scholars have precedence over an ignoramus in such decisions)

The statement that a Jew is someone whose mother is Jewish—does that belong to the “Talmudic” part? (If so, I’m in trouble.) Or to the “non-Talmudic” part? (Then I’m fine.) How do we know?

The example of Israeli law defining who is Israeli is a good one, but I’m not sure I agree with you. I’ll think about it, but it seems to me that there needs to be a people/national group before they have a law.

With respect, but I’m starting to break. I wrote explicitly that even if this is a Talmudic law, we will accept it, unless we have decided by consensus to give up the Talmud. I only added that even if we did not accept such a law, in order to reject the law on that ground you need to show that it was created in the Talmud and not that the Talmud merely records and passes it on. Practically speaking, I do not need to know whether this is a Talmudic law or not.
As for the substance of the question, there are laws regarding which this can be known because the Talmud itself records the formation of the law. There are laws where there is no clear decision whether the Talmud is merely recording them or whether they were created there. But as stated, that is not very important for our purposes.