Q&A: Does This Have a Name?
Does This Have a Name?
Question
On matters of religion and state, I know what to call what I think. On the one hand, I truly, truly don’t care what each person does; on the other hand, I’m always in favor of laws that align with Jewish law, because in my view there’s something special about the state of the Jewish people having Jewish laws. So even though I don’t care if a man marries his mother, if I’m asked whether I want such marriages to be legal in the State of Israel, I would oppose it.
And not only on religious matters. Some of my friends (educated people with senior positions in high-tech) snort cocaine in the middle of the workday, are addicted to hashish/cannabis, go out to parties and get high, and I have no interest in what they do. But on the other hand, I do not want drugs to be legally approved.
I don’t know how to clarify (to myself) whether this is a legitimate / hypocritical / foolish position.
Answer
A completely legitimate position, and not foolish at all. You explained it very well. I would suggest two interpretations of the apparent contradiction in your words:
- At the end of the day, it really does bother you that people do such things, but you are against coercing them. However, if there is such a law, that is indirect coercion (for example, because they still have the option of violating the law quietly, without you noticing).
- There is another possible interpretation, a declarative one, in your view: you don’t care if people do X, but the character of the state should be that X is forbidden. The consideration is not preventing the acts but the declarative “character” consideration (in the language of Rabbi Kook). But in my opinion this is not a particularly logical approach, though it is common among Religious Zionists (those who object to El Al, as a state company, flying on the Sabbath, but private companies with the same number of passengers—such as El Al itself after privatization—do not trouble them). I do not support “character of the state” considerations of this kind (similar to this is the position of the author of the Akeidat Yitzhak, Vayera, Gate 20, who opposed the institutionalization of prostitution on a similar character-based consideration. See, for example, here).
[Excuse me, but in my opinion it’s a foolish and illegitimate position. Morality should be limited to matters between one person and another, and there whatever is forbidden should be enforced, and there is no logic in tolerance—unless in the bigger picture it will be even more of a nuisance. People invent baseless values and then grant others autonomy to violate them. Really, thank you very much.]