Q&A: Authority
Authority
Question
A rabbi, in a lesson on conceptual analysis, says that “authority belongs only to the Talmud, and not to the Geonim, nor to the medieval authorities (Rishonim), nor to the later authorities (Acharonim).”
1) How do we know that? Maybe they also have authority, just like the Talmud does?
2) Does that mean it is permitted to disagree with a Gaon or a Rishon? I always heard (maybe not correctly, which is why I’m asking) that each generation is forbidden to disagree with the generation before it, and therefore a Rishon may not disagree with a Gaon, and all the more so we may not disagree with an Acharon or a Rishon?
3) And if you say that it is indeed permitted, it says in the Talmud that if the earlier ones were like human beings, then we are like donkeys. Can a donkey disagree with a human being? Obviously not.
4) Basically, why is a generation forbidden to disagree with the generation before it? After all, you already said that the decline of the generations is clearly not in wisdom, and all the more so not in the scope of knowledge. So it would seem that it should be permitted to disagree—why not?
Answer
- Whoever claims there is authority bears the burden of proof. As long as it has not been proven, there is none. On the substance of the matter, this is what the Rosh writes at length in Sanhedrin, chapter 4, no. 6, and his words are brought in the Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 25. But halakhic authority derives from “do not turn aside,” and that was certainly said only about the Sanhedrin and not about any other religious court or sage (except for the puzzling view of Sefer HaChinukh, that it applies in every generation). Therefore, the existence of authority requires justification. For example, the authority that the Talmud has, even though its sages did not have ordination and were not a Sanhedrin, is based on the fact that we accepted it upon ourselves (see Kesef Mishneh, Laws of Rebels 2:1).
- Correct, there is no impediment whatsoever to disagreeing with anyone you wish after the Talmud. Of course, these are great Torah scholars, so one should consider it carefully and examine well whether you truly disagree with what he says. But that is substantive authority, not formal authority. I made this distinction in my trilogy, and I suggest you read it, because all your questions here on the site are answered there.
- One should not take analogies too far. Didn’t later authorities disagree with medieval authorities? Beyond that, the permission to disagree is not based on our being greater than they were, or on our being right and them being wrong. The basis is the duty of autonomy in halakhic ruling: every person must conduct himself according to his own ruling (if he is qualified for that). See my article here on autonomy and authority in halakhic decision-making.
- I didn’t understand the question. I said that it is permitted to disagree. But you are not quoting me correctly. The decline is not in the scope of knowledge and not in analytical wisdom, but it may be that there is a decline in synthetic wisdom. I elaborated on this in my book Two Carts.