Q&A: Formal Authority – Talmud
Formal Authority – Talmud
Question
Hello Rabbi,
In many of your lectures and books you keep saying that the Talmud has formal authority. And you rely on the Kesef Mishneh on Mamrim 2:1 which says,“They upheld and accepted that later generations would not dispute the earlier authorities.” And it seems to me that this is somewhat foundational in your approach.
I have several questions about this :
1) Do you see this as a halakhic fiction?
2) If not, why do you rely on the Kesef Mishneh, after all:
2.1) He only says “it seems to me.” Is it really enough to rely on “it seems to me” in order to prove something so basic?
2.2) More than that, it seems from my reading (especially the books “History of the Halakhic Decisors” by Rabbi Zev Young and “How Do We Know This” by Jay M. Harris) that there was a struggle during the Geonic period between the Karaites and the Geonim. And the Geonim won, so the Talmud spread throughout the entire Jewish people (at the price of minimizing the importance of aggadic material and also of homiletic interpretations). So how can a political / governmental victory give legitimacy to any book?
Maybe you’ll tell me that the Geonim won because the Jewish people accepted the Talmud upon themselves. But :
– It doesn’t seem to me right to call this “accepting it upon themselves.” The people simply preferred the Geonim (they did not accept the Talmud upon themselves).
– And also even if you want to call this acceptance we have no indication whatsoever that there was an acceptance not to dispute the medieval authorities (Rishonim). At most one could saythat the custom of Israel is to be bound by the Talmud.
So why do you think the Talmud has substantive authority?
Answer
- Absolutely not a fiction. The Jewish people really did accept the Talmud upon themselves.
- 2. I don’t rely on him. His words are an illustration. I rely on reality. One can ask why one should obey even if the Jewish people accepted it upon themselves, but that is a different discussion. In practice, whoever is faithful to the Torah accepted the Talmud upon himself. Every public process is political, so “political” here is not a dirty word. Mount Sinai was also political. A public made a decision to comply and to bind all of its descendants by it. It’s clear that you know my position, so you surely know that I do not accept that there is any prohibition against disputing the medieval authorities (Rishonim).
Discussion on Answer
I assume so, unless something in their framework seemed problematic to me and plainly incorrect.
I hear that. But it feels a bit strange to me. Why does the framework need to seem reasonable to you? If you think formal authority can arise from the people’s agreement, why bring the content of the agreement into the picture?
Suppose there is a Great Sanhedrin (with ordination passed down from ordained judges all the way back to Moses) and you think all the judges are idiots. Would you obey their ruling even if it did not seem reasonable?
I wrote that the agreement helps determine what the interpretation is, but there also has to be faithfulness to the original word of God. That overrides the agreement.
Thanks. But I have two questions about that.
1) According to you, the Talmud’s interpretation (of the Torah) is the binding interpretation. And as a halakhic communitarian, I assume you would agree that the binding interpretation can be incorrect. So do you think there are specific interpretations in the Talmud that are incorrect?
2) It seems to me that the Kesef Mishneh is not a good illustration of your position. I’ll try to explain this better.
– Premise A) According to you, the Mishnah’s interpretation of the Torah has formal authority.
– Premise B) According to you (and according to Maimonides), any interpretation by a Sanhedrin (which has formal authority) can be rejected by a Sanhedrin from a later period.
– Conclusion: the Amoraim could have contradicted the words of the Mishnah. Contrary to what the Kesef Mishneh wrote.
1. That’s not just according to me. It’s the view of all the halakhic decisors. It is very likely that there are incorrect interpretations. What are the odds that the Sages always hit the truth?! Zero.
2. You’re asking about a contradiction in Maimonides. What does that have to do with me or with the Kesef Mishneh? Rather, your question is exactly the Kesef Mishneh’s question, and he answers that they accepted upon themselves not to dispute. Look there inside.
1) Thanks, I understand. Just out of curiosity, can you point to one or two Jewish laws that stem from a Talmudic interpretation which, in your view, is mistaken?
2) So according to the Kesef Mishneh, the Talmud has both formal authority (like a Sanhedrin) and also an acceptance not to dispute it (which neutralizes the possibility of disputing it in the area of interpretation).
According to your view, if I understood correctly, the Talmud has only formal authority (the people accepted the Talmud as binding = like an instruction of the Sanhedrin; they did not accept not to dispute the Talmud’s interpretation). So do you think it is possible to dispute the Talmud in the area of interpretation?
And if you answer me that as a matter of fact all the sages (Geonim and medieval authorities) accepted not to dispute the Talmud, I would note that:
i) why would the agreement of a small group (of sages) create formal authority? Fine for the whole Jewish people, but a group of Torah scholars is hard for me to accept.
ii) today there is broad agreement in groups of “sages” not to dispute the medieval authorities. Why does such an agreement not prevent you from thinking that one may dispute the medieval authorities?
1. I can’t point to any. Maybe regarding creeping creatures that are generated from putrefaction (which according to science do not exist). My claim was a principled one: it is not reasonable that there are no mistakes. There are of course various scientific mistakes.
2. The formal authority comes by virtue of acceptance. Those are not two different things. In the area of interpretation of the biblical text, one certainly can dispute it, and sages did so as well. That doesn’t affect Jewish law, so what is the significance of that dispute?
There is no agreement not to dispute the medieval authorities. There is an agreement to give significant weight to their opinion.
1. That is not a mistake in the Talmud’s halakhic interpretation. In your language, that is not a bridge principle; it is a fact. My question was whether you could point to a mistaken bridge principle or a mistaken halakhic exposition. If not… then not. But I’m surprised that Rabbi Michi wouldn’t be able to find even one bridge principle that seems mistaken to him in a book of 2,711 pages 🙂
2. Sorry, I didn’t understand you when you wrote: “The formal authority comes by virtue of acceptance. Those are not two different things.” Maybe let’s take an example to simplify the discussion.
Situation (imaginary) 1
Suppose a Sanhedrin of ordained judges (with formal authority) in the 5th century interpreted: “The word melakhah appears thirty-nine times in the Torah, therefore in practical Jewish law there are thirty-nine categories of labor on the Sabbath.”
Can a Sanhedrin in the 21st century come and say: “What are you talking about! It says in the Torah ‘any melakhah,’ and by gematria that equals ‘to the people.’ Therefore it is forbidden to do ‘community service work’ on the Sabbath!”? According to Maimonides it can (because this is a dispute over interpretation of the Torah). And the Jewish law would change.
Do you agree with me?
Situation 2
Suppose the Talmud said: “The word melakhah appears thirty-nine times in the Torah, therefore in practical Jewish law there are thirty-nine categories of labor on the Sabbath.”
Can a religious court in the 21st century come and say: “What are you talking about! It says in the Torah ‘any melakhah,’ and by gematria that equals ‘to the people.’ Therefore it is forbidden to do ‘community service work’ on the Sabbath! And we dispute the Talmud’s interpretation, and of course this has practical halakhic consequences”?
I assume you will answer that this court is forbidden to dispute the Talmud’s interpretation.
But why? What is the difference between the formal authority of the Sanhedrin and the formal authority of the Talmud?
(I know this is the Kesef Mishneh’s question. But his answer, as I understand it, is that the sages of the period of the sealing of the Talmud agreed/accepted not to dispute the Talmud, and that future generations too would not dispute it. That has nothing to do with any kind of formal authority of the Talmud. But you rejected this distinction when you wrote: “The formal authority comes by virtue of acceptance. Those are not two different things.”)
I don’t understand this bizarre discussion. There is permission to eat creeping creatures that are generated from putrefaction, and a prohibition to eat creeping creatures that developed inside the fruit, and so on. That is a halakhic mistake (grounded in a factual mistake). If you don’t like the example, please go look for others. I did not claim I have examples. What I said was that it is not reasonable that there are no mistakes in the Talmud. When I speak with the Holy One, blessed be He, and can check the matter with Him, I’ll try to provide you with more examples.
Situation 1: absolutely.
Situation 2: absolutely can dispute the Talmud, when they are ordained judges. Today there are no ordained judges, so they cannot dispute. Today we also cannot dispute the rulings of an earlier Sanhedrin. A matter decided by a counted assembly requires another counted assembly to permit it.
In short, it all seems completely clear and simple to me, and I don’t understand this discussion at all.
Sorry, but it’s still not clear to me. A simple question:
Maimonides tells us that a court of non-ordained judges can dispute a Sanhedrin (from an earlier period) regarding interpretation of the Torah, and it can change the Jewish law.
Why can’t we (a court of non-ordained judges) dispute the Talmud (the Sanhedrin of ordained judges)?
Where did you see a court of non-experts in me? Even ordained judges cannot. Only the Great Court. Every “court” in the laws of Rebels in Maimonides is the Great Court (= Sanhedrin).
It seems to me that you yourself said this. In lecture 1 on Midrash and Logic: https://m.soundcloud.com/mikyabchannel/1-8?in=%2Fmikyabchannel%2Fsets%2Fkvoyihqnym7n
@ from 11:53 to 12:25 you basically say:
“Any court in any generation can interpret the Torah entirely differently from all previous generations.” It sounds to me from your words that this is true for any court (even a court of three) and for any generation (including our own, where no one is ordained). And you go on and say, “If a court came today and decided, on the basis of these or those interpretive and homiletic considerations, that there are only two primary categories of labor on the Sabbath and not thirty-nine, then that is what would be. There would be only two.”
@ from 17:38 to 18:20 I quote you: “From the straightforward formulations in Maimonides, any court in any generation… any court of three […] does not require ordination […] uses the toolbox of midrashic interpretation.”
That is what emerges from the sequence of your words.
Nothing emerges from the sequence of my words. You keep mixing things up here. So I’ll close the discussion with a summary of my position (really a summary of the halakhah, regardless of my own position. There is nothing novel in it on this issue):
1. There is no limitation on the authority to expound the Torah. Any person, and certainly any court of three, can do so, even against earlier generations (but not against a Sanhedrin). However, what they determine binds only them and does not become binding Jewish law.
2. Binding Jewish law is determined only by a Sanhedrin. Such law can be changed only by another Sanhedrin according to the rules for changing laws described by Maimonides in chapter 2 of Laws of Rebels. The term “court” in Maimonides there refers to the Great Court (= Sanhedrin).
That’s it. I’m done.
Oh, one more thing:
3. The Talmud has formal authority by virtue of the public’s acceptance (even though it is not a Sanhedrin), and this is similar to a Sanhedrin even though it is not based on “do not stray.” Its words may not be disputed regardless of greatness or number, until a Sanhedrin arises and the rules for changing laws return as before (may it be His will, speedily in our days).
It surprises me when you write, “Every court in the laws of Rebels is the Great Sanhedrin.”
In the context of a temporary suspension or of “they may flog and punish not according to Torah law,” Maimonides speaks of a court, and that is true even of a court that is not a Sanhedrin (chapter 2, law 4).
Understood. Thank you very much for your answers.
Correct. That is only with regard to the suspension process, which I discussed elsewhere. That is proven from his wording there. Suspension is not change. If you read the whole chapter you will see that in the first two laws (which are the only ones we discussed here, because they deal with changing the law) he means the Great Court.
Very clear. Thanks.
Just a thought experiment to test whether I understood you correctly.
What if the Karaites had won and the majority of the Jewish people had rejected the Talmud and accepted a Karaite Talmud instead (there is no such thing, but let’s assume there were). Would you accept the Karaite Talmud?