Q&A: A Majority That Is Present Before Us
A Majority That Is Present Before Us
Question
Hello, I read a lesson by the Rabbi about the Sanhedrin and about the distinction you made between a majority that is present before us, which relies on common sense, and a majority that is not present before us, which relies only on probability and not on common sense. To illustrate this, you gave the example of a die: the chance that it will land on 1 is not 1/6 because nobody has ever actually tested it; rather, it follows from common sense. But with a sample in which we saw that 80% of women give birth by the end of the ninth month, that still does not necessarily mean that this particular woman will also be part of that set; maybe she will deviate from the pattern and different rules will apply to her. So in the end, with a majority that is not present before us, am I also relying on common sense? I would be happy if the Rabbi could explain the point I’m missing here. Thanks in advance.
Answer
See columns 79, 226, and 237.
One always relies on generalization and common sense. The question is whether this is a generalization based on a sample or merely a conceptual assumption.
Discussion on Answer
It’s the same question as why one should prefer science over mere reasoning. When you rely on observational data, a generalization yields a more well-founded result. As in science. But even if there are advantages on both sides, one still cannot derive one from the other.
The Ran represents the position of most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and the straightforward reading of the Talmud in Hullin, that a majority that is present before us is preferable. Rabbi Shimon Shkop notes that according to Maimonides the opposite comes out. Apparently those medieval authorities hold that when the whole group is actually before us, that is stronger than a general sample that is extended to all objects. There is definitely logic to that.
So if I understood correctly, basically the Ran and the other medieval authorities are saying that a majority that is present before us is preferable because it does not use “generalization”?
That’s one way to put it.
From what I understood from the columns you referred to, with a majority that is present before us, the weakness is that I am not relying on observations at all, but rather using arbitrary assumptions. But here I am not using a “generalization,” which as you noted there is also something rather problematic. And with a majority that is not present before us, I am using a representative sample, which is the result of calculation, but the weakness is that I am using a generalization. If so, then there is a weakness both in the case that is present before us and in the case that is not present before us—each has a different weakness. So why is it preferable to rely on a majority that is not present before us rather than on a majority that is present before us? Also, if the Rabbi could explain the words of the Ran on the Rif in Avodah Zarah, where he distinguishes between what is present before us and what is not present before us, and writes there that what is present before us is preferable because, and I quote: “The reason for the matter is that since it is a majority and is known before us, it is significant enough to nullify the minority and render it as though it were nonexistent.” End quote. I’d be happy to know whether the Rabbi has any interpretation of the Ran’s words.