Q&A: Question on Lesson 14 about Doubt
Question on Lesson 14 about Doubt
Question
Hello Rabbi,
In the lesson, the Rabbi distinguished between an “existing majority” and a “non-existing majority” by saying that an existing majority is based on reasoning, whereas a non-existing majority relies on a sample. In this context, the Rabbi explained that the majority of judges is an existing majority, but emphasized that it is nevertheless based on reasoning—that the majority is usually correct when all are equal in wisdom. I wanted to ask two questions בעקבות these points:
- If the majority of judges belongs to the category of an existing majority, how does the distinction of “separation” apply to it? Is it possible that “separation” is not a characteristic that defines the type of majority, but only a secondary matter?
- In addition, if I have a logical reason to think that the majority is correct, why is it impossible to build from that a (negative) sample that would show me that in most panels of 3 judges that have existed and will exist, most of the time (without knowing the exact percentage, but it is enough for me that it is a majority) the majority is correct? And on the basis of this sample to learn about other cases. According to this, even if there is a logical reason, one could still classify the majority of judges as a non-existing majority, and from here it would follow that the reasoning is not the defining characteristic of an existing majority.
Thank you very much for the excellent lessons.
Answer
The majority among judges is an existing majority, and therefore it is based on reasoning (not that despite this it is based on reasoning).
I explained in detail in the lesson the separation that applies to judges. The ruling stands before us, and each judge assigns it to one side, just like with the piece of meat and the shops. I mentioned that this may also be what Mordechai means in Chullin.
How would you build a sample of judicial panels when you have no way of knowing who is right in any given case?