Q&A: One of Them Is Found to Be a Relative or Otherwise Disqualified
One of Them Is Found to Be a Relative or Otherwise Disqualified
Question
Hello and blessings,
What is the logic behind saying that when one of the witnesses is found to be a relative or otherwise disqualified, the disqualification spreads to all of them? Is this disqualification some kind of contagious disease?
Wouldn’t it make more sense to say something like what the later authorities (Acharonim) say regarding a co-wife of a forbidden relative: that this is an inherent disqualification itself (not that she becomes forbidden by force of the forbidden-relative status, but that there is a prohibition called “co-wife of a forbidden relative”)—so too here: not that the disqualification passes from one to the next, but that the Torah introduced a new intrinsic disqualification of a witness who joined with a disqualified witness.
Answer
Where did the Torah introduce that? Regarding a wicked person, it is written: “Do not join your hand with a wicked person to be a corrupt witness,” and the Sages explain that this refers to joining with a wicked person. But regarding other disqualified witnesses, that is not written. And the exposition from “two or three witnesses” does not stand on its own. It is a rabbinic exposition, and as such it requires logic; without that logic, they would not have derived this from the exposition, but would have interpreted it differently, if at all.
Beyond that, the novelty of “a witness who joined with a disqualified witness” is also a scriptural decree. So what have you gained with this alternative? Is joining itself a contagious disease?
One can think of explanations: for example, a decree lest one come to rely on a disqualified witness. Alternatively, a decree because of the case of a set of two witnesses, where if one is disqualified only one witness remains and one cannot rely on him. Therefore the Torah disqualifies both. Alternatively, without the disqualified witness there would have been one witness here who could obligate an oath, and the Torah does not want to obligate an oath when the claimant brought a disqualified witness. Of course all of this can be debated, but the disqualification of joining seems to me much stranger.
Discussion on Answer
According to such views, there is logic to it. And it can even be learned from “Do not join your hand with a wicked person.”
But I do not see any connection to what Rabbi Shimon Shkop says.
That’s nonsense. According to this explanation, he should be disqualified for other testimonies as well, whereas it is obvious that he is disqualified only for this particular testimony.
Not necessarily. There are disqualifications that apply only to that particular testimony. After all, he does not have the status of a wicked person, since he did not violate a prohibition punishable by lashes. Therefore at most we are dealing with a concern for falsehood. And the logic is that if he joined with a disqualified witness, apparently in this case he has a special interest, and so we suspect that he is lying. Another possibility is that they penalized him in order to prevent people from joining with a disqualified witness.
What I meant was according to the views of some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) that knowledge that the other witness is disqualified is required in order for the testimony to be voided. One could say that when they knowingly join with a disqualified witness, they are acting improperly and are therefore disqualified, and the verse “do not join with a wicked person” reveals the principle that anyone who joins with a witness who is unfit (a wicked person) becomes disqualified from testimony. This is even more understandable if we assume that in testimony we are not satisfied merely with clarifying the truth, but that the witnesses also give validity and force to the religious court to issue its ruling (Sha’arei Yosher 7:1 and other later authorities). What do you think?