Q&A: Dancing and Clapping on the Sabbath
Dancing and Clapping on the Sabbath
Question
Hello Rabbi!
The Mishnah (Beitzah 5:2) says that it is forbidden to clap on the Sabbath and forbidden to dance. The Talmud gives the reason that this is a decree lest one repair a musical instrument.
The Rabbi has written a lot about the repeal of decrees. So my question is: nowadays, according to the Rabbi, is it possible to “disregard” this decree?
Tosafot already noted that the decree was apparently only for a reality in which people were knowledgeable about repairing musical instruments. The explanation seems reasonable to me, but that would make it possible to disregard many decrees through distinctions like this, and then the concept that “when the reason is nullified, the enactment is not nullified” would no longer apply. Because regarding an enactment whose reason has lapsed, one could say that it was originally decreed only for a situation in which the reason applied.
And perhaps it also matters that the reason appears in the Talmud and not in the Mishnah, so maybe this is only a line of reasoning suggested by the amoraim, but not necessarily the real reason. (Menuchat Ahavah writes that this is the case with killing a louse on the Sabbath: the tannaim permitted it, and the amoraim gave a reason that today has been discovered to be incorrect, but it is still permitted because that is how the tannaim ruled. And if that reason had appeared in the words of the Mishnah, then we would say that the tannaim also erred in their assessment of reality, and therefore it would be forbidden to kill a louse.)
What does the Rabbi say? Is it permissible to clap on the Sabbath and to dance?
Thank you very much!
Answer
Repealing decrees requires authority. According to Maimonides, it requires a religious court greater in wisdom and number, even if the reason for the enactment has lapsed. The mechanisms I suggested there are sometimes possible even without authority, but that is mainly when the enactment causes harm. If there is no harm and it is simply no longer relevant, then it is harder to repeal. In any case, it is reasonable that some sort of consensus among the halakhic decisors would be needed for this. Beyond that, even nowadays there are situations of repairing musical instruments. We do not build them and do not make substantial repairs, but there certainly are repairs such as putting a string back in place, fixing a drum that has come loose, and the like. In short, I do not have a clear-cut answer on this matter, and as long as there is no unequivocal ruling here, my inclination is that the decree cannot be repealed.
I do not agree with Menuchat Ahavah. This is unfounded speculation. If a reason was given, then that is the reason (I never liked the hypothesis about hidden reasons attributed to the Vilna Gaon). And indeed, today it is forbidden to kill a louse. Moreover, even if the Sages had forbidden it, and today it were discovered that it does not reproduce sexually, I would permit killing it, even as a leniency regarding a prohibition punishable by stoning.
Discussion on Answer
Thank you very much! (Both to the Rabbi and to Yoel.)
I don’t understand the Rabbi’s difficulty with Menuchat Ahavah — he is not claiming, like the Vilna Gaon, that besides the stated reason there are other hidden reasons. He is claiming that the tannaim simply did not reveal their reason in the Mishnah. And the amoraim only suggested an idea for why the tannaim enacted it. Why is that not reasonable?
When the authors of the enactment also write its reason, it seems to me that he would agree that this is the real reason on the basis of which we would rule, and there is no need to take all sorts of hidden reasons into account.
And another question regarding the decree lest one repair an instrument:
Already in the Talmud it is mentioned that among the Jewish people it was customary even after the decree to clap on the Sabbath, and the Talmud says they did not protest because it is preferable that they be inadvertent sinners rather than intentional sinners.
My question is: if they understood that the people could not abide by such a decree — since they would violate it in any case — then why don’t we say that this is a decree that the community cannot uphold?
See Arukh HaShulchan, section 339, paragraph 9, which permits clapping and dancing in our times, for a different reason.