Q&A: Hinting to a Gentile on the Sabbath in a Way That Fits Every Case
Hinting to a Gentile on the Sabbath in a Way That Fits Every Case
Question
I didn’t understand why people always get tangled up over how to hint to a Gentile on the Sabbath.
In my opinion there’s a simple method that fits every case, and the Gentile will always understand what is wanted from him, but it would still count as a hint and not as a direct statement.
For example, in a case where you need to turn on the air conditioner on a hot Sabbath, you call the Gentile to the house and say to him:
“Dear Gentile, according to Jewish law it is forbidden for me to tell you to turn on this air conditioner for me with this remote and with this specific button, but I am allowed to benefit from the air conditioner if you, on your own initiative, turn on the air conditioner without my having told you directly.”
And so on for all the possible situations where one needs to hint to a Gentile.
Does the Rabbi agree with my opinion that this is a hint that is seemingly permitted? After all, I didn’t command him to do anything, but only explained to him that I am forbidden to tell him to do a certain action.
Answer
Hello.
It seems to me that many people do this. I’ll make two comments:
- Contrary to the common perception, the Rema in section 307, subsection 22 rules as Jewish law that there is no difference between directly telling a Gentile and hinting to a Gentile: when one is permitted, the other is also permitted, and vice versa. And in the Mishnah Berurah, subsection 10 (on subsection 2 in the Shulchan Arukh), he distinguishes between saying it on the Sabbath and saying it before the Sabbath. His source is the Pri Megadim, Mishbetzot Zahav, subsection 2.
- There in the Taz, subsection 10, he brings from the Bach that a statement from which the Gentile understands what to do is permitted, and is not similar to a hint. Here there is room for a philosophical discussion about the relation between what you wrote and a hint. Seemingly this is easier, because a hint is like speaking in another language, body language, whereas your suggestion is not a statement at all. After all, in practice you are saying something else, as in the Bach just mentioned. On the other hand, seemingly the meaning of a statement is what the listener understands, and in that sense you did indeed speak or hint. There are halakhic decisors there from whose words it appears that one should not distinguish, and any statement from which the Gentile understands that he should act is forbidden. In the Shulchan Arukh there, subsection 2, he wrote this only regarding statements made after the Sabbath, from which the Gentile can understand that he should do it on the following Sabbath. That implies that one should not say such a thing on the Sabbath itself.
And see close readings from the Shulchan Arukh HaRav and a similar explanation here: http://shulchanharav.com/contents.asp?aid=115235
Discussion on Answer
I assume permission to lie in that way was said only in a pressing situation or for a great need. So it is hard to draw a conclusion from there. Maybe that’s what you were hinting at with the word “leniently.”
[Sounds reasonable, although I hadn’t thought of that. By the word “leniently” I meant that even in the speech as such there are two interpretations, and Jacob intentionally used ambiguous speech according to that interpretation, so why is the true/false determination made according to interpretation A and not according to interpretation B? From this it would seem that the determination goes leniently, or is left in the speaker’s hands to determine.
Still, by simple logic, speech is determined solely by what one is trying to get the listener to understand, and if someone says “no,” then it is no, even if in ancient Chinese that sound means yes].
Likewise, by the way, it is hard to understand the words of the Sages on “I did not tell you to slaughter him, but rather to bring him up; you brought him up, now bring him down.” In Hebrew, the meaning of offering something up as a burnt offering is to slaughter and burn it, so what difference does it make if in the speaker’s mind, the Holy One, blessed be He, had a different creative interpretation that can be forced into the canonical statement? Maybe this can be connected to Turim on representations.
Perhaps from the words of the Sages on “I am Esau your firstborn” — “I am; Esau is your firstborn” — it appears that speech is determined not by the listener’s understanding but by a possible interpretation that was in the speaker’s mind, that is, according to “the speech in itself,” leniently.