Q&A: Leniency Here and Leniency There — Wicked
Leniency Here and Leniency There — Wicked
Question
You already explained this to me once, but with your permission I’d like a fresh answer, from the standpoint of Jewish law.
In the Talmud, Eruvin 6, there is a baraita: “The leniencies of Beit Shammai and the leniencies of Beit Hillel — that person is wicked; the stringencies of this one and that one — that person is a fool.” And the Talmud there (7a) explains: “We do not follow the stringencies of two different schools where they contradict one another.” Rashi explains: the reason that one sage’s leniency here is a stringency elsewhere, etc.; and if he actually accepts that reasoning, then he should follow both that sage’s leniency and that sage’s stringency.
Suppose there are two disputes that everyone agrees are independent of one another. Shammai is lenient in the first and stringent in the second, while Hillel is stringent in the first and lenient in the second.
A person who doesn’t know how to study and decide is allowed to “choose a rabbi” (I don’t know the source for this, but it seems many people assume that this is so).
Under those assumptions, can you explain in plain human terms why he is not allowed to choose the hologram of an imaginary rabbi who is lenient in both disputes, and then happily conduct himself according to both leniencies and inherit 310 worlds?
Answer
The simplest explanation is that this is not about the question of truth but about self-education. One should not go around looking for leniencies just because. Beyond that, if you rely on someone, it has to be an actual someone. Especially if you are not qualified to issue a halakhic ruling, it may be that when you choose two leniencies they actually contradict one another or create a problem elsewhere, even if you are unaware of it. Sometimes it is not an outright contradiction but a softer kind of conceptual coherence, which you, as someone who is not a Torah scholar, would not notice.
Discussion on Answer
A. What you want is irrelevant. I don’t want to refrain from eating chicken with milk. So what? You could perhaps argue that there is no prohibition here (“leniency here and leniency there”), only a recommendation. In that case, if you don’t want to — fine, but that’s what you should do.
B. Because you can never know that there really was someone like that. Of course this is connected to the other reasons as well (because maybe there is a coherence problem).
C. Maybe if you ask them and they say there is no contradiction, then it would be permitted.
C. Why “maybe” (aside from A)?
Because maybe they themselves are not aware of the coherence problem. Someone who holds a certain position is not the same as someone who examines it from the outside.
Got it
Actually, what about the consideration of a majority that is not directly before us? If, from the outside at least, the two disputants agree that there is no contradiction in holding both leniencies, then presumably the odds are that they’re right and there is no coherence problem.
That’s not unreasonable. So they were stringent not to rely on a majority for one’s general conduct in Jewish law unless there is an explicitly stated view like that.
I’ll go look for those stringent authorities and we’ll see whether the outcry is justified.
Maybe there’s also someone who is lenient on this issue, and then you can choose him 🙂
Wait, slowly.
A. Self-education — I don’t want that 🙁 . Just as there is no requirement of self-education to choose the most stringent rabbi in the group.
B. It has to be an actual someone. To my mind, that’s most of the issue. Why? If not for murderous Romans, there would have been such a tanna. What does it add that he really existed and ate and drank and slept?
C. Maybe they contradict one another: you can ask the disputants whether there is any connection. If they don’t know of any connection, then maybe they themselves are holding a view that contains contradictions? Do you mean that they themselves are not aware of the depth of their own reasoning?