[By the way.
Ta’anit 18a: Turnus sought to kill Lulianus and Pappus his brother in Lodkia.
Rashi writes: “Lulianus and Pappus his brother were completely righteous men. In Lodkia—that is Lod, and this is what we say everywhere: regarding those killed in Lod, no creature can stand in their section of the Garden of Eden. And some say they were killed because the king’s daughter was found murdered, and they said, ‘The Jews killed her,’ and they decreed a decree against the enemies of Israel; and these men arose and redeemed Israel and said, ‘We killed her,’ and the king killed only them.”
I once saw someone remark that he had not found a source for this “and some say” (or what their source was).
And I wondered to myself: why did both of them go? Why wouldn’t it have been enough for just one of them to say, “I killed her,” and thereby save the Jews? And if one would have sufficed, then the second one would be committing suicide and would have no share in the World to Come. And who gave permission for a bird to fly over Jonathan ben Uzziel and sentence itself to burning? Rather, if only one had gone, the king would suspect exactly that—that perhaps he wanted to save the Jews and was sacrificing himself. But when two go, then they went through interrogation, examination, and cross-checking, and despite that they managed to convince the king because their statements matched, and therefore he believed them.
And perhaps that is part of their praise—that they did not hand themselves over in a single moment of weakness, but invested effort and work in creating a detailed and precise cover story that would stand up under scrutiny.

Why use an arbitrary line and not rely on the judge’s discretion: the more grandiose the claim is (the smaller the prior probability), the more witnesses and additional circumstantial evidence would be needed, and so on and so forth. Inspired by the column on statistical dragging, which is a formalization of Hume’s argument about belief in miracles: evidence that is somewhat good for a very bad claim is not good enough.

Does setting fixed rules for tools that are ultimately meant to clarify reality, like witnesses, also exist in other legal systems? (There are pilpul-style analyses that the witnesses are not “the glasses of the religious court,” but rather they themselves generate the verdict, and the court merely instructs the if-then—meaning, “if these witnesses are correct, then the ruling is such-and-such”—and “the hand of the witnesses shall be first against him,” and through them the verdict is carried out. That seems very strange to me).

The Torah itself established this, and I am only suggesting an explanation. There is legal logic to setting a sharp rule. Of course, in the background there is always the law of a fraudulent case, so that the judge will not be forced to issue an incorrect ruling. And there is also the authority of a religious court to punish extrajudicially, beyond the strict law.

The source for the idea that witnesses participate in creating the sentence is Rabbi Shimon Shkop in Sha’arei Yosher. It was discussed here in recent days.

If there is legal logic to it, then seemingly it ought to appear in other systems too (I don’t know whether such a thing exists nowadays, for example). The law of a fraudulent case is seemingly only for pathological cases where the judge is personally really convinced of the opposite.

I don’t know that Rabbi Shimon Shkop. Is the question from the last few days this one? I just saw that you pointed to Gate 7: https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%d7%a2%d7%93%d7%95%d7%AA-2 Who’s the hero who made it all the way there? I’ll look into it. I only heard the idea back in the day from someone orally (his name is Menashe Ohana, talented as a demon, and in my opinion we’ll still be hearing about him), so I thought crocodiles had come out of our own navel.

Why does this have to be bound by rules? Not that that’s so out of character for Torah law, but why can’t every case be judged on its own merits?
And was “two are like a hundred” accepted in other legal systems??????

Are you asking questions just because another possibility exists? I am explaining the Torah’s law and I don’t see any problem with it. It is completely reasonable and logical.

Do you distinguish between explanation and legislation? Seemingly, “reasonable and logical” means that as a legislator this is what you would legislate. (Similar to the idea that logical entailment of proposition A from set B means that “not A” is inconsistent with set B.)

I definitely distinguish. At least when there are two possibilities and both are reasonable, then even if I might have chosen option A, that is no objection to someone showing me that the Torah chose option B. Especially since I assume the Torah has insights that I do not have, and goals that are not before a regular legal system. Of course, as much as possible it is worthwhile to understand the logic of the Jewish laws, but it is not always possible, and if there is an option that seems reasonable even to me, then the claim that it could have been done differently is very weak.

That is if there are two equally reasonable options and only one can be chosen, then you can choose arbitrarily (you don’t even need to draw lots, because there is no demand here for equal rights for anyone). But if one is more reasonable, then what is the difference between saying the Torah chose the less reasonable option and saying it chose a completely unreasonable option? From your wording it sounds like once you cross the threshold of reasonableness, that is enough, and then the choice can be attributed to hidden insights and unknown goals.

Draw lots*

By the way, these are admittedly loose thoughts, but what do you think about the question, according to the “and some say” in Rashi, that Pappus and Lulianus took the blame on themselves:
A. Why was it permitted for them to do that? Seemingly, according to deontological Jewish law, a person is forbidden to jump off the bridge with his own hands in order to stop the train that is about to run over five people (unbelievable. In my opinion, of course, everyone is obligated to jump). Or perhaps here it is to save the many, and then deontology bows to consequentialism. Or perhaps here it is only lying to the government and not an act done directly by one’s own hands, and therefore even halakhic deontology is not all that angry.
B. Why was it permitted for both of them to do it, and not just one alone?

Is it possible that it was forbidden to them (or to one of them), and nevertheless if they did it they would still receive reward?

If there is a reasonable possibility, even if it is not the most reasonable, it is easier to assume that there is something I missed, and therefore there is no major difficulty.

A. There are opinions that this is permitted, just not obligatory. In Hagahot Maimoniot, chapter 1 of Laws of Murderer, in the name of the Jerusalem Talmud, it says so even for saving a single person.
B. In Tzitz Eliezer it was argued that saving the many is different (and not merely many individuals, but a community).
C. It is plausible that if both had not surrendered themselves, it would not have worked. And perhaps one encouraged the other, such that without that he would not have dared to do it, and therefore they went together. Of course I do not know.
D. There can be an act that is forbidden and nevertheless one receives reward for it (and perhaps together with that also punishment—a fine of one shekel). I think the act of Roi Klein is not a bad example of such an act. On the face of it, it is forbidden, but it is a heroic deed that deserves reward. Certainly if the person himself thought it was permitted and proper.

[C. Reading between the lines, we learned that you didn’t much like the suggestion that precisely because two witnesses are much more reliable than one (because of the cross-checking), their trick was to succeed in being credible despite the cross-checking, and then they would be less suspected of lying in order to save Jews. If only one had gone, they would have suspected him. Whoever wants to be a successful liar should recruit another liar with him.]

That is certainly possible, like various other suggestions.

You should remember that for precisely this reason it is not advisable to go as a pair, since a contradiction could be found in their testimony. The strength of their truthful testimony is the weakness of their false testimony.

I didn’t find Hagahot Maimoniot, chapter 1 of Laws of Murderer, on this topic. In law 14 Maimonides writes the rule of “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood.”

Ah. The Beit Yosef, Choshen Mishpat 426, used the Constantinople edition. But it isn’t here: https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=14274&st=&pgnum=123

In Kesef Mishneh (Laws of Murderer 1:14) and in Beit Yosef, Choshen Mishpat 426, he brings Hagahot Maimoniot in the name of the Jerusalem Talmud that one is obligated even to put oneself into possible danger. And apparently that is how it appears in the Constantinople edition of Hagahot Maimoniot (which are the Hagahot Maimoniot with Tosafot whose source is apparently unknown, and it is known that this was the edition Rabbi Yosef Karo had. I did not find it on HebrewBooks). And Kesef Mishneh explained it because this one is certain and that one is only a doubt.

But to place oneself in certain mortal danger for a single person—I don’t think there is any opinion there saying that it is permitted (even if not obligatory).
[And in my opinion, in such a case “morality” demands seeing the situation as it really is, that there is one person who will die, and therefore one may choose arbitrarily whom to save, and is entitled to choose to save himself. Exactly like a case where there are two people to save and he can save one, in which case he may choose arbitrarily. And if in the case where there are two to save he may not choose arbitrarily but must conduct a lottery (according to your view that chance is a right and must be distributed equally), then also when he himself is one of the two who can be saved (he can save himself by passive omission, which is exactly like positive action) he must be objective. And just as “morality” does not favor the addressee of the command, so too it does not disfavor him and forbid him, by a normal prohibition, to hurt himself, exactly as it forbids him to hurt another. ]