Q&A: Avshalom Elitzur on Consciousness
Avshalom Elitzur on Consciousness
Question
Hi,
I don’t know whether you happened to hear it (by the way, do you tend to listen to podcasts?), but in this podcast: https://m.soundcloud.com/tuval-rosenwasser/xywojuezni7u
if I understood correctly, Avshalom Elitzur argued that the idea that human consciousness affects things is a mistake. (He also offered some consolation by saying that many great people were mistaken about this.)
When he explained why this is a mistake, he told the interviewer that, according to principles from his field (philosophical principles), something that cannot be disproved is irrelevant. (It can’t really be disproved, because we are always subject to consciousness.)
How significant is the weight of that claim? Wouldn’t it be more accurate to say that it could be true, but since we have no tools to deal with it, it’s not relevant—and not necessarily a mistake?
Another question related to the content of the podcast:
Avshalom Elitzur argued there that the proof that consciousness exists is that they are talking about it. I didn’t really understand that. What, is it impossible to talk about consciousness in a situation where it does not exist?
Can one also argue that the fact that I’m aware that I’m thinking about what I’m thinking about is also proof of the existence of consciousness?
Thank you
Answer
First, even if he is right, that is not a mistake but at most something unscientific.
Second, I don’t understand why it cannot be refuted. I can easily think of such effects that are measurable (for example, the placebo effect and many others).
As for the proof that consciousness exists, it depends on what you call a proof. I don’t understand why one needs to bring proof if this is the thing most present before us at every moment. Is there proof that what we see exists? We simply see it. And therefore you are absolutely right that the fact that I am conscious is the proof that I have consciousness.
Discussion on Answer
I hope I didn’t leave out details from his argument.
In any case, presumably the answer relates to my summary, so I assume it will be understood.
Another question related to Descartes’ cogito, “I think, therefore I exist.”
When I first read this sentence, I thought it was an axiom.
Because why does the fact that I think necessarily testify to my existence?
But now, in my opinion, it is not an axiom but actually a fact, perhaps the only one that exists.
I think, therefore the “I” (the one that thinks) exists.
No matter how you define existence, no matter whether it is an illusion or anything else—it exists. It is given.
Is that what is meant?
Thank you
.,
Of course there is no proof for the existence of other consciousnesses. But there is also no proof for the existence of other bodies. Anyone can present me with images and induce illusions in me.
Aharon,
Of course. This is an argument, not a definition. As a definition it has no value whatsoever. The whole idea was to present an argument that proves my existence.
See column 363 on this.
“I do X, therefore I am Y” is a nonsense argument unless there is some theory about the world that creates a relationship between X and Y.
And if there is such a theory, then say it instead of making claims.
The answer is that his theory assumed that he exists.
Therefore, “I think, therefore I exist” is nonsense no matter how you look at it.
Avshalom argues there that the fact that we talk about consciousness proves—not the very existence of consciousness—but rather that it affects our physics.
And what about proof for other people’s consciousnesses? The problem of other minds.
According to Avshalom’s view, which I didn’t understand what exactly it proves, you would say there is proof. But according to the Rabbi’s view, there is no proof.
Even an iPhone can produce speech for me through Siri on matters of consciousness.