Q&A: Can Someone as Skeptical as Descartes Argue Against Self-Evident Claims?
Can Someone as Skeptical as Descartes Argue Against Self-Evident Claims?
Question
With God's help,
Hello Rabbi,
I wanted to ask: according to Descartes' skeptical approach in his initial assumption, can one say that even claims that seem to us apriorily necessary / self-evident could be false? (For example, that the whole is smaller than the sum of its parts.)
I think so, because one can imagine that there is an unlimited power that causes us to be unable to think of another option, even though it really exists. Our thought would simply get stuck every time we try to think about it. What do you think about that? Does the Rabbi also think this is possible?
I just saw that there is a major dispute among the skeptics on this issue. (Descartes indeed held as I said, but many objected, and I wasn't able to understand how.)
It may have practical implications for the claim about whether God can bring about some of the paradoxes. (Meaning, the fact that we can't think otherwise doesn't necessarily mean that this is indeed so; this has implications for knowledge and free choice, and so on.)
Answer
First, Descartes' initial assumption is methodological skepticism, not real skepticism. But that's just a side remark.
A skeptic can cast doubt on anything, but not on logic. He can, but then he's just confused. Logic is a precondition for discussion, including for raising doubt. When you explain that there is an omnipotent power forcing us into something, you have already made a claim. If you depart from logic, then at the same time there also is no omnipotent power forcing us, and even if it does force us we are not being forced, and so on and so forth—nonsense. The words stop meaning anything.
I've addressed this more than once on the site.