Q&A: Not Deviating Because of Dispute
Not Deviating Because of Dispute
Question
In the Mishnah in tractate Pesachim (50a) it is explained that a person should not deviate because of dispute; similarly, one who goes from a place where the produce has been used up to a place where it has not been used up is obligated to dispose of it, etc. This requires clarification, because the rule of not deviating because of dispute is a stringency. If so, here, if he must dispose of it, according to Maimonides (7:3), who holds that disposal is by burning, he would be violating a Torah-level prohibition of destruction. So the stringency due to dispute ends up creating a leniency regarding the prohibition of destruction.
Answer
There are two answers to this:
1. The prohibition of dispute is also a prohibition, so there is room even to be lenient in order to avoid dispute. The expression “the stringencies of the place he left and of the place he went to” describes the usual case, since generally when one is stringent there is no room for dispute. Especially since we are dealing with an act regarding which there is a halakhic opinion that it involves no prohibition at all. After all, according to the practice of his current location, it is permitted to burn the produce and there is no prohibition in that. Something similar is found in Ritva on Sukkah 10b: when an act is forbidden in Reuven’s view and permitted in Shimon’s view, Reuven may allow Shimon to stumble in it, provided that he informs him. That is, when something is subject to dispute, even according to the stringent side it is treated more lightly. This is also what we find in the statement, “Rabbi Shimon is worthy to be relied upon in a pressing situation,” and the common practice of halakhic decisors is to be lenient in accordance with lenient opinions in situations of need or pressure, even if they do not generally rule that way. Preventing dispute is certainly a need.
2. When he burns it in order not to get into a dispute, he is not violating the prohibition of destruction, because he is destroying the produce for a purpose. Just as it is permitted to eat them in order to benefit from eating them, so too it is permitted to burn them in order to prevent dispute. Similar to what the medieval authorities (Nachmanides and his students) wrote regarding “You shall work them forever,” that it is permitted to free a slave in order to complete a quorum—not because of the commandment of the quorum, but because this is a release for a purpose, and it is considered like making use of the slave for one’s own need, which is permitted. They compared this to “do not show them favor”—and much unnecessary confusion has arisen about this, as in Kovetz Shiurim and elsewhere. It is obvious that this is not literally the law of “do not show them favor,” but this is not the place to elaborate. There are other examples of this as well.