Q&A: Regarding the Rabbi’s article on ukimtot
Regarding the Rabbi’s article on ukimtot
Question
Hello,
A question about the article on ukimtot (https://mikyab.net/%d7%9e%d7%90%d7%9e%d7%a8%d7%99%d7%9d/%d7%9e%d7%91%d7%98-%d7%90%d7%a4%d7%9c%d7%98%d7%95%d7%a0%d7%99-%d7%a2%d7%9c-%d7%94%d7%90%d7%95%d7%a7%d7%99%d7%9e%d7%aa%d7%95%d7%aa/)
In general, it is argued there that ukimtot are “laboratory conditions” for the principles they wanted to teach us.
I wanted to know whether the Talmud in Bava Metzia 45b-46a contradicts that claim (I know you wrote there that the claim still stands even if there are contradictory cases, but still, is this such a case?):
The Talmud discusses whether coins can be acquired through barter according to the view that a coin does not effect barter—
Rav Pappa said: Even according to the one who says that a coin cannot serve as barter, although it cannot effect barter, it can nevertheless be acquired through barter, just as produce according to Rav Nachman. Is produce, according to Rav Nachman, not such that even though it cannot effect barter, it can still be acquired through barter? So too with a coin—it is no different.
An objection was raised: If one was standing in the threshing floor and had no money with him, he says to his fellow: These fruits are hereby given to you as a gift, and then he goes back and says: They are hereby redeemed onto the money that I have at home. The reason is that he has no money with him; but if he did have money with him, let him transfer them to the other person by physical pulling. And it answers: This way is preferable, because perhaps he has in mind a gentile. But if you say that a coin can be acquired through barter, let the money be acquired by that other person through a kerchief, and let him redeem them. [It answers:] He has no kerchief. Then let him acquire them for him through land. He has no land. But it taught: He was standing in the threshing floor. In a threshing floor that is not his own. And did the tanna really go to such lengths (Rashi: Did the tanna occupy himself and trouble himself to teach us a law in such an uncommon situation—that a person is standing in a threshing floor stark naked? Rather, must it not be that it is in a threshing floor that is not his own, but he does have a kerchief, and even so he must give him the fruits as a gift, because money cannot be acquired through barter.) to teach us about a stripped-bare man who has nothing at all? Rather, conclude from this that a coin cannot be acquired through barter. Conclude from this.
Seemingly, here there is a practical difference in the ukimta (whether a coin can be acquired through barter), and the claim is rejected because of a “stripped-bare man”?
Thank you
Answer
Indeed, this does look like a counterexample. It may be that something in the wording of the baraita suggested to them that it came to teach a law and not a general principle. But you are right that this is a problematic Talmudic passage. In any case, it is problematic even apart from me, since the Talmud discusses a flying camel and wheat that descended in the clouds and other strange and rare realities (if they exist at all).
Discussion on Answer
I agree with the commenter above me. In principle, what the Talmud raises there is advice, and advice is not given under laboratory conditions.
In addition, a counterexample to the “laboratory conditions” theory would only be if we really see that an ukimta is rejected because of its implausibility *despite* the fact that a general principle can be learned from it—for it could be that an ukimta is rejected for implausibility in a situation where there simply is no reasonable or evidently necessary general principle that can be learned from it under laboratory conditions.
It seems to me that this can be explained.
When the tanna wants to teach a certain law, it may be that an ukimta is needed in order to isolate that law and say what its rule is. But if the tanna wants to give practical guidance that is not itself novel, but rather to work out the practical case and publicize practical Jewish law, then it cannot be that an esoteric ukimta is required, because then there is no practical guidance here.
We already learned the legal workaround regarding second tithe, and it is done by giving money to a gentile who will redeem it (“How does one employ a legal workaround regarding second tithe? … Here is money”). Another way is by giving the fruits to a gentile and redeeming them, and that is less recommended for various reasons.
Now the tanna, in the case of the owner of the threshing floor, says that if he cannot give money, then he should give the fruits. There is no new theoretical law here. Since in either case a gentile redeems the tithes and there is no added fifth, and certainly all these are possible ways to employ a legal workaround. Rather, the tanna comes to tell us that if the preferred way is not possible, then one may make do with the less recommended way, which has a certain appearance issue to it. Such a statement is made when it is common for the preferred way not to be possible. That is, it must be a common case that it is impossible to give money. If so, it follows that a coin cannot be acquired through barter.
If the tanna had come here to teach us this law itself, that a coin cannot be acquired through barter, then it would have been possible to make ukimtot that would allow him to teach that law in an isolated way, as was written in that article about ukimtot. And he certainly did not come to do that, because the law that a coin cannot be acquired through barter can be taught easily and directly, whereas the ukimta is really needed for the sake of teaching the law—and besides, the laws here are the laws of tithes, not the laws of acquisitions.
Rather, the tanna comes to introduce something new to us in the laws of tithes, and this is practical guidance, specifically about a common case, and therefore it follows that a coin cannot be acquired through barter.