But I seem to remember that you also wrote there that if the pursued person could save himself from the pursuer by injuring one of his limbs and did not do so, then he is liable. Why doesn’t that apply here too with regard to mistakes?

First of all, who says this is a case where he could have been saved? There are harms to innocents that are unavoidable. Second, even if there is a way to avoid it in this particular case, mistakes happen and are part of the way of the world in war.
Maimonides’ view is that such a killer is not liable. It is forbidden, but he is not a murderer. Tosafot’s view is that he is.

Reason suggests that if I mistakenly damaged the pursuer’s property unnecessarily, I am not obligated to compensate him. And several medieval authorities and later authorities wrote that with regard to the pursued person himself there is not even a prohibition against killing him, even when he could save himself by injuring one of his limbs. That was said only about a third party.

If a case occurred in which one of the agents of the State of Israel (a soldier/policeman) went rogue and intentionally committed a forbidden act against a Palestinian civilian (say, a soldier raped a Palestinian woman), then in such a case is the State of Israel obligated to compensate that victim of the offense?

I think so. There would then be room to sue the soldier afterward so that he repays the money to the state. But he acted by its power and with the power (authority and weaponry) that it gave him, so it is responsible for his actions.

If he just raped her, not by means of the weapon or authority he was given but like any other man, then in my opinion the claim is personal against him and the state has no obligation to compensate.

Regarding the state’s responsibility, how does that fit with what you wrote above, that the state is not responsible for its mistakes, whereas here it is responsible for the intentional acts of its agents (which from the state’s perspective are not considered intentional)?

Because there we were talking about damage caused in war, and for that there is no responsibility because there is a law of a collective pursuer. But an arbitrary act that is not for the needs of the war certainly does create an obligation of compensation. There is no law of pursuer here.

A similar case is known: in 2000 Mustafa Dirani filed a tort claim against the State of Israel, arguing that he had suffered two incidents of sexual abuse at the hands of his interrogators. Among other things, the statement of claim alleged that a major in Unit 504, nicknamed “Captain George,” inserted a baton into Dirani’s anus. According to Dirani, during his interrogation he underwent torture, including shaking, humiliation, beatings, sleep deprivation, and being tied in a crouching position for prolonged hours, and for the purpose of humiliating him he was interrogated while naked.[10] Interrogation tapes filmed by Unit 504 were shown on the television program “Uvda” on December 15, 2011.[11] In one of the videos, the interrogator George is seen calling one of the other interrogators and ordering him to pull down Dirani’s pants in front of him and threatening Dirani with rape if he did not provide information[12].

In July 2011 the Supreme Court ruled, by majority opinion, that Dirani could continue to pursue the tort claim he had filed against the State of Israel, despite the fact that he lives in an enemy state and had even returned to involvement in hostile activity against the state[15]. At the state’s request, a further hearing was held, and in January 2015 it was ruled that Dirani’s claim should be dismissed, on the grounds that after Dirani was released from detention he returned to the ranks of a terrorist organization whose aim is to act against the state and even bring about its destruction, and therefore he is not entitled to make use of the institutions of the state for his own purposes.[16]

From here it seems you can see that there is relevance to the question of whether the plaintiff lives in an enemy state or not. I also seem to remember that there is a regulation from the British legal era that says an enemy cannot sue.

My answers are not legal ones (I am not an expert in international law). I was stating my opinion on the moral plane.
As for Dirani, the problem was not that he lives in an enemy state but that he is an active enemy. Someone who lives in an enemy state can certainly sue for compensation, but only if something unlawful was done to him and not within the framework of the war (that is, incidental harm to innocents). I assume that these acts of torture were not done just in order to abuse him but in order to get information out of him. Therefore these are acts of war. If they were simply abusing him, even if it was in a Shin Bet facility as part of the interrogation, then even as an enemy he might perhaps be able to sue for compensation, and that was the discussion taking place there.
By the way, the argument that if he is working for the destruction of the state that prevents him from having the right to use its institutions sounds to me pretty dubious legally. Every enemy soldier (a prisoner of war) is in that situation, and I assume no one would say that about a soldier. They said it about Dirani because he is a terrorist.
Moreover, there is a double-edged argument here: if the abuse exceeded what was permitted or was done for the sake of abuse alone, then even if Dirani has no right to sue, the state should have investigated and punished those who did it (criminal punishment, regardless of Dirani’s civil suit). And if they did not exceed what was permitted—then what difference does it make that he is an enemy? There is no cause of action.

With God’s help, 25 Shevat 5782

It seems that the terrorist organizations because of whose murderous actions the IDF must carry out defensive and preventive operations—they are the ones obligated to compensate for the damages caused during the fighting to innocent civilians, Jews and Arabs alike.

Best regards, Hasdai Bezalel Duvdevani Kirshen-Kwas