Q&A: Moral Fact Versus Authority
Moral Fact Versus Authority
Question
1. It seemed that the Rabbi answered this question in the course of his remarks, but I wasn’t able to understand what the answer actually is. I’d be glad if you could define the difference for me.
What is the difference between the claim “God is a binding authority” and David Enoch’s claim that any ethical proposition is binding because it is binding? Seemingly, the claim that God binds us is itself an ethical claim that does not need a source and cannot have a source.
2. Regarding the question of who is truly moral, Huckleberry Finn or Kant: seemingly, the question that should be asked is, “If both Kant and Finn happened to hate you for some reason, with whom would you prefer to be on the boat?” The answer to that would actually be the measure of which of them is truly moral and not just acting on instincts.
Answer
1. The difference is the intuition/common sense. After all, at the basis of every justification there must be a principle that itself has no justification outside itself (an axiom). But an unreasonable axiom requires justification, and therefore should not be accepted. A reasonable axiom can stand on its own. Commitment to a divine command is a reasonable axiom. It does not require external justification. But commitment to facts that stand somewhere for some reason in the world of ideas does not seem reasonable. Why should I listen to and be bound by that pile of stones?
2. You’re right that to the second question I would answer that Kant is preferable. But it is not equivalent to the first one. I would prefer to be with Huckleberry Finn (when he doesn’t hate me), because he is nicer and more pleasant.
Discussion on Answer
He is compelled by his beliefs and exempt. No one should be punished for something he does not believe in.
He should not be punished for something he does not believe in—meaning, he should not absorb the “desert” component of punishment. Someone who does not use that detached component in punishment at all (and on the contrary sees it as a crime), but only other components like deterrence, revenge, and prevention, is exempt from having to appeal to that person’s beliefs.
You assume it’s additive, but that is a mistaken assumption. Otherwise someone acting under coercion or by accident would not be exempt. In fact, the combination of the components of punishment is not additive (that is, it is not a simple or weighted sum of them). We want to punish in order to deter, but if the person himself does not deserve a sanction, then there is no justification for imposing punishment on him even for deterrence, because the blood of the others who would benefit is no redder than his blood, since he loses out by being punished when he does not deserve it. Only if he deserves a sanction can the offender then be used to deter others.
[If we are going to discuss it from the side of such objections (and not the thing itself on intuitive grounds, which of course not every mind can accept), one could say that we exempt someone acting under coercion or by accident because that pays off more for everyone: all upright people will fear that perhaps they too may sin under coercion or by accident and be punished. Just as we don’t harvest organs from random people. In order to deter, of course you need to punish specifically the offender. And if, in utmost secrecy, they frame some righteous person, then strictly speaking that is indeed like punishing the offender.]
Enoch’s claim is ultimately just belief in idols.
If God is the cause of everything, then it cannot be that there are other things that obligate you and that He is not their cause.
(This answer was given irrespective of the fact that the concept of “obligating” is a purely psychological concept.)
Tirgitz, beyond the fact that I do not agree, I do not understand your approach. What bothers you about exempting someone who is unaware? Let him be exempt for your reasons. How is that different from coercion?
Because most people do not fear that they may change their views, but they do fear that they may err under coercion or by accident. And two more reasons: [a] on the contrary, someone who thinks that in principle the act is permitted is in practice even more dangerous than someone who chose evil. To “rehabilitate” someone who murdered over a parking dispute is much easier than to “rehabilitate” an ideological Palestinian terrorist. [b] It gives people an incentive (a subconscious bribe) to hold views that permit things for them, when there is no price tag attached to forming an opinion; the power of casuistic arguments is in practice almost unlimited, and you can’t rely on them.
[Of course, according to the above, there is also no need for the punishment system to rely on the assumption of free choice. In my view, that is a good indication of a stable system.]
Can commitment to a divine command be understood as an axiom that also binds one who claims there is no such commitment, such that based on my intuition I should see him as inconsistent? Or is someone who claims there is no such commitment exempt from moral matters, and I have no right to punish him from within my own position?