Q&A: Doubt Regarding Tekhelet
Doubt Regarding Tekhelet
Question
Hello Rabbi,
For a person who is uncertain whether the commonly used tekhelet today is the original tekhelet that the Torah spoke about:
1. Is there any problem nevertheless with wearing the tekhelet? Is this a case of “do not add”? Any other prohibition?
2. If not, is he not obligated to wear it because of the rule that in a Torah-level doubt one must be stringent?
3. If the answer to 2 is yes, then in a case of definite animal suffering, does a Torah-level doubt still require stringency? (I assume this depends on the source of the prohibition of animal suffering, whether it is Torah-level or rabbinic.)
Thank you
Answer
- In my opinion, no. Wearing indigo dye is plainly forbidden under the laws of commerce. And “do not add” is not relevant here, because if this is not tekhelet then you are not adding anything. Precisely if this is in fact tekhelet, there would be room to discuss whether someone who wears it like the Raavad (two strings) or like Rashi and Tosafot (four) violates “do not add” according to Maimonides (one string).
- In my opinion, definitely yes. There is indeed an argument by some later authorities (Rabbi Akiva Eiger) that in a doubt of this kind there is no rule at all to be stringent, since even if you do wear tekhelet, if this is not the real tekhelet then you have not fulfilled the obligation of tekhelet. The obligation to be stringent applies only when, by being stringent, you have certainly covered all possibilities. But simply speaking, one should be stringent even in such a situation, and the Rebbe of Radzin discussed this at length in his book.
- I didn’t understand the question. How did we get to animal suffering?
Discussion on Answer
I’m not aware of that. Beyond that, killing is not suffering. Pain is suffering.
For some reason my comment didn’t go up.
I didn’t understand why that distinction is relevant. Killing an animal is at least as severe as causing an animal suffering. If causing an animal suffering is forbidden, then killing an animal is forbidden at least on the same level. Isn’t that so?
In any case, even you would agree that there is a moral problem with killing animals (without getting into the nuance that morality is between human beings. There is a values issue here.)
In any case, the question is more general: does a definite moral prohibition (like killing an animal) get set aside in the face of a Torah-level doubt?
Fine, I’ll repeat again that I disagree. Killing an animal is not animal suffering, but perhaps “do not destroy”. And where there is a need, there is no prohibition of “do not destroy.”
If there were a moral prohibition against a Torah-level doubt, there would be room to discuss it.
3. From what I know, snails are killed in the process of preparing the tekhelet. Am I mistaken?